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ABSTRACT 
JEONGYOUNG PARK: The Effects of State Minimum Staffing Standards on Staffing, 
Quality of Care, and Financial Performance in Nursing Homes 
(Under the direction of Sally C. Stearns) 
 
This dissertation attempts to provide a comprehensive understanding about the 
impacts of state minimum staffing standards and to determine unbiased estimates of the 
effect of staffing on quality of nursing home care.  Specifically, by exploiting differences in 
the timing of staffing standard changes for the 50 states and the District of Columbia from 
1998 to 2001, this study conducts three empirical analyses to examine (1) the total effects of 
staffing standards on staffing choices and on quality of care, (2) the total effect of staffing 
standards on financial performance, and (3) the underlying (causal) relationship between 
staffing and quality of care.     
The major findings are as follows: (1) Increases in staffing standards matter 
particularly for the subset of nursing homes with staffing level previously below or close to 
new standards, whereas the results show consistent beneficial effects for the rate of restraint 
use and the number of total deficiencies at all types of facilities.  (2) Increases in staffing 
standards have significant negative impacts on total margin at nonprofit facilities with 
relatively low staffing.  (3) When endogeneity of staffing is taken into account, the results 
support the persistent beneficial effects of increasing total staff hours on the onset of pressure 
sores, contractures, and catheter use.   
 iv
The analyses performed in this dissertation are particularly relevant to the era of 
growth in the aged population and provides important policy implications.  Structural 
differences in nursing home behavior in response to increased staffing standards suggest that 
future policy should be developed by emphasizing on stragetic planning and operative 
management of scarce labor resources to achieve both better quality and greater efficiency.  
In order to achieve the benefits of mandatory staffing standards, the federal and state 
governments should determine the additional costs and develop a plan to adequately fund the 
required increases in staffing levels.  The monitoring and enforcement of federal and state 
laws and regulations are necessary.  Lastly, the findings suggest that differences in financial 
performance may result in differences in quality produced and vice versa.  An integrative 
perspective which explores the relationship between quality and financial performance may 
be insightful in the future research.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Quality of nursing home care is an important public policy issue, especially given the 
aging of the population.  Inadequate nurse staffing could reduce the use of timely health 
interventions, which may result in deterioration of resident health outcomes because of 
delayed care (IOM, 1993).  Public concerns about the quality of care led researchers and 
policymakers to develop and implement staffing standards to ensure higher quality of nursing 
home care.  Over the past 10 years, a number of states have implemented or expanded 
minimum staffing standards that exceed current federal guidelines.  While some states have 
considered or implemented a broader array of reforms to help providers recruit and retain a 
stable, well-trained workforce, the minimum staffing standards in nursing homes have 
become a major subject for debate at the state and national level because of the importance of 
nurse staffing levels to the processes and outcomes of care (Harrington, 2005a, 2005b; PHI 
and NCDHHS, 2004). 
Considerable research has been devoted to the issues of the number and composition 
of nursing staff required to meet the needs of nursing home residents (Abt, 2001; Carter and 
Porell, 2003; Castle, 2000; Cohen and Spector, 1996; GAO, 2002a; Harrington et al., 2000b; 
Kayser-Jones et al., 2003; Weech-Maldonade et al., 2004).  Not surprisingly, most findings 
have suggested that a higher nursing staff level (i.e., more care hours per resident day) and 
more highly skilled nursing staff mix (i.e., a greater proportion of professional nursing staff 
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such as registered nurses) are associated with higher quality of care in nursing homes 
measured by various process and outcome indicators. 
Despite the public policy importance, little analysis has been done to link the staffing 
standards to outcomes, either with regard to the level of staffing, quality of care, or financial 
performance in nursing homes.  The role of minimum staffing standards was not directly 
considered in the earlier empirical work, and little is known about whether the staffing 
requirements lead to higher levels of staffing and quality of care, or whether or to what extent 
staffing requirements influence financial performance in nursing homes.  This dissertation 
attempts to provide a broad understanding of impacts of state staffing standards.  Three 
investigations are provided.   
The first component uses a national sample of freestanding nursing homes to 
investigate whether the increased state minimum staffing standards have changed nursing 
home staffing levels and quality of care.  Between 1998 and 2001, 16 states implemented or 
expanded minimum staffing standards in excess of federal requirements with a goal of 
improving quality of care.  Information on the experience or outcomes associated with recent 
changes in state staffing standards was scanty, and researchers and policymakers had 
contradictory comments about the use of staffing standards.  Some critics contend that the 
federal and state governments have implemented regulations based on anecdotal information, 
with no research-based evidence (Kovner and Heinrich, 2000).  This study is the first to 
attempt to assess the impact of state minimum staffing standards on the level of staffing and 
quality of care by exploiting differences in the timing of standard changes for the 50 states 
and the District of Columbia from 1998 to 2001.     
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The second component examines the impacts of state minimum staffing standards on 
financial performance for a national sample of freestanding Medicare-certified skilled 
nursing facilities.  The cost of increasing the staffing levels under the current nursing 
workforce shortage can be substantial for both the government and nursing facilities.  The 
government paid 61% of the total costs and the Medicaid program alone paid 48% of the 
total $92 billion in nursing homes expenses in 2000 (Levit et al., 2002; Zhang and Grabowski, 
2004).  The call for greater staffing suggests that additional government funds could be 
required.  Moreover, staffing is the main input in the production of care accounting for nearly 
two-thirds of all nursing home costs, implementation or expansion of staffing standards may 
generate an industry-wide cost increase and place substantial financial pressures on nursing 
homes.  Further assessment of the financial impacts1 of minimum staffing standards for 
nursing homes is useful to understand the benefits and pitfalls of implementing or increasing 
mandated staffing standards.   
The third component of this dissertation uses the same national sample used in the 
first component to explore causal pathways of the relationship between staffing and quality 
of care by controlling for underlying staffing choices made by the facilities.  Existing 
estimates of the effect of staffing on quality may be biased because the prior estimates of the 
relationship between staffing and quality of care have been identified by cross-sectional 
variation, and the potential endogeneity of staffing has not been fully controlled for.  In the 
absence of some corrective statistical procedure, endogeneity of staffing may result in a 
spurious correlation between staffing and quality of care.  The purpose of the third analysis is 
to assess longitudinally whether in fact changes in total staffing hours lead to changes in 
                                                 
1 Assessing fiscal impacts on the federal or state’s budget is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  In this 
dissertation, the impact of minimum staffing standards limits to the finances of individual home.   
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quality of care while controlling for the potential endogeneity of staffing.  This approach 
helps to resolve the gaps in the previous literature on the relationship between staffing and 
quality of care. 
The remaining chapters of this dissertation are organized as follows: Chapter II 
provides background on minimum staffing standards and reviews the relevant literature.  
Chapter III provides a theoretical framework for the three research questions.  The main data 
and construction of key variables in the empirical analyses are described in Chapter IV and V, 
respectively.  The empirical models, specific analytic issues related to each research question, 
and results are presented in Chapter VI, VII, and VIII, respectively.  Finally, Chapter IX 
discusses overall results and their implications with regard to current nursing home staffing 
policy and future policy development. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
  
 This chapter provides updated background information about minimum staffing 
standards and their implementation.  Section 2.1 outlines main features of federal and state 
minimum staffing standards.  In addition, it discusses why federal and state government set 
and/or changed the minimum staffing standards, and how compliance has been monitored 
and enforced.  Section 2.2 discusses the minimum staffing standards in the context of major 
policy changes in Medicaid and Medicare during the study period, with a brief review of the 
major impacts of these changes on nursing home staffing.  Finally, Section 2.3 reviews the 
previous work on the effects of minimum staffing standards and the relationship between 
nursing home staffing and quality of care. 
 
2.1.  Overview of Minimum Staffing Standards (MSS) 
2.1.1.  Factors leading to MSS 
Poor quality of care in nursing homes has been a national concern to policymakers 
and the public since the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging first began hearings in 
1963 (Harrington et al., 2004).  Reports about poor quality as well as the active efforts of 
many consumer advocacy and professional organizations called for stronger federal 
regulations (IOM, 1986).   
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In an attempt to improve the quality of care in nursing homes, the federal government 
strengthened national staffing standards through the Nursing Home Reform Act (NHRA) 
which was enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA).  
OBRA 87 requires nursing facilities that wish to be certified for participation in Medicare or 
Medicaid to have: licensed nurses (LNs) on duty 24 hours a day; a registered nurse (RN) on 
duty at least 8 hours a day, 7 days a week; and a registered nurse director of nursing (DON).  
Facilities should also have sufficient nursing staff to maintain the physical, mental and 
psychosocial well-being of residents (Zhang and Grabowski, 2004). 
Although it was expected that the OBRA 87 would improve quality, the existing 
federal staffing standards have come under scrutiny because a number of studies identified 
that many nursing homes still had quality of care problems (GAO, 1998, 1999, 2000).  In 
response to continuing concerns about the quality of care in nursing homes, President Clinton 
and Senators Grassley, Breaux, and Reed called for increased nurse staffing in nursing homes 
in 2000 (Harrington, 2005b).  Congressman Waxman and other in the U.S. House of 
Representatives introduced legislation in 2001 and 2002 calling for minimum federal staffing 
levels for nursing homes, improved staff reporting requirements, and improved regulation of 
staffing (Harrington, 2005b).  Several different federal minimum staffing levels have been 
examined by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM), and other experts since OBRA 87.   
The CMS reported the findings of research conducted by Abt Associates in their 
Phase I and II studies (Abt, 2000, 2001).  These reports found a relationship between staffing 
levels and quality of care.  In particular, the reports found evidence of critical thresholds for 
nursing staff, below which nursing home residents were at risk for serious quality of care 
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problems, and above which no measurable increases in quality of care were observed with 
additional nursing staff.  The Phase I report (2000) indicated that staffing levels below a 
specific threshold (3.9 hours per resident day) could result in serious resident impairment.  A 
more recent study (2001) reported a minimum of 4.1 hours per resident day (HPRD) was 
needed to prevent harm to residents with long stays (90 days or more) in nursing homes.  Of 
this total, 0.75 RN HPRD, 0.55 licensed practical nurse (LPN) HPRD, and 2.8 nurse aide 
(NA) HPRD were needed to protect residents.  Although CMS did not make a 
recommendation for a federal minimum standard for nursing homes, the reports were clear 
about the potential jeopardy to residents in nursing homes without adequate nurse staffing 
levels.   
A recent IOM study (2003) recommended at least one registered nurse on duty at all 
times and staffing levels that increase as the number of patients increases.  Higher minimum 
staffing standards have also been strongly recommended by an expert panel on nursing 
homes sponsored by the Hartford Institute for Geriatric Nursing (Harrington et al., 2000a).  
In addition to the RN DON, the panel recommended a full-time assistant DON for nursing 
homes with more than 100 beds, at least one RN nursing supervisor on duty at all times, and 
one full-time RN director of in-service education in nursing homes with more than 100 beds.  
The experts recommended a ratio of 1 direct caregiver to 5 residents on the day shift (1.6 
HPRD), 1 to 10 for evening (0.8 HPRD), and 1 to 15 for nights (0.53 HPRD).  Finally the 
panel recommended nurse staffing levels be adjusted upward for residents with higher 
nursing care needs.  Overall, the experts recommended a minimum 4.44 HPRD of total 
nursing time (Harrington et al., 2000a). 
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While debate over the federal standards has intensified, some states have established 
or increased their staffing standards.  Findings from case studies of eight states (e.g., 
Arkansas, California, Delaware, Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, Vermont, and Wisconsin) with 
recent changes in their staffing standards indicated that activities to increase state staffing 
requirements typically came about as a reaction to publicity about quality problems and with 
the goal of improving the quality of resident care in nursing homes (DHHS, 2003).  
Advocacy groups were frequently involved in promoting state action in response to the 
publicity.  Arkansas experienced high-profile lawsuits concerning nursing home quality, and 
California has been the subject of some highly negative reviews by the federal General 
Accounting Office (GAO).  In Ohio and Wisconsin, state officials responded to a stream of 
consumer complaints about inadequate staffing, and in Vermont, union-sponsored organizing 
activity was instrumental in generating support for that state’s new standards.  Such activities 
resulted in important improvement in nurse staffing standards through changes in state 
legislation and regulation (DHHS, 2003). 
More generally, a number of political scientists have sought to understand why states 
choose particular public policies.  Most assessments have focused on historical and cultural 
attitudes as well as political and socioeconomic variables in explaining state variation in 
policies (Miller, 2005).  The willingness of the federal government and states to increase 
nursing staffing standards may also depend on the general economy within states, tax 
revenues available within states, the action of advocacy organizations or interest groups, the 
political orientation of state legislators and elected officials, and many other considerations 
(Harrington, 2005b).   
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2.1.2.  Variation in MSS across states 
2.1.2.1. Variation in standards implemented 
By the year 2003 a total of 36 states supplemented the nominal federal guidelines 
with more stringent staffing standards which require either a certain number of nursing care 
hours per resident day or a specified staff-to-resident or staff-to-bed ratio.  As Table 2.1 
shows, the other 14 states and the District of Columbia did not have minimum staffing 
standards beyond the federal requirements for Medicare and Medicaid participating facilities. 
Table 2.1  State Minimum Staffing Standards Type for Nursing Homes by 2003 
 State Standards Type 
AL Alabama Federal 
AK Alaska Staff-to-occupied bed ratio 
AZ Arizona Federal 
AR Arkansas Staff-to-resident ratio 
CA California HPRD 
CO Colorado HPRD 
CT Connecticut HPRD 
DE Delaware HPRD + staff-to-resident ratio 
DC District of Columbia Federal 
FL Florida HPRD + staff-to-resident ratio 
GA Georgia HPRD  
HI Hawaii Federal 
ID Idaho HPRD 
IL Illinois HPRD 
IN Indiana HPRD 
IA Iowa HPRD 
KS Kansas HPRD + staff-to-resident ratio 
KY Kentucky Federal 
LA Louisiana HPRD 
ME Maine Staff-to-resident ratio 
MD Maryland HPRD + staff-to-resident ratio 
MA Massachusetts HPRD 
MI Michigan HPRD + staff-to-resident ratio 
MN Minnesota HPRD 
MS Mississippi HPRD 
MO Missouri Federal 
MT Montana Staff-to-bed ratio 
NE Nebraska Federal 
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NV Nevada Federal 
NH New Hampshire Federal 
NJ New Jersey HPRD 
NM New Mexico HPRD 
NY New York Federal 
NC North Carolina HPRD 
ND North Dakota Federal 
OH Ohio HPRD + staff-to-resident ratio 
OK Oklahoma HPRD + staff-to-resident ratio 
OR Oregon Staff-to-resident ratio 
PA Pennsylvania HPRD + staff-to-resident ratio 
RI Rhode Island Federal 
SC South Carolina Staff-to-resident ratio 
SD South Dakota Federal 
TN Tennessee HPRD 
TX Texas HPRD + staff-to-resident ratio 
UT Utah HPRD 
VT Vermont HPRD 
VA Virginia Federal 
WA Washington Federal 
WV West Virginia HPRD 
WI Wisconsin HPRD  
WY Wyoming HPRD 
Note: HPRD=hours per resident day 
Sources: (1) Harrington, C. (2002). Nursing Home Staffing Standards. The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid 
and the Uninsured. (2) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation Office of Disability (2003). State Experiences With Minimum Nursing Staff Ratio For Nursing 
Facilities: Finding From Case Studies of Eight States. 
 
State staffing standards differ across states and vary in terms of which types of staff 
are regulated and how standards are defined (DHHS, 2003).  Of the 36 states with staffing 
standards, 29 states set standards for total nursing staff, and 27 states establish direct care 
staff (including RN, LPN, and NA) standards.  Thirty two states have licensed nurse 
requirements, and 9 states set specific registered nurse requirements.  For example, 
California requires 3.2 hours of direct care per resident day while Maine maintains a direct 
care staff-to-resident ratio of 1 to 5 during the day, 1 to 10 in the evening, and 1 to 15 at night 
in 2003.  Twenty one states have staffing mandates defined as staff hours per resident day, 6 
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states set mandates in ratios, and 9 states establish standards in terms of both staff hours per 
resident day and ratio.   
Some states (e.g., Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Montana, Pennsylvania) 
have more complex standards in terms of facility size, shift, staff type, and licensure type.  
Arkansas, for example, has standards that facilities containing 70 beds or more must employ 
an RN supervisor during the day and evening shifts; facilities containing 100 beds or more 
must employ an RN supervisor during night shift, a full-time assistant director of nursing, 
and a full-time RN director in service education in addition to previous requirements (DHHS, 
2003).  New Jersey requires 2.5 hours of direct care per resident day and additional hours of 
direct care for residents receiving special care such as wound care, tube feeding, and oxygen 
therapy.  Given these variations, direct comparisons across states should be made with 
caution.  
 
2.1.2.2. Variation in timing of implementation 
While the details differ by state, a total of 16 states made major changes to their 
staffing standards from 1998 to 2001 with the goal of improving quality of care in nursing 
homes (Table 2.2).  Fourteen states (Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, 
Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and 
Wisconsin) increased existing state staffing standards.  California increased direct care staff 
standards from 3 HPRD to 3.2 HPRD in 2000, and Maine increased direct care ratios from 
2.07 HPRD to 2.93 HPRD in 2001.  Three states (Arkansas, Delaware, and Oklahoma) made 
more comprehensive changes to staffing requirements, using a phase-in period to implement 
standards by shift and staff type.  In 2000, Delaware passed Eagle’s law which established 
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minimum staffing standards in nursing homes.  This law phases in three standards of care 
over time.  Facilities must provide at least 3 direct care HPRD in phase I (2001), 3.28 HPRD 
in phase II (2002), and 3.67 HPRD in phase III (2003).  Wisconsin increased direct care staff 
HPRD and had case-mix adjusted staffing standards for intensive skilled nursing care, skilled 
nursing care, and intermediate care based on resident need.  Minnesota rescinded a case-mix 
adjusted ratio in 2001 and is developing standards with conversion to a Medicaid payment 
methodology based on the Minimum Data Set (MDS) and Resource Utilization Groups 
(RUGs) (34 case-mix levels).  Two states (New Mexico and Vermont) implemented new 
staffing standards in 2000 and 2001, respectively.  Starting in 2001, Vermont required 
nursing homes to provide an average of 2 HPRD of nurse aide care as part of an average 3 
HPRD of overall nursing care.     
Table 2.2  Summary of Changes in State Minimum Staffing Standards, 1998-2001 
Status State (year of legislative change) 
Modification  AR (1998, 2001, (2003))* 
CA (2000) 
DE (2001, (2002, 2003))* 
FL (2001)  
GA (1998)  
IA (2000)  
ME (2001)  
 
MN (2001)  
MS (2000)  
OH (2001)  
OK (2000, 2001, (2002, 2003))* 
PA (1999)  
SC (1999) 
WI (1999) 
 
Establishment NM (2000) 
VT (2001) 
 
No change AL, AK, AZ, CO, CT, DC, HI, ID, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, MD, MA, MI, MO, 
MT, NE, NV, NH, NJ, NY, NC, ND, OR, RI, SD, TN, TX, UT, VA, WA, 
WV, WY 
Sources: (1) Harrington, C. (2002). Nursing Home Staffing Standards. The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid 
and the Uninsured. (2) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation Office of Disability (2003). State Experiences With Minimum Nursing Staff Ratio For Nursing 
Facilities: Finding From Case Studies of Eight States. 
* Multiple changes/Phase-in 
 
2.1.3.  Compliance with MSS 
2.1.3.1. Monitoring process 
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The government is the dominant purchaser of nursing home care by means of the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs, with state Medicaid programs covering approximately 
50% of all nursing homes expenditures and 70% of all bed days (Zhang and Grabowski, 
2004).  Since 1965, when the Medicare and Medicaid programs were established, nursing 
home regulation has been a joint federal and state responsibility (GAO, 1999, 2000; 
Harrington et al., 2004).  State agencies are responsible for certifying facilities that meet the 
conditions for participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs, and for licensing 
nursing facilities if they meet state legal requirements.  Oversight includes routine and 
follow-up surveys to assess compliance with federal standards and enforcement activities to 
ensure that identified deficiencies are corrected.  States also enforce their own licensing 
requirements in all state-licensed nursing homes, and check for compliance with these 
licensure requirements during standard surveys.   
At the time of the annual facility survey by state agencies, CMS requires nursing 
homes to submit a uniform staffing report on nurses by type of staff (for a two-week period 
prior to the survey).  These data are reported on the federal Online Survey Certification and 
Reporting (OSCAR) system.  Most states’ surveyors take a sample of staff schedules, time 
sheets, or payroll records to determine facility compliance.  In addition to the survey process, 
Arkansas and Vermont periodically review monthly staffing data submitted by facilities, 
which helps state officials monitor staffing levels.  Most states also monitor staffing when 
investigating any complaints about poor quality of care that may be related to insufficient 
staffing.   
 
2.1.3.2. Enforcement process   
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Nursing homes that are not compliant with a staffing standard receive a deficiency 
citation labeled “A” through “L” depending on the scope (the number of patients adversely 
affected) and severity (the extent of patient harm) (GAO, 1999).  Table 2.3 provides the 
scope and severity grid for the Medicare and Medicaid compliance deficiencies.  
Table 2.3  Scope and Severity Grid for Deficiencies 
 Scope  
Severity Category 
Isolated Pattern Widespread 
Immediate jeopardy 
(i.e., actual or potential for death/serious injury) J K L 
    
Actual harm G H I 
    
Potential for more than minimal harm D E F 
    
Potential for minimal harm  
(i.e., substantial compliance) A B C 
Source: GAO. (1999). Nursing Homes: Additional Steps Needed to Strengthen Enforcement of Federal Quality 
Standards. Washington DC. 
 
Facilities with deficiencies at the C level or below are considered to be in “substantial 
compliance” with the regulations and are not subject to sanctions.  Facilities with deficiencies 
that have a potential for more than minimal harm (D or E level) are required to submit a plan 
of correction.  If the harm is serious or the problem persistent, more severe remedies are 
available, including directed plans of correction, civil monetary penalties, and denial of 
payment for new or current admissions.  Facilities with deficiencies rated as F through I are 
required to receive a denial of payment for new or current admissions or civil monetary 
penalties of $50 to $3,000 per day.  Deficiencies that cause actual or potential for death or 
serious injury (J through L) are categorized as causing immediate jeopardy and are subject to 
such sanctions as temporary management, termination, and civil monetary penalties of 
$3,000 to $10,000 per day of noncompliance.   
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Under the shared responsibility for Medicare-certified nursing homes, state agencies 
identify and categorize deficiencies and make referrals with proposed sanctions to CMS.  
CMS is responsible for imposing sanctions and collecting monetary penalties (GAO, 1999).  
However, the federal government does not require states to report state penalties and fines or 
other state enforcement actions to the federal government (Tsoukalas et al., 2006).  
Furthermore, although the regulatory system is shared between CMS and states, the 
implementation of the regulations has been largely devolved to the states (Harrington et al., 
2004).  CMS has detailed requirements for states regarding nursing home surveys, but the 
state survey process and enforcement activities vary widely across states in the number and 
type of deficiencies issued, collection and use of penalties and fines, and intermediate 
sanctions (DHHS, 2003; GAO, 1999, 2000; Harrington et al., 2004).   
Harrington et al. (2004) conducted a study of state nursing home enforcement 
systems and ranked all states across the five enforcement indicators in 1999: (1) average 
number of deficiencies per facility, (2) percent of facilities with deficiencies, (3) percent of 
facilities cited for harm or jeopardy, (4) percent of cited for substandard care, and (5) average 
civil monetary penalties issued per facility.  Washington, Arkansas, California, Oregon, and 
Idaho were ranked as the top five states with the most stringent enforcement activities, while 
the lowest were Colorado, the District of Columbia, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Vermont.      
In addition to variation in state enforcement stringency, poor enforcement systems 
and the ineffective use of both intermediate and permanent sanctions have been documented.  
Only a few facilities were terminated from the Medicare or Medicaid programs, and most of 
these were later reinstated and continued to have deficiencies (Harrington et al., 2004).  
States issued many deficiencies, but few deficiencies resulted in penalties and fines in 
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general (Harrington et al., 2004; Tsoukalas et al., 2006).  According to a recent 
Commonwealth Fund-supported study on the collection and use of funds from civil money 
penalties and fines from nursing homes, out of a total of $61 million in collected penalties 
over the 1999-2005 period, 32 states spent $28 million on projects to relocate residents, train 
employees, and explore opportunities to promote resident-centered care (Tsoukalas et al., 
2006).  Most of the funding, however, was used for short-term or one-time projects.  State 
officials reported that few projects reported outcomes and most did not have any formal 
evaluations.  
Various factors predict the variation in enforcement activities across states: political 
variables, facility characteristics, competition measure, state generosity measure, and quality 
of care indicator (Harrington et al., 2004).  Staff turnover, recruitment problems and fiscal 
problems at the state agency level may hamper survey and enforcement efforts (GAO, 2000).  
More standardization of survey and enforcement process across states may be necessary for 
minimum staffing standards to be effective in order to protect and promote the quality of care 
in nursing homes. 
 
2.1.3.3. Exemptions process 
 An important issue in considering the appropriateness of minimum staffing standards 
is whether the nursing workforce will be adequate to meet higher workforce requirement that 
would result from adoption of a staffing requirement (Abt, 2001).  A large number of studies 
have referred to the existence of a current nursing shortage and recruitment problems (Abt, 
2001; Buerhaus et al., 2000; Grabowski et al., 2004b).  In particular, the RN shortage 
continues to be somewhat problematic (Buerhaus et al., 2000).  Buerhaus et al. (2000) 
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projected that the size of the RN workforce will be nearly 20 percent below projected 
requirements by 2020.  With the decline over the past twenty years in the number of younger 
women entering the nursing profession, the nation’s nursing workforce is aging and fewer 
RNs are choosing to work in long-term care facilities (Grabowski et al., 2004b).  Certain 
rural and urban areas may experience difficulty in recruiting required additional nursing staff.   
In practice, therefore, some states do allow waivers of licensed nursing staff (i.e., 
federal staffing requirements) under limited conditions such as the inability to recruit the 
required personnel despite efforts or location in a rural area with an insufficient labor supply 
(DHHS, 2003).  For example, nursing homes in Delaware that cannot meet the required 
staffing standards may apply for a waiver through the Division of Long Term Care Residents 
Protection, waivers are subject to approval by the Delaware Nursing Home Residents Quality 
Assurance Commission (DHHS, 2003).  However, comprehensive data on state-specific 
exemptions processes are not available in the data sources used for this study.  
 
2.2.  MSS in the Context of Other Nursing Home Policy Changes 
Some studies have indicated that minimum staffing standards might not have much 
effect on staffing, because they are too low to affect average staffing in any appreciable way 
(DHHS, 2003; GAO, 2002c).  Staffing regulations mainly target a subset of facilities with 
relatively low staffing; therefore, staffing standards will not necessarily affect those facilities 
already at or above the standards.   
However, the amount of money that nursing homes have available to spend on 
increased staffing is heavily dependent on public (Medicaid or Medicare) payment systems.  
State initiatives on long-term care direct care workforce such as a wage pass-through and 
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major payment changes in Medicaid and Medicare occurred during the study period from 
1998 through 2001.  Those other policy changes for nursing homes most likely have a direct 
impact on staffing levels.  Therefore, teasing out the effects of MSS when implementation 
was accompanied by other regulatory changes can be very challenging.  This subsection 
provides a brief review of these changes and their impacts on nursing home staffing.   
 
2.2.1. Wage pass-through 
Recruitment and retention of adequate numbers of qualified direct care workers are 
major concerns for many long-term care providers.  A wage pass-through is the most 
commonly proposed strategy to achieve wage increases by funding benefit enhancements 
including health insurance, or implementing activities aimed at recruitment and retention of 
direct care staff (DHHS, 2003). 
From the 2003 survey by the Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute and North 
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Long Term Care, the majority 
(26 states, 59.1%) have funded a wage or benefit pass-through (PHI and NCDHHS, 2004).  
Typically, a wage pass-through has been implemented by a designating specified dollar 
amount ranging from $0.5 per hour to $2.14 per hour and $4.93 per resident day.  These 
states included Arkansas, Colorado, Massachusetts, Missouri, Oregon, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington.  Some states (e.g., California, Illinois, Maine, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana) established a certain percentage of the increased 
reimbursement rates.  For example, 80% of Minnesota’s recent 40% rate increase was 
earmarked for wages and benefits, while Illinois had a law requiring 73% of all rate increases 
be used for wages and benefits.   
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In spite of state initiatives on the long-term care direct care workforce, the effects of 
such initiatives have not been assessed across states.  Several case studies from California 
and Vermont reported that a wage pass-through had no observed effect on staffing levels 
(DHHS, 2003). 
 
2.2.2. Medicaid reimbursement rates 
Prior to 1998, state Medicaid officials opposed the Boren amendment2 because it was 
believed to cause states to spend too much on nursing home care relative to other services 
(Grabowski et al., 2004b).  The repeal of the Boren amendment in 1997 gave states 
considerable discretion in setting Medicaid payment methods and rates.  Given state budget 
shortfalls, several studies expressed concerns that states might reduce the rate of growth in 
Medicaid spending by cutting Medicaid payment rates for nursing homes (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2003; GAO, 2003; Grabowski et al., 2004a).   
However, in spite of concerns about widespread adoption of cost-saving state policies, 
the average Medicaid payment rates for nursing home care experienced a sizable increase 
since 1998 (GAO, 2003; Grabowski et al., 2004b).  Grabowski et al. (2004b) surveyed the 
average daily Medicaid nursing home payment rate during 1999-2002 and found that the 
inflation-adjusted average per diem rate was $105.8 in 1999, $108.14 in 2000, $112.21 in 
2001, and $117.73 in 2002, with an average annual increase of 3.8 percent.   
Increased Medicaid nursing home reimbursement generally accompanied increased 
state minimum staffing standards in many states, through a variety of mechanisms.  Some 
                                                 
2 The Boren amendment required that Medicaid nursing home rates be reasonable and adequate to meet the 
costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities in order to provide care and 
services in conformity with applicable state and federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards 
(Section 1902(a)(13)(A) of the Social Security Act).   
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states either used some form of bed tax or quality improvement fee to generate increased 
Medicaid revenues which were then passed back to facilities to help pay their labor costs.  
Other states implemented wage pass-through legislation designed to require facilities to 
spend the increased funding on staffing (DHHS, 2003).  For example, California increased 
Medicaid rates by approximately $2.96 per resident day to pass through wages and benefits 
to support higher standards in 2000 (Horowitz et al., 2003).  Delaware increased average 
daily rates from $105.22 a day in 1998 to $171.62 in 2002 and estimated that it has spent 
about $14.2 million in additional nursing home reimbursement expenditures since 
implementing the new MSS in 2001 (DHHS, 2003).  
Even though the previous work on the relationship between Medicaid payment levels 
and quality of or access to care has been inconclusive, more recent work has found that 
higher Medicaid payment rates were positively associated with staffing, nursing home care, 
and access to care for Medicaid recipients (Cohen and Spector, 1996; Grabowski, 2001a, 
2001b, 2002; Grabowski et al., 2004a). 
 
2.2.3.  Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) and post-PPS implications for nursing 
homes  
 Medicare payment rates have been considered to be less important to nursing home 
finances than Medicaid because only about 9% of patients on any one day nationwide have 
care paid for by Medicare, compared to about 69% for whom Medicaid is the primary payer 
(Abt, 2000).  However, until July 1998 Medicare reimbursed skilled nursing care on a 
retrospective cost-based system.  Medicare payments under cost-based reimbursement 
encouraged a rapid increase in the use and cost of skilled nursing care, and historically 
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helped subsidize Medicaid reimbursements that were felt to be less than adequate.  The 
Congress responded to the growth in Medicare skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) expenditure 
by adopting a prospective payment system for Medicare skilled nursing care as part of the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA).  Under the new PPS system, Medicare nursing facility 
rates are calculated prospectively based on the resident needs (acuity) for nursing care and 
therapy services.   
SNF PPS resulted in increased payments for some institutions and decreased 
payments for others.  Payment reductions were particularly severe for hospital-based SNFs, 
which historically have had shorter stays and much higher costs per day than freestanding 
facilities.  Many hospitals responded to the transition to SNF PPS by getting out of this line 
of business (Dalton et al., 2005).   
Because payments are fixed per resident day, the PPS system has strong incentives 
for providers to reduce spending, including that on nursing staff.  Even though new policy 
initiatives for higher standards are being considered in some states, the average hours of RN 
care in nursing homes declined dramatically since the PPS was implemented (Harrington and 
O’Meara, 2006; Konetzka et al., 2004b).   
The Congress responded to these concerns with temporary increases in the nursing 
component of the Medicare payment in order to encourage SNFs to increase their nursing 
staff.  The Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 1999 (BBRA) raised the daily payment rates 
by 20 percent for 15 high-cost RUGs beginning in April 2000.  BBRA also increased the 
daily rate for all RUGs by 4 percent for fiscal years 2001 and 2002.  The Benefits 
Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA) increased the nursing component of the 
SNF PPS rates by 16.66 percent effective in April 2001.   
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A report from the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO, 2002c) found that SNF 
staffing changed little after April 2001 when the increase in the nursing component of the 
PPS payment took effect.  This report, however, found that SNFs with relatively low staffing 
level in 2000 increased their staffing hours in 2001, and SNFs provided slightly less RN time 
and slightly more LPN and NA time in 2001. 
 
2.3.  Prior Studies 
2.3.1.  Effects of MSS on staffing and quality of care 
Several studies have examined state minimum staffing standards (Harrington, 2002; 
DHHS, 2003) and analyzed the relationship between state minimum staffing standards and 
actual staffing levels in nursing homes (Harrington, 2005a, 2005b; Mueller et al., 2006).  
Harrington (2005a, 2005b) reviewed the nurse staffing standards in nursing homes in all 
states and the District of Columbia in 2000 to 2001 through the Internet survey of state 
statutes and regulations.  Harrington found that the actual median nurse staffing level in 
nursing homes was substantially higher than each state’s staffing standards.  These studies, 
however, were based on simple comparisons between staffing standards and actual staffing 
levels without controlling for any facility and/or state characteristics.  While controlling for 
facility and state covariates, Mueller et al. (2006) investigated how state staffing standards 
were related to staff hours per resident day with data in 2004.  Using hierarchical linear 
models, their study found that facilities in states with high staffing standards had somewhat 
higher staffing on average than states with no standards or low standards, whereas facility 
staffing in states with low standards was not significantly different from that in states with no 
standards.   
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Several early studies examined the impacts of federal staffing standards on nursing 
home quality of care.  Janelli et al. (1994) found that the implementation of federal standards 
was associated with a decrease in restraint use, but this decrease in restraint use was 
accomplished largely without an increase in staffing among nursing homes in New York 
State.  Moseley (1996) examined the 1990 implementation of NHRA legislation on catheter 
use among Virginia nursing home residents, and found that post-NHRA catheterization rates 
were lower than the pre-NHRA rates.  These studies, however, were based on simple pre and 
post comparisons in one or several states.   
With national data and further methodological improvement, a recent paper by Zhang 
and Grabowski (2004) directly attempted to link the staffing requirements under NHRA with 
quality measures to determine whether the increased staffing requirements have translated 
into higher quality.  However, the results from their study were unable to link higher staffing 
under the NHRA to better quality except in certain cases where facilities had substandard 
staffing in the pre-NHRA period.  
Although previous studies have found some evidence that the federal staffing 
standards via NHRA have had a positive impact on nursing home quality of care, the federal 
staffing standards have not been changed since 1987, and the current federal requirements are 
far below the actual levels used by many facilities (Harrington, 2005a, 2005b; Zhang and 
Grabowski, 2004).  As described earlier, the state standards are much more stringent than 
federal mandated levels, so a number of nursing homes may have to respond to the state 
standards.  Variation also exists across states in terms of types of standards and the timing of 
legislation, as a total of 16 states made major changes to their staffing standards from 1998 to 
2001 period.  Furthermore, the federal BBA of 1997 repealed the Boren Amendment, giving 
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states additional flexibility in determining nursing home payment rates as well as other state 
Medicaid policies (Weiner and Stevenson, 1998).  As states gain freedom to set the Medicaid 
policies, it becomes important to understand whether and how these recent changes in the 
states might affect staffing decisions and quality of care in nursing homes.  
 
2.3.2.  Effects of MSS on financial performance 
With respect to the financial outcomes, considerable research has focused on the 
impacts of Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement changes on financial performance (Cohen 
and Dubay, 1990; Davis et al., 1998; GAO, 2002b; Nyman and Connor, 1994) and efficiency 
in nursing homes (Nyman and Bricker, 1989; Sexton et al., 1989).   
In understanding the potential cost implication of minimum staffing standards, it is 
important to estimate the cost increase to the federal or state government of paying facilities 
associated with the higher staffing requirements.  Since the Medicare and Medicaid programs 
together are responsible for more than half of the nursing home resident revenues, increasing 
minimum staffing standards will have a significant impact on the federal and state’s budget.  
Several studies estimated the potential costs to increase staff to meet various levels of new 
(or proposed) staffing standards to the Medicare or Medicaid programs (Abt, 2000; 
CADHSLCP, 2001; Decker and Dollard, 2001).  According to the American Health Care 
Association, the added costs to increase staff to meet the various ratios proposed by CMS 
sponsored study can range from approximately $3 billion to over $15 billion in 2001 alone 
(Decker and Dollard, 2001).  The exact cost implication for public payers may depend on 
how many facilities need to increase staff up to a new standard, or how adequate the current 
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Medicare and Medicaid payment rates are to allow facilities to staff at or above the new 
standards.   
However, the cost to the government might not be the same as the cost of compliance 
to facilities.  Although little analysis of estimating fiscal impacts on facilities has been done, 
a report to the California Legislature noted that the industry as a whole was already suffering 
financial stress facing increased staffing standards3 in 2000 (CADHSLCP, 2001).  For 
example, as of December 2000, six of the nation’s largest nursing home chains in California 
had fallen into Chapter XI bankruptcy, with approximately 11 percent of nursing homes 
filing for bankruptcy as of August 2000.  The financial stability of nursing homes is an 
important consideration.  Resident care can be disrupted as a result of financial problems; 
facility closure requires that the residents be moved to another facility, which causes a great 
deal of stress for the residents and their families (CADHSLCP, 2001).  In addition, any 
significant reduction of available beds in a community may reduce access to needed nursing 
care for frail and chronically ill patients (CADHSLCP, 2001). 
No prior work has directly examined whether or to what extent recent state minimum 
staffing standard changes might affect financial performance in nursing homes.  Further 
understanding of the effects of minimum staffing standards is obtained by assessing whether 
these pressures alter financial status in nursing homes.   
 
2.3.3.  Effects of staffing on quality: concerns about endogeneity of staffing 
Staffing may be the most critical element in ensuring high quality of care in nursing 
homes.  Using OSCAR data from 1992 to 1997, Castle (2000) examined the effect of staffing 
patterns on the use of physical restraints.  The full-time equivalent (FTE) hours of registered 
                                                 
3 California increased direct care staff standards from 3.0 HPRD to 3.2 HPRD in 2000.   
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nurses, licensed practical nurses, and nurse assistants per 100 beds were included as nurse 
staffing variables.  The results showed that facilities with more FTE RNs per 100 beds were 
less likely to increase restraint use, and those with more NAs per 100 beds were more likely 
to increase restraint use.  Harrington et al. (2000b) examined the relationship between 
different types of nursing home staffing hours per resident day and facility deficiencies 
identified by state surveyors under the federal nursing home certification regulations.  
Consistent with previous research, fewer RN staff hours were associated with more quality of 
care deficiencies and fewer NA hours had a consistent, significant negative relationship with 
total, quality of care, and quality of life deficiencies.  Using qualitative methods to analyze 
physical environment and organizational factors influencing end-of-life care in nursing 
homes, Kayser-Jones et al. (2003) argued that inadequate staffing and lack of supervision 
contributed to poor quality of care, with 54% of the residents having pressure ulcers and 82% 
of these residents subsequently dying.  Schnelle et al. (2004) compared California nursing 
homes on 27 quality of care processes, showing that the highest-staffed homes performed 
significantly better on 13 of 16 care processes implemented by NAs compared to lower-
staffed homes.  
Having certain types of staff may be more important than the total number of nursing 
staff hours per resident (IOM, 1986).  In a study using a nationally representative sample of 
nursing homes and residents, Cohen and Spector (1996) measured staffing intensity as the 
number of FTE staff by type of staff (RNs, LPNs, and NAs) per 100 residents adjusted for 
case mix.  They found that a higher RN intensity was associated with a lower rate of 
mortality, and a higher intensity of LPN staffing improved functional status measured by 
Activities of Daily Living (ADLs).  However, having more NAs had no impact on resident 
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outcomes.  These findings suggest that the professional mix of staff may be more important 
than the overall number, and that efforts to improve quality should focus on increasing the 
intensity of the professional staff.  Carter and Porell (2003) examined the relationship 
between nursing personnel expenses and hospitalization rates among residents of 527 nursing 
homes in Massachusetts using three years (1991-1994) of state quarterly Medicaid case mix 
reimbursement data linked with Medicare hospital claims.  Residents of nursing homes 
where nursing personnel expenses were more heavily allocated to LPNs versus RNs were at 
greater risk of hospitalization relative to similar residents of nursing facilities with relatively 
greater RN expenses.  Using a sample of 1,287 nursing homes in five states (New York, 
Maine, Vermont, Kansas, and South Dakota), Weech-Maldonado et al. (2004) found that 
greater use of RNs, both in total and relative to total nursing staff, was associated with a 
reduced likelihood of pressure ulcers or restraint use, and with better cognitive functioning 
and processes of delivering care such as lower use of restraints. 
  Porell et al. (1998) investigated resident and facility attributes associated with health 
outcomes for long-stay residents using quarterly survey data for Medicaid case mix 
reimbursement of nursing homes in Massachusetts from 1991 to 1994.  Regression models 
were estimated for survival, ADL functional status, incontinence status, and mental status 
outcomes.  Better survival chances were found in facilities devoting large fractions of their 
nursing expenses to LPNs, and better mental status was found in facilities with greater nurse 
FTE staffing levels per resident day.  The authors speculated that the lack of effect for RN 
staffing in their study may be due to their focus on long-stay rather than short-stay residents.  
More recently, Decker (2006) used National Nursing Home Survey Data from 1999 to show 
that RN staffing levels were associated with better outcomes measured by faster discharge to 
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the community for short-stay residents requiring primarily post-acute or rehabilitation care 
but not for long-stay residents.  The cross-sectional nature of the study, however, may have 
limited the ability to detect an effect for long-stay residents. 
Although most studies have found that higher nursing home staffing are associated 
with higher quality of care, the implication of previous findings may not reflect the true 
relationship between staffing and quality of care.  Many of these studies were based on the 
cross-sectional variation in staffing and quality of care, and did not control for the 
unobserved facility-specific characteristics that influence both the level of staffing and the 
quality of care.  For example, while increasing staffing may improve quality of care in a 
given facility, facilities with better managerial efficiency and leadership may also have been 
more likely to adopt a higher level of staffing and higher quality.  The omission of a measure 
of managerial efficiency and leadership will cause upward bias on the estimated effect of 
staffing on quality of care, with an overestimate of the effect of staffing on quality of care.  
Alternatively, if an unobserved measure of nursing practice skill is positively associated with 
quality of care but negatively related to the staffing, then the estimated effect of staffing on 
quality of care will be understated due to downward bias. 
Indeed, staffing may also be adjusted and chosen by facilities in response to the 
changes in residents’ health needs as well facilities’ internal resource allocation criteria.  In 
particular, staffing may be jointly determined with the level of quality of care.  It is possible 
that facilities that attract sicker residents, those more prone to adverse outcomes, tend to hire 
more staffing.  In that case, failure to account for this endogeneity or reverse causality would 
result in underestimates of the effect of staffing on outcomes.  Conversely, a facility with 
higher quality also may have more incentive to adopt a higher level of staffing.  As high 
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quality may drive a facility to adopt high staffing, quality and staffing may be simultaneously 
determined.  In this case, the omitted variable bias would likely result in an overestimation of 
the effect of staffing on outcomes in nursing homes. 
Analyses that do not control for unobserved facility heterogeneity and simultaneity 
(or reverse causality) will produce misleading results and policy implications.  Concerns 
about possible endogeneity of staffing due to facility heterogeneity and simultaneity have 
been raised by recent studies (Castle, 2005; Harrington and Swan, 2003; Zhang and 
Grabowski, 2004), and examined by several hospital staffing studies (McCue et al., 2003; 
Mark et al., 2004; Mark et al., 2005).  The use of a longitudinal model in a recent study of the 
effect of hospital staffing on mortality was shown to result in substantially smaller estimates 
than estimates from cross-sectional research (Mark et al., 2004), with a larger RN effect 
when endogeneity was addressed.   
Within the nursing home literature, a recent paper by Zhang and Grabowski (2004) is 
the only published study that directly controls for the unobserved time-invariant factors 
across homes using a first difference (FD) approach to fixed effects (FE) regression analyses.  
Using data from 5,092 nursing homes from 22 states linked across the pre-NHRA (1987) and 
post-NHRA (1993) period, they examined whether changes in staffing have been related to 
changes in quality before and after the federal staffing regulation.  However, as mentioned 
before, the results from this model were unable to link higher staffing under the NHRA to 
better quality except in certain cases where facilities had substandard staffing in the pre-
NHRA period. 
Although their study tried to control for unobserved and potentially confounded 
factors which are common across homes over the study period, FE estimators do not fully 
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correct for potential simultaneity, and are still biased if there are omitted variables correlated 
with staffing choice which are not common across homes over time.  Furthermore, their 
study analyzed a period prior to important legislation affecting the nursing home industry.   
CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In order to assess the effects of state minimum staffing standards on nursing home 
performance and to estimate the unbiased effect of staffing on quality of nursing home care, 
it is important to explore how nursing homes make input and output decisions in response to 
the various internal and external environments they face.  Section 3.1 provides an overview 
of economic models of nursing home behavior previously published in the nursing home 
literature.  Section 3.2 discusses the implications for nursing home input and output decisions 
in face of increased minimum staffing standards.  Section 3.3 summarizes several other 
factors affecting nursing home decisions.  Finally, three research questions with testable 
hypotheses and the significance of this study are described in Sections 3.4 and 3.5. 
 
3.1. Economic Models of Nursing Home Behavior 
 Over several decades, economists have developed theories to explain the behavior of 
health care organizations.  This subsection reviews the standard economic theories of nursing 
home behavior, and further explores the empirical models to explain nursing home decision-
making process.   
 
3.1.1. Nursing home objective function and the choice of quantity and quality 
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The standard economic model generally hypothesizes that health care organizations 
maximize the quantity and quality of services they provide (Newhouse, 1970; Phelps, 1997; 
Sloan, 2000).  An individual firm has a utility function (i.e., objective function) of the form 
),( QualityQuantityUU = , and gains utility from both quantity and quality of services.  After 
taking the full derivative of the utility function and then holding the change in utility equal to 
zero, the resulting expression quantityquality UUdQualitydQuantity // −=  gives the usual 
economic notion of quantity and quality trade-off in producing utility.  Regarding the best 
choice of quantity and quality, this result implies that firms will choose the point on the 
quantity and quality trade-off curve (i.e., the loci of equilibrium quantity-quality 
combinations) which yields the highest utility (i.e., tangent to the highest attainable 
indifference curve) (Phelps, 1997).   
Facilities may weigh quantity and quality considerations differently depending on 
various internal and external factors.  Evidence from empirical studies indicates that 
nonprofit firms will emphasize quality (Chou, 2002; O’Neill et al., 2003).  The decisions are 
also influenced by unobserved facility characteristics (e.g., norms, tastes of the facility 
administrator, etc.).   
This general idea of the utility-maximizing model has often been cited to explain 
behavior by nonprofit-dominated firms such as acute hospitals.  While a hospital can be 
better off with an increase in services provided, at the same time the hospital decision makers 
may desire to show professional excellence or technical virtuosity by stressing quality of care 
(Newhouse, 1970).     
Although the utility-maximizing behavior would be similar for nursing homes, the 
nursing home market differs from the acute hospital market in several fundamental ways.  
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For example, the nursing home industry is dominated by for-profit facilities sometimes 
facing excess demand (Norton, 2000).  Despite extensive theoretical examination of the 
utility-maximizing framework, in the real world, empirical models for the for-profit 
dominated nursing home industry often consider alternatives such as profit-maximization or 
cost-minimization models.  The following subsection (3.1.2) briefly introduces a formal 
model of profit-maximizing nursing home behavior frequently used in the nursing home 
literature.  
 
3.1.2.  Profit-maximizing level of quality 
Unlike acute hospitals, nearly two-thirds of nursing homes are for-profit facilities 
(Grabowski and Norton, 2005).  Thus, the majority of nursing homes have strong incentives 
to choose the profit-maximizing level of quality of care under a given level of quantity.  Most 
economic studies of quality of care in nursing homes during the 1980s and 1990s were based 
on Scanlon’s (1980) and Nyman’s (1985) models of a profit-maximizing monopolistically 
competitive market under a binding bed constraint.  Nonprofit facilities may have different 
goals from for-profit facilities but still must operate efficiently to stay in business under the 
current competitive circumstances; therefore, the essence of the same profit-maximization 
problem would be imbedded in the decisions of any nonprofit facilities (Konetzka et al., 
2004a).  In the absence of an alternative well-accepted model of nursing home behavior, 
therefore, a profit-maximization framework would appear to be a good starting point for 
analysis.   
Norton (2000), who synthesized the previous theoretical and empirical work, 
described the following model of nursing home quality of care.  Nursing homes care for two 
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types of patients: those who finance their care privately and those whose care is paid for 
through the Medicaid program.4  The sum of private and Medicaid residents cannot exceed 
the total capacity regulated by the Certificate of Need (CON) and construction moratoria 
legislation which restrict the supply of nursing home beds.  Nursing homes are assumed to 
provide the same level of quality to both private and Medicaid residents (i.e., quality as a 
public good), but only private residents can choose nursing homes based on quality.   
Private demand is a function of price and quality ),( qpX , where X  is the number of 
private residents, p  is the private price, and q  is the quality provided.  The number of 
private residents is assumed to be decreasing in price and increasing in quality.  The nursing 
home takes both the Medicaid payment rate r  and its own bed supply Y  as given.  The 
nursing home cost function depends on quality and is assumed to be increasing in quality.  
Under these assumptions, the nursing home chooses the optimal private price p  and quality 
of care q  so as to maximize profit Π  subject to the binding bed constraint Y : 
 
)|()],([),(max
,
YqCqpXYrqppX
qp
−−+=Π     (3.1) 
 
The first-order conditions, 0=Π p  and 0=Π q , imply that the nursing home sets the 
marginal revenue from a change in either private price or quality of care to be equal to the 
marginal cost. 
    
0)( =+− XXrp p                                   (3.2) 
                                                 
4 Although nursing homes also serve Medicare residents, the proportion has historically been small and, prior to 
prospective payment, had reimbursement rates that were as desirable as private rates. 
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0)( =−− qq CXrp                                   (3.3) 
 
This type of model has been applied to study nursing home decisions about the private price 
and quality of care in face of various Medicaid cost containment policies, including changes 
in payment method, payment level, and CON legislation (Cohen and Spector, 1996; Gertler, 
1989; Gertler and Waldman, 1992; Nyman, 1985; Scanlon, 1980).  For example, the effects 
of a change in the Medicaid payment rates on the private price and quality of care can be 
found by (1) totally differentiating the first-order conditions with respect to private price, 
quality of care, and the Medicaid rate, and then (2) applying Cramer’s rule to get the 
equations of rp ∂∂ /  and rq ∂∂ / .  The comparative statics results lead to intuition pertaining 
to the effects of Medicaid payment rates ( r ) on the private price ( p ) and quality of care ( q ).  
Under a binding bed constraint, nursing homes do not view a Medicaid payment as a reward 
for quality, and thus have an incentive to first accept higher-paying private pay residents and 
then fill the remaining beds with Medicaid residents (Grabowski, 2001b).  Raising Medicaid 
rates in a market with excess demand is, therefore, hypothesized to reduce an incentive to use 
quality of care to compete for the private residents.  Several earlier studies confirmed this 
inverse relationship between Medicaid payment rates and quality of care (Gertler, 1989; 
Gertler and Waldman, 1992; Nyman, 1985).   
However, several conditions have changed since most of these studies were 
conducted.  In particular, the model above may not account for the more recent competitive 
state of the nursing home industry.  Competition from other long-term care alternatives (e.g., 
assisted living facilities, home health care etc.) has reduced demand for nursing home 
services (Grabowski, 1999, 2001b; Grabowski and Norton, 2005).  The steady declines in 
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nursing home occupancy rates over the last two decades and recent repeal of CON or 
moratoria laws in many states confirmed that current market conditions may no longer 
support the existence of excess demand in the nursing home industry (Grabowski, 1999, 
2001b).  Without a binding bed constraint, nursing homes use quality of care to compete for 
both private and Medicaid residents.  Unlike the earlier research, recent studies have 
generally found a modest positive relationship between Medicaid payment rates and nursing 
home quality of care (Grabowski, 1999, 2001b; Grabowski and Castle, 2004).   
In addition, the model may not account for an important third group of nursing home 
Medicare residents.  Given the fact that the implementation of prospective payment system 
for Medicare skilled nursing services in 1998 ended the generous cost-based reimbursement 
that Medicare previously offered, recent Medicare payment changes may directly alter 
nursing home behavior and affect quality of care provided.  In order to account for recent 
changes in nursing home market, several recent studies modified the model above by 
weakening the binding bed constraint (Grabowski, 1999, 2001b; Grabowski and Castle, 
2004) and adding Medicare residents explicitly (Konetzka et al., 2004a, 2004b).   
Despite some of the recent changes in the current nursing home market, the 
conceptual framework in this study uses the profit-maximization model in order to be 
consistent with the assumptions from the previous literature, and for simplicity as well.  The 
next subsection (3.1.3) will introduce another important concept of factor substitution to 
explain how profit-maximizing nursing homes choose the optimal combination of input uses 
to produce nursing home care.  The profit-maximizing model described above and the theory 
of factor substitution together will provide useful intuition as to the nursing home decision-
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making process in response to increased minimum staffing standards while holding quantity 
constant. 
 
3.1.3. Factor substitution in the production of nursing home care 
Nursing homes choose levels of inputs such as labor, materials, and capital to 
maximize profit which is equal to the sum of revenues from selling their output minus the 
costs.  In the short run, however, the capital is fixed ( K ) and a nursing home must choose 
the cost-minimizing combinations of labor ( L ) and materials ( M ) to produce a given level 
of output.  
The marginal rate of technical substitution ( MRTS ), the rate at which one input can 
be substituted for another without changing the amount of output produced, is defined as the 
ratio of marginal products of two inputs (Folland et al., 2001; Jehle and Reny, 2000).  
Suppose w  and v  are the prices of labor and materials, respectively.  Firms will maximize 
their output subject to a budget constraint by setting the MRTS equal to the ratio of input 
price: 
v
w
MP
MP
Mq
LqMRTS
M
L
LM −==∂∂
∂∂=
/
/ .   
In Figure 3.1, the isoquant curve shows the combinations of labor and materials 
producing equal quality level 1, holding quantity constant.  The negative slope to an isoquant 
indicates the possibility of factor substitution.  The optimal choice of inputs should depend 
on the relative price of labor ( w ) and materials ( v ) holding capital fixed.  For example, 
ignoring the income effect,5 a lower price of labor ( Bw ) will lead to a relatively large 
                                                 
5 In general, when the price of any one input increases, the total effect of a price change can be decomposed into 
the substitution and income effects.  The substitution effect occurs because the firm shifts away from the now 
more expensive input into less expensive input.  The income effect occurs because the firm demands less of 
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substitution of labor for materials (point B) for a given output quality1.  When labor becomes 
relatively more expensive ( Aw ), nursing homes might choose less labor-intensive care (e.g., 
feeding by hand, scheduled toileting) and more material-intensive care patterns (e.g., use of 
feeding tubes, urethral catheterization) to minimize costs.  This effect is shown as the 
movement along the isoquant Quality1 from point B toward A (i.e., substitution effect).     
 
Figure 3.1  Factor Substitution in the Production of Nursing Home Care 
 
 
3.2. Input and Output Decisions in Response to MSS 
 Nursing home input and output decisions in response to the increased minimum 
staffing standards are a major focus of this study.  The framework described in Section 3.1.3 
allows for consideration of the impact of MSS on staffing, quality of care, and financial 
performance while holding quantity constant. 
 
3.2.1.  Implications of MSS for the staffing decision  
                                                                                                                                                       
both labor and materials because of the increase in costs.  In this discussion, the income effect is ignored 
initially for simplicity under the assumption that the substitution effect will dominate the income effect.   
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The theory of factor substitution suggests that the optimal choice of inputs should 
depend on the relative price of labor and materials.  However, nursing homes do not have 
complete freedom in choosing the amount of labor used in production.  Federal and state 
minimum staffing standards impose constraints on nursing homes’ choice of staffing level 
(Cawley et al., 2004).  Nursing homes can only choose their staffing at or above the 
minimum regulation level of MSS represented by the vertical portion of the isoquant in 
Figures 3.2 and 3.3.  The compliance is monitored through an annual survey and certification 
process.  Unless they apply for and receive an exemption, facilities that are not compliant 
with staffing standards can receive a deficiency and are subject to such sanctions as civil 
monetary penalties, denial of payment, or termination depending on the scope and severity.  
Suppose that the minimum staffing standards increase from MSS to MSS’ in Figures 
3.2 and 3.3.  Since mandated staffing standards are mostly directed at marginal performers at 
the low-end of the staffing spectrum, the new staffing standards will not necessarily affect 
facilities already at or above the standards (i.e., above MSS’).  For this reason, two separate 
responses may occur, depending on the level of staffing prior to the regulation change.   
If staffing were below the new standards (MSS’), those facilities at point A in Figure 
3.2 must increase their staffing level to become compliant with new standards in the next 
period.  While low-end facilities may be able to increase staffing level above new standards, 
the new MSS constraint likely leads those nursing homes to choose the corner (binding) 
solution of staffing at the new minimum regulation level of MSS’ (point A’).  Assuming both 
quantity and quality are held constant with no change in input prices (of either labor or 
materials), the relevant isocost (IC) line shifts from IC1 to IC2 and the firm operates at point 
A’ with more labor and less materials being used in the production of QualityA1 (Figure 3.2).  
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IC2 represents a greater level of total costs of production than IC1, so financial performance 
may decline because of the need to cover the extra costs (as discussed in more detail in 
Section 3.2.3).  Furthermore, those low-staff facilities may compete with other facilities in 
the market in order to employ or maintain adequate numbers of qualified workers, and 
thereby may need to increase wages or benefits paid to the nurse staff in order to meet new 
standards.  A rise in wages makes the isocost line steeper at point A’(from IC2 to IC3 in 
Figure 3.2).  According to the traditional theory of factor substitution, as wages rise, facilities 
will have an incentive to substitute materials for labor to minimize costs of production.  
However, because they need to keep minimum level of staffing for certification, the firm will 
continue to operate at point A’ (the corner solution) facing even higher labor and therefore 
higher total costs. 
Facilities with relatively high staffing may respond to new standards differently.  First, 
since mandated staffing standards are mostly directed at marginal performers at the low-end 
of the staffing spectrum, the new staffing standards will not necessarily affect facilities 
already at or above the standards (i.e., above MSS’).  Facilities with already higher staffing 
level than new standards may not change their staffing level and may keep their current level 
of staffing for certification (i.e., stay at point B in Figure 3.3).   
As facilities with previously lower staffing hire more staff, nursing homes with 
sufficiently high staffing that were not originally affected by the new standards may have to 
pay higher wages given the limited supply of nursing workers in the market.  According to 
the traditional theory of factor substitution, as wages rise, facilities will have an incentive to 
substitute materials for labor to minimize costs of production.  The new MSS constraint then 
leads those nursing homes to reduce their staffing level.  As an extreme solution, the firms 
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might even have to choose the same corner (binding) solution of staffing at new minimum 
regulation level of MSS’ as low-staff facilities do (though they might not decrease their 
staffing this much, it all depends on how much nursing wages increase).  In this case, a rise 
in wages results in less labor and more materials being used in the production of QualityB1 
in order to minimize costs.  This effect is illustrated as the movement along the isoquant 
QualityB1 from point B toward B’ in Figure 3.3. 
Other changes that are not as easily derived within this framework may also occur.  
For example, more and more facilities have shifted their focus to using quality of care as a 
means of competing for patients to improve their financial performance in the recent more 
competitive market.  Thus, another plausible response is that those facilities may view the 
new staffing regulation as either increased scrutiny on their quality of care or as heralding 
new competition on quality from previously lower quality facilities with lower staffing.  A 
differentiation strategy based on quality may make them look for other ways to improve 
quality by facilities to increase their use of both labor and materials.  The isocost line then 
shifts from IC1 to IC4 (assuming both prices constant), and the firm operates at point B’’ with 
more labor and more materials to produce the higher level of QualityB2.  In this case, as a 
result, the staffing or quality spectrum between low-end and high-end facilities could become 
wider than it once was. 
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Figure 3.2  Factor Substitution in the Production of Nursing Home Care: Low-Staff (Below New MSS) 
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Figure 3.3  Factor Substitution in the Production of Nursing Home Care: High-Staff (At or Above New 
MSS) 
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3.2.2.  Implications of MSS for the nursing home quality 
While MSS is a strong predictor of staffing choices, the effects of MSS on quality of 
care might not be straightforward because MSS affects the non-staffing input decisions as 
well.  Even though the theory of factor substitution assumes no change in quality of care 
along the given quality isoquant, empirically, increased staffing is generally hypothesized to 
result in higher quality since better staffing is likely to be associated with more individual 
attention to residents and an improved quality of life (Cohen and Spector, 1996).  Conversely, 
the provision of nursing home care in material-intensive ways has been of particular concern 
because such care patterns are associated with greater risks of morbidity and mortality 
(Cawley et al., 2004; Zinn 1993).  Under the production function of quality of care, the 
optimal combination of staffing and non-staffing inputs is transformed into a certain level of 
quality.  An additional hour of nursing time will produce different amounts of quality 
depending on the levels of other inputs (i.e., materials).   
Furthermore, the increased demand for staffing due to new MSS and its consequent 
effects on nursing home quality will depend at least in part on unobserved characteristics 
such as organizational efficiency and productivity of nursing home workers (i.e., unobserved 
heterogeneity in factor quality).  Nursing homes are forced to operate at a high level of 
efficiency, particularly under the nursing shortage and documented staff recruitment and 
retention difficulties.  Nursing homes that employ or retain more productive workers under 
the new MSS likely pay higher wages.  Increases in labor costs, however, may be mitigated 
by improvements in production processes such as increases in overall organizational 
efficiency.  By improving efficiency, nursing homes can produce more output with the same 
inputs, thereby generating higher revenues or reducing costs.  This improvement in 
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organizational process may cause a facility with staffing originally higher than MSS’ to 
achieve higher level of quality of care even without changing staffing hours, holding 
materials use constant.  Nursing homes may also be able to improve the productivity level of 
nursing workers by increasing job satisfaction or decreasing turnover rates.  In this case, 
nursing homes may end up producing higher quality of care without changing staffing hours.   
Even though the points along the isoquant assume a single type of labor or, at least, a 
constant staff mix, facilities are also able to change their mix of staffing in that they can 
substitute cheaper forms of labor (e.g., LPNs or NAs) for some expensive forms (e.g., RNs) 
that may have higher productivity.  It is also important to note, therefore, that increases in 
staffing hours may not necessarily result in increases in quality if other dimensions of 
staffing are changing.  
 
3.2.3.  Implications of MSS for the nursing home financial status 
While MSS is hypothesized to unambiguously increase staffing at facilities whose 
staffing is below the new standards, the impacts on financial performance are less clear.  
Increases in staffing will increase costs (and may also increase quality unless the facility 
simply substitutes staff for non-staff inputs).  The implications for financial performance, 
however, depend heavily on the response by consumers.  The response will also depend on 
the payer status of consumers.   
If private pay residents value quality, then they may be willing to pay more for better 
quality of care.  Facilities that increase their staffing might then not only be able to cover 
increases in costs but might even show improved financial performance if there is an increase 
in demand for their services.  If private pay residents do not realize the value of increased 
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quality, then they may not be willing to cover the costs of the additional staffing, and facility 
financial performance would decline because of the inability to get residents to cover the 
higher staffing costs.  Since Medicaid rates are set by each state, a facility’s financial return 
on Medicaid clients will only increase if the state raises the rate (e.g., in conjunction with the 
MSS).  Even if Medicaid residents value quality, however, they may not be able to increase 
their use of nursing homes and could find themselves displaced by private pay residents 
seeking higher quality of care (unless the market has excess capacity or unless the state 
intervenes by increasing the rate). 
Some of these changes, especially the input and to some extent the output responses, 
can be delineated using the graphical approach employed in the previous section.  For 
facilities with low staffing levels before the new regulation, an increase in staffing input use 
(from point A to A’ in Figure 3.2) increases nursing home costs.  IC2 represents a greater 
level of total costs of production than IC1 so that profits should decrease to operate at point 
A’ unless the facility looks for other ways to improve financial performance.  If increasing 
either staffing or quality raises costs more quickly than revenues, profit must fall (at least in 
the short run) as quality improves (O’Neill et al., 2003).  Furthermore, as discussed earlier, 
the increased demand for staffing due to new standards and competition with previously 
higher quality facilities with high staffing may lead those low-staff facilities to face higher 
wages even after they meet new standards.  A rise in wages makes the isocost line steeper at 
point A’ (from IC2 to IC3 in Figure 3.2), as a result, profit may be even lower under IC3 due 
to additional labor costs. 
However, this conventional trade-off between quality and profit would not pertain to 
all nursing homes.  Facilities, especially those with high staffing, can vary in their ability to 
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efficiently produce quality, for example, as a result of differences in their scale of operations 
(O’Neill et al., 2003).  Nursing homes with higher quality may also experience better 
financial performance through their ability to generate higher revenues to offset increased 
costs.   
More importantly, financial status will depend at least in part on consumers’ 
responses to changes in price and quality level.  Facilities could differ in terms of their ability 
to charge higher prices due to differences in demand elasticity in the markets they serve 
(O’Neill et al., 2003).  Nursing homes blend multiple revenue streams to cover fixed and 
operating costs for all residents (Konetzka et al., 2006).  Nursing homes may generate higher 
revenues especially from more profitable private pay residents, to compensate for the 
additional costs associated with new staffing standards.  As the model of profit-maximizing 
nursing home behavior suggests, the decisions about the private price ( MSSp ∂∂ / ) and 
quality of care ( MSSq ∂∂ / ) will also change as nursing homes maximize profits under the 
new staffing standards.  Since the number of private residents is assumed to be decreasing in 
the private price and increasing in quality, facilities can compete for private pay residents by 
increasing quality or (less likely) by decreasing price.  In particular, more and more facilities 
focus on enhancing their quality of care as a means of improving their financial performances 
(Weech-Maldonado et al., 2004).   
The private resident price that evolves in the market is a function of the elasticity of 
private demand with respect to price and the elasticity of private demand with respect to 
quality of care.  Measuring elasticities is complicated but provides useful intuition on 
changes in profit level.  If the private demand with respect to quality of care becomes more 
elastic (i.e., private residents become more sensitive to quality), an increase in quality of care 
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will attract more private residents and increase private demand.  This increase in quality can 
pay for itself if the increase in private demand is large enough.  Thus, the marginal benefit of 
raising quality of care is higher than before, and nursing homes can raise quality to attract 
private demand. 
Even though the general assumption is that private demand is decreasing in price, 
homes may charge higher private prices to match the additional costs associated with 
enhancing quality as long as the market bears these increases.  In particular, firms that 
previously had staffing below new standards may have to increase private rates to cover their 
now higher staffing costs; at the same time, firms that originally had staffing above new 
standards may also increase their private prices without losing market share and may use 
those higher revenues to improve quality (through staffing or non-staffing measures).  These 
changes may be explained by the fact that private residents satisfied with the quality of care 
are more willing to pay for the benefits they receive and are more likely to tolerate price 
increases (Weech-Maldonado et al., 2004).   
One important way a nursing home can increase revenues to offset increased costs is, 
therefore, to attract more profitable private pay residents.  The increased revenues from the 
private residents are used to maintain overall revenues that support the costs of care for all 
types of patients (Konetzka et al., 2006). 
 
3.3. Factors Affecting Nursing Home Choices 
General agreement exists in research on the factors which affect both input and output 
decisions in the production of nursing home care.  For example, the acuity level of residents 
is expected to be the most important factor in determining both facility staffing decisions and 
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observed health outcomes.  Facility characteristics such as ownership and market and state-
specific environments affect both staffing decisions and quality of care.  The decisions are 
also influenced by unobserved facility characteristics (e.g., norms, tastes of the facility 
administrator, etc.).   
 
3.3.1.  Initial staffing status 
In order to increase quality in a policy domain, many current state minimum staffing 
standards serve as the “floor (or minimum)” rather than the “ceiling (or optimum)” regarding 
quantity and quality of staffing (Marek et al., 1996).  Mandated staffing standards are 
directed at marginal performers at the low-end of the quality spectrum, in particular, with 
respect to the staffing level.  Therefore, new staffing standards will not necessarily affect 
those facilities already at or above the standards.  Those facilities at the high-end may decide 
to maintain current level of staffing for certification.  Only facilities with relatively low 
staffing will have to increase staffing level to become compliant with new standards.  Most 
importantly, therefore, nursing homes will likely respond differently to the standards based 
on their staffing status along with their organizational goals, market socioeconomic 
conditions, or state political environment.   
 
3.3.2.  Ownership type 
In contrast to the hospital industry, nearly two-thirds of all nursing homes are for-
profit.  The mix of for-profit and nonprofit firms has led to studies of how ownership affects 
costs, quality, and access to care (Grabowski and Norton, 2005).  For example, nonprofit 
facilities may weigh quality and profit considerations differently, and they may end up with 
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zero profit.  Many studies found that for-profit homes have significantly lower quality than 
nonprofit homes (Chou, 2002; O’Neill et al., 2003).  It is commonly assumed by property 
rights theory that the profit motive is attenuated in nonprofit firms (Rosko et al., 1995).  As 
competition increases, however, differences in behavior among different ownership types 
would be narrow and the decision-making process will be similar (Sloan, 2000; Grabowski 
and Hirth, 2003).  
 
3.3.3.  Market competition 
Facilities in different market environments may have different incentives to make 
decisions.  If nursing homes compete on the basis of quality, facilities in more competitive 
areas may maintain staffing or quality above the minimum requirements.  Many recent 
studies argue that the nursing home market has become more competitive than it once was, 
especially with the implementation of Medicare PPS (Konetzka et al., 2006).  Over the last 
two decades many states have repealed CON legislation, and declining occupancy rates 
suggest that the excess demand is not the case in recent nursing home market (Grabowski, 
1999, 2001b; Grabowski and Norton, 2005).  Competition from assisted living facilities and 
other alternative care sites (e.g., home health care, adult day care, and hospice care) has 
reduced demand for nursing home services.  Therefore, nursing homes in more competitive 
markets could find it more difficult to retain clients while delivering poorer quality, or find 
that quality is a way of distinguishing oneself in a competitive market (O’Neill et al., 2003).  
 
3.3.4.  Informed consumers: publicizing quality information 
  50
Nursing homes have additional incentives to improve quality by other forms of 
regulation such as provision of quality information to consumers.  Quality of health care was 
considered to be difficult for consumers to monitor, but much progress has been made in this 
field in recent years.  CMS has published nationwide reports with quality measures at the 
individual nursing home through the Nursing Home Compare (NHC) website.   
The collection and reporting of quality information may assist consumers in choosing 
nursing homes and may improve providers’ performance by stressing quality of care.  For 
example, some nursing homes may believe that higher nursing staffing levels are directly 
related to higher quality of care and to consumers’ perceptions of quality (Harrington and 
Swan, 2003).  These facilities may be aggressive in increasing staffing levels regardless of 
costs.  Other facilities which are more profit-oriented may be less aggressive in implementing 
costly care services and, as a result, keep staffing levels at the minimum standard levels.  
Publicly available quality information may also remove the worst performers out of business 
and help to improve quality in nursing home market.  
 
3.3.5.  Medicaid reimbursement rates and other policies 
Facilities in different state environments may have different incentives to make 
decisions.  States with more generous Medicaid programs as reflected by higher 
reimbursement rates will enable facilities to maintain higher staffing and quality than will 
facilities in states with less generous Medicaid rates.  As described in Section 2.2, in 
particular, many states implemented several quality initiatives at the same time as they 
increased MSS.  For example, many states increased Medicaid rates accompanied by MSS 
and those states commonly used a wage pass-through for recruitment and retention of 
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adequate numbers of qualified direct care workers (DHHS, 2003).  Increased public funding 
allows facilities to increase both staffing and non-staffing input to produce more output (i.e., 
income effect).  Other policy changes for nursing homes have a direct impact on nursing 
home decision-making process.  Therefore, such policy changes should be controlled for in 
the empirical models of assessing the effects of MSS. 
 
3.4.  Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The theoretical models described above enable important policy assessments by 
exploring facilities’ strategic decisions on staffing input use, quality of care, and financial 
performance.  The empirical analyses use different strategies to estimate total effects of MSS, 
and to estimate the relationship between staff and quality of care to determine if in fact more 
nurse staffing hours result in better quality of care.  Figure 3.4 shows the pathways between 
state minimum staffing standards, nursing home staffing, quality of care, and financial 
performance.  This dissertation was conducted in three parts to answer the three research 
questions described below.   
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Figure 3.4  Pathways between Minimum Staffing Standards, Staffing, Quality of Care, and Financial 
Performance in Nursing Homes 
 
 
Note: Bold lines represent the pathways estimated in this dissertation. 
 
 
Research Question 1: Do state minimum staffing standards improve the level of staffing and 
quality of care in nursing homes?   
The first analysis assesses the total effects of state minimum staffing standards on 
staffing choices and on quality of care in nursing homes using a reduced-form facility-level 
fixed effects (difference-in-differences) approach.  The effect of staffing standards on actual 
level of staffing is represented by pathway “A” in Figure 3.4, and the effect of staffing 
standards on quality of care is represented by pathway “B or (A+D)” in Figure 3.4.   
While the hypothesized effect of MSS on staffing is direct, quality of care may be 
influenced by other aspects determined by MSS such as physical environment, differing 
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methods of treatment, the facility’s efficient use of staff and non-staff inputs, or staff quality 
and productivity level.  The reduced-form quality analyses do not directly answer the 
question whether more staffing results in better quality of care, but instead address the 
question of the total effects of MSS on quality.  
Although not depicted in the diagram, the model specifies two different levels of 
policy effects (transition effects and steady state effects) by using a one year lagged time 
variable in order to account for a transition year as well as the fact that the effect of policy 
changes may occur after some lead time.  Since a number of facilities operate at levels far 
above the mandated levels, nursing homes with staffing level previously below or close to 
new standards are more likely to have responded to the increased state standards.  To the 
extent that the effect of minimum staffing standards is heterogeneous, the magnitude and 
direction of effects will be different.  The analysis exploits this variation by including two 
policy variables reflecting time since implementation and their interactions with the indicator 
of low-staff facility.  Furthermore, the study allows for differential effects of policy changes 
by ownership type.  Structural differences for different types of facilities may suggest 
different policy implications in implementing or expanding staffing requirements, and may 
help to make well-informed policy decisions.   
Based on the discussion above, the first analysis tests the following hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1a provides an overall assessment, while hypotheses 1b and 1c focus on 
comparisons by staffing status or ownership type.  
• Hypothesis 1a: Increases in state minimum staffing standards will increase the 
staffing and quality of care in nursing homes. 
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• Hypothesis 1b: Low-staff facilities (facilities with previous staffing levels below 
newly mandated standards) are more likely to be influenced by increases in 
staffing standards. 
• Hypothesis 1c: For-profit facilities are less likely to be influenced by increases in 
staffing standards. 
 
Research Question 2: What are the impacts of state minimum staffing standards on financial 
performance in nursing homes?   
While higher nursing home staffing is hypothesized to lead to higher quality of care, 
the higher quality comes at a cost.  In particular, increased mandated staffing standards may 
cause (at least some) facilities to face severe financial constraints.  The second analysis 
investigates how recent changes in state staffing standards affect the financial performance in 
skilled nursing facilities by comparing financial measures before and after the changes in 
state staffing standards.   
The total effects of staffing standards on financial performance, represented by 
pathway “C or (A+D+E)” in Figure 3.4, is assessed using the same reduced-form facility-
level fixed effects (difference-in-differences) approach used in the staffing and quality 
analyses.  The purposes of the second analysis are to: (1) assess the effects of state minimum 
staffing standards on the financial performance as reflected by profit, revenue, and cost 
during the period 1998 to 2001, and (2) determine whether nursing homes differ in financial 
performance in response to policy changes by staffing status or ownership type.  Hypotheses 
tested are as follows:  
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• Hypothesis 2a: Increases in state minimum staffing standards will diminish 
financial status in nursing homes.     
• Hypothesis 2b: In response to increases in state staffing standards, low-staff 
facilities are more likely to experience greater declines in financial performance 
than facilities with relatively high staffing. 
• Hypothesis 2c: In response to increases in state staffing standards, for-profit 
facilities are more likely to experience less severe declines in financial 
performance than nonprofit facilities. 
 
Research Question 3: What is the causal relationship between nursing home staffing and 
quality of care? 
Besides identifying the effects of MSS on nursing home performance, an 
understanding and awareness of how current staffing differences across facilities affect the 
quality of care is also a major purpose of this study.  A separate analysis is performed to 
confirm the relationship between staffing and quality of care.  In contrast to the first analysis 
on the effect of MSS on quality of care, the third analysis directly measures the effect of a 
one unit increase in total staff hours on quality of care by including a staffing variable on the 
right hand side.  However, the possibility that there may be unobserved heterogeneity in 
facility characteristics in choosing staffing could be a function of quality of care (i.e., reverse 
causality) makes it important to seek exogenous variation in staffing when attempting to 
estimate the unbiased effect of staffing on quality of care.  
In the absence of some corrective statistical procedure, endogeneity of staffing may 
result in a spurious correlation between staffing and quality of care.  In contrast to earlier 
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studies, the empirical models in the third analysis are designed to reduce or eliminate 
possible endogeneity bias while at the same time taking into account the panel nature of data.  
The third analysis assesses the causal effect of staffing on quality of care, represented by “D” 
in Figure 3.4, using state policy, market (county) level nurse supply and demand shifters as 
instruments to predict the staffing changes over time.  Instrumental variables are incorporated 
in the empirical models in order to (1) identify how nursing homes respond to the changes in 
the exogenous state policy shock (i.e., state minimum staffing standards), the relative 
competitiveness of the market and local resource constraints, and (2) investigate how these 
changes interact with staffing to yield changes in quality of care.  The following hypothesis is 
tested. 
• Hypothesis 3a: After accounting for endogeneity, more total staff hours will 
improve quality of nursing home care. 
• Hypothesis 3b: The direction or magnitude of the effects will be significantly 
different from the estimated effects in a model without adjustment for 
endogeneity. 
 
3.5.  Significance of This Study 
This dissertation attempts to provide a detailed understanding of the main impacts of 
state minimum staffing standards.  Specifically, the proposed study contributes to a more 
comprehensive understanding of the relationship between staffing standards, the level of 
staffing, quality of care, and financial performance in nursing homes in several ways.   
• By comparing state minimum standards with actual nurse staffing levels in 
nursing homes in each state, this study assesses the behavior of nursing homes in 
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response to the changes in staffing standards, which may differ significantly when 
nursing homes face various environments.  In addition, this study helps to inform 
a debate on the need for government regulations of nursing home staffing levels. 
• By evaluating whether mandated staffing levels ensure high-quality nursing care, 
this study provides the insights into the policy debate about whether staffing 
standards are indeed an important policy instrument towards addressing the 
quality of nursing home care. 
• By evaluating the impacts on financial performance in nursing homes, the 
potential association between quality and financial performance gives a new 
insight into policy implications relevant to facility management strategies to 
achieve both better quality and greater efficiency (i.e., increased productivity or 
more effective use of staffing).   
• By investigating the underlying (causal) relationship between staffing and quality 
of care, this study provides further information about the appropriate staffing 
levels to ensure quality of care.
CHAPTER IV 
DATA SOURCES 
 
This study used secondary datasets from several distinct sources.  Information on 
state minimum staffing standards was obtained from various published sources.6  The 
facility-level staffing, quality, and financial information were drawn from two sources: 
Online Survey Certification and Reporting System and Medicare Cost Reports (MCR).  Two 
other data sources were utilized to supplement OSCAR and MCR data.  Market-level 
socioeconomic variables were obtained from the Area Resource File (ARF), and data on the 
population for each county came from the U.S. Census Bureau.  The four distinct datasets 
that were combined with MSS data to form the analytic file are described separately below. 
 
4.1.  Online Survey Certification and Reporting System  
The data on facility characteristics, staffing, and quality measures came from the 
OSCAR from 1998 through 2001.  The OSCAR data are from state surveys of all federally 
certified Medicare skilled nursing facilities and Medicaid nursing facilities in the U.S.  The 
OSCAR system includes about 96% of nation’s nursing homes, and information from the 
                                                 
6 (1) Harrington, C. (2002). Nursing Home Staffing Standards. The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured.  (2) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation Office of Disability (2003). State Experiences With Minimum Nursing Staff Ratio For Nursing 
Facilities: Finding From Case Studies of Eight States. 
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system is used to determine whether nursing homes are complying with federal regulations 
(Grabowski, 1999).   
On average, nursing homes are surveyed every 12 to 15 months by state agencies 
under contract to CMS.  In an initial survey, the standard forms are filled out by each facility 
at the beginning of the survey, and a team of state surveyors review the data and check its 
accuracy by comparing the facility report with individual resident medical reports, staffing 
records, and observations of data.  In certain cases, follow-up surveys are conducted to assure 
that a facility correctly reported at the initial survey.  Additionally, facilities must be re-
surveyed when there are substantial changes in organization and management or to follow-up 
any complaints that allege substandard care.  When there were multiple surveys of the same 
facility within a given calendar year, the most recent survey was used for the analysis in this 
dissertation.   
Although OSCAR is the only uniform and easily available source for the data 
required for this analysis, it has several limitations.  First, the certification procedures are 
generally not audited, which raises concerns regarding the validity and reliability of the data.  
Furthermore, staffing is reported for a two-week period at the time of survey, so it may not 
accurately depict the facility’s staffing over a longer period.  In particular, it may overstate 
the actual staffing level if the facility increases the staffing level during the period around the 
survey (Harrington et al., 2000b; Zhang and Grabowski, 2004).  Staffing information is also 
found in annual Medicaid cost reports that nursing homes are required to file with the state 
health department.  These reports provide staffing data for an entire year and they are 
reviewed by inside or outside auditors.  However, these reports do not contain nationally 
uniform staffing data because the categories and definitions differ from state to state (GAO, 
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2003).  A study by Harrington et al. (2000b) found that the staffing measures from OSCAR 
and California cost reports were quite similar; average staffing hours reported on OSCAR for 
California facilities were found to be only 0.1 hour higher than corresponding cost report 
data.  Furthermore, OSCAR is the only national data available on staffing information and 
has been widely used for nursing home studies. 
Second, the quality and resident characteristics available from OSCAR are also 
aggregated at the facility level.  These data may, therefore, not reflect the true average 
resident-level case mix and severity, quality of care, or variation in these measures.  More 
precise outcome measures (e.g., urinary tract infections, fractures, pain, weight loss etc.) 
would require resident-level data available in the MDS.  However, the MDS is not readily 
available and some quality indicators from this data source may have reliability issues 
(Castle and Engberg, 2005).  The MDS data acquisition process is very long and complex 
due to confidentiality concerns.  Outcome measures are also available from the Nursing 
Home Compare (NHC) website.  Since November of 2002, the CMS has reported 
information on quality indicators based on patient outcomes from the MDS (Mukamel and 
Spector, 2003).  However, NHC measures are not yet stable and their risk adjustment 
methods change over time (Castle and Engberg, 2005).  Therefore, the OSCAR data are the 
only national data source publicly available on the CMS website for this study.   
Third, most data elements pertaining to resident characteristics and care practices 
from OSCAR are obtained partially by direct observation of surveyors based on the 
information provided by a facility.  These measures include the use of restraints, activities of 
daily living, incontinence, and medications.  However, the assessment of a selected sample is 
usually conducted in daytime, thus the observed care practices may not be accurate if other 
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shifts do not follow the same practices (i.e., restraint use may be higher at night when 
staffing levels are lower) (Grabowski and Castle, 2004).  
One further limitation of the OSCAR data pertains to documented inter-survey 
reliability (both across and within states) in assessing the quality of facilities (IOM, 1986).  
Even though CMS has made efforts to standardize the reporting systems by state surveyors 
and provided extensive new federal training for state surveyors, some regional variations 
may exist.  Different states may vary their survey procedures, training efforts, and 
enforcement stringency.      
 
4.2.  Medicare Cost Reports 
All Medicare-certified SNFs are required to file cost reports annually in order to 
receive payments for treating Medicare residents.  The MCR contains provider information 
such as facility characteristics, utilization data, cost and charges by cost center (in total and 
Medicare), Medicare settlement data, and financial statement data (http://www.cms.hhs.gov).  
Specifically, the data on financial performance analysis came from 1998 through 2001 
freestanding SNF MCR that were in the CMS files released in June 2004.  Since hospital-
based nursing facilities are very different in terms of resident severity, care practice, and cost 
accounting systems (i.e., allocation of hospital overhead costs to the SNF units), this study 
only analyzes cost report data from freestanding skilled nursing facilities.   
The historical purpose of MCR has been to determine Medicare’s share of allowable 
costs and to provide a basis for calculating Medicare payments to providers.  The cost reports 
for nursing homes do not undergo rigorous independent auditing.  Consequently, the cost 
reports contain a wealth of cost accounting data, but a number of financial accounting 
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elements have historically been unreliable, poorly defined, and lacking in critical details.  
Documented problems include major differences in: reported profits; variations in the 
reporting of both revenues and expenses; an absence of relevant details, such as charity care, 
bad debt, operating versus non-operating income, and affiliate transactions; an inconsistent 
classification of changes in net assets; and a failure to provide cash flow statements (Kane 
and Magnus, 2001).   
Although data quality concerns were identified, because of the limited disclosure of 
accurate, timely, and comprehensive financial statements, the MCR has been a primary 
national database of financial information of Medicare-certified providers including hospitals, 
SNFs, and home health agencies.  The financial performance indicators in this study were 
obtained from the operating statistics on the SNF MCR (from worksheets G and S, as 
described in more detail in Section 5.1.3).  These data were then converted to the calendar 
year data using the facilities’ accounting period-end dates in order to merge with other 
calendar year data.  
 
4.3. Area Resource File  
The ARF is a collection of data from more than 50 sources, including the American 
Medical Association, American Hospital Association, U.S. Census Bureau, Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and National Center for Health 
Statistics.  The data include county codes and classifications, health care professions, health 
care facilities, population and economic data, health care professions training, hospital 
utilization, hospital expenditure, and environment data.  The county is used as the basic 
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geographical unit of aggregation since it is the smallest unit for which many health care 
measures are available. 
The file is a publicly available dataset containing more than 7,000 economic and 
demographic variables for each of the nation’s counties.  The ARF is widely used by 
policymakers and researchers interested in the nation’s health care delivery system and 
factors that may impact health status and health care in the U.S.  Thus, market-level variables 
such as per capita income and unemployment rate were obtained from the ARF.  
 
4.4.  U.S. Census Bureau 
The U.S. Census Bureau publishes annual population estimates for states, counties, 
and all other units of general purpose government each year.  Specific information on the 
population estimates by age and sex for each county came from the U.S. Census Bureau.  
The reference date for these estimates is July 1st of each year. 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
CONSTRUCTION OF KEY VARIABLES 
 
5.1. Variable Definition and Sources  
Table 5.1 summarizes the definitions and data sources for the constructed variables in 
the models.  Construction of variables within the major categories is described in separate 
sections below. 
Table 5.1  Description of Variables and Data Sources 
Variables Definition Sources 
Staffing:   
   RN HPRD (RN FTEs reported for a 2-week period × 
70(hr)) / (Total residents × 14(days)) 
OSCAR 
   LPN HPRD (LPN FTEs reported for a 2-week period × 
70(hr)) / (Total residents × 14(days)) 
OSCAR 
   NA HPRD (NA FTEs reported for a 2-week period × 
70(hr)) / (Total residents × 14(days)) 
OSCAR 
   Total HPRD (Total FTEs reported for a 2-week period × 
70(hr)) / (Total residents × 14(days)) 
OSCAR 
   
Quality of Care:   
   % Pressure sores (Residents with pressure sores / Total 
residents) × 100 
OSCAR 
   % Contractures (Residents with contractures / Total residents) 
× 100 
OSCAR 
   % Incontinence (Residents with bladder incontinence / Total 
residents) × 100 
OSCAR 
   % Catheter use (Residents with catheter use / Total residents) 
× 100 
OSCAR 
   % Restraint use (Residents with restraint use / Total residents) 
× 100 
OSCAR 
   Total deficiencies Total number of deficiencies cited OSCAR 
   Incidence rate of pressure sores [(Residents with pressure sores on survey – 
Residents with pressure sores on admission) / 
Total residents] × 100 
OSCAR 
   Incidence rate of contractures [(Residents with contractures on survey – 
Residents with contractures on admission) / 
OSCAR 
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Total residents] × 100 
   Incidence rate of catheter use [(Residents with catheter use on survey – 
Residents with catheter use on admission) / 
Total residents] × 100 
OSCAR 
   Incidence rate of restraint use [(Residents with restraint use on survey – 
Residents with restraint use on admission) / 
Total residents] × 100 
OSCAR 
   
Financial Performance:   
   Total margin [(Net patient revenues + Other operating and 
non-operating revenues – Total operating 
expenses – Other expenses) / (Net patient 
revenues + Other operating and non-operating 
revenues)] × 100 
MCR 
   Revenue per diem Net patient revenues / Total resident days 
Adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
MCR 
   Expense per diem Total operating expenses / Total resident days 
Adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
MCR 
   
Policy: Staffing Standards   
   Transition effect =1, if one year after a state established or 
increased minimum staffing standards 
Harrington (2002) 
DHHS (2003) 
   Steady state effect =1, if two years afterward Harrington (2002) 
DHHS (2003) 
   
Facility:   
   Ownership  OSCAR 
      For-profit 1=For-profit  
      Nonprofit 1=Nonprofit OSCAR 
      Government 1=Government OSCAR 
   Chain 1=Chain, 0=No Chain OSCAR 
   Payer mix   
      % residents paid by Medicare (Residents on Medicare / Total residents) × 
100 
OSCAR 
      % residents paid by Medicaid (Residents on Medicaid / Total residents) × 
100 
OSCAR 
      % residents paid by others (Residents on private pay / Total residents) × 
100 
OSCAR 
   Total beds Total number of beds OSCAR 
   Occupancy rate (Total residents / Total beds) × 100 OSCAR 
   Case mix   
      Acuity index =ADLINDEX + STINDEX 
• ADL index (ADLINDEX): An average of 
the percent of residents who are bedfast or 
chairbound or need assistance with eating, 
toileting, and transferring, weighted by the 
amount of assistance needed 
• Skilled service index (STINDEX): A sum 
of the percentage of residents utilizing 
intravenous therapy, suctioning, respiratory 
therapy, tracheostomy care, and parenteral 
OSCAR 
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feeding 
      % Pressure sores on admission Rate of pressure sores on admission OSCAR 
      % Contractures on admission Rate of contractures on admission OSCAR 
      % Catheter use on admission Rate of catheter use on admission OSCAR 
      % Restraint use on admission Rate of restraint use on admission OSCAR 
   
Output:   
   Ln (Total resident days) The natural log of total resident days MCR 
   
Input Price:   
   Ln (CMS SNF wage index) The natural log of CMS SNF wage index CMS 
   
Market:   
   Herfindahl-Hirschman index The sum of each facility’s squared percentage 
share of beds for all facilities in the county 
Computed from 
OSCAR 
   Empty beds per 1,000 elderly (65+) Number of empty beds per 1,000 community-
dwelling elderly (65+) in the county 
Computed from 
OSCAR 
   Per capita income (in $1,000s) Per capita income in the county / 1,000 ARF 
   Unemployment rate (16+) Unemployment rate (%) in the county ARF 
   Population 85+ (in 1,000s) Population aged 85 and over in the county / 
1000 
US Census Bureau 
   Female population 15-44 (in 1,000s) Female population aged 15 to 44 in the county 
/ 1,000 
US Census Bureau 
   
State:   
   Medicaid rate State Medicaid rate adjusted by the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI) 
Grabowski  et al. 
(2004) 
Harrington et al. 
(1999) 
Notes: HPRD=hours per resident day, FTE=full-time equivalent, ADL=Activities of Daily Living, 
OSCAR=Online Survey Certification and Reporting System, MCR=Medicare Cost Reports, CMS=Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, ARF=Area Resource File 
Sources: (1) Harrington, C. (2002). Nursing Home Staffing Standards. The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid 
and the Uninsured.  (2) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation Office of Disability (2003). State Experiences With Minimum Nursing Staff Ratio For Nursing 
Facilities: Finding From Case Studies of Eight States. (3) Grabowski, D. C., Feng, Z, Intrator, O., & Mor, V. 
(2004). Recent Trends In State Nursing Home Payment Policies. Health Affairs Web Exclusive, June 16, 2004.  
(4) Harrington, C., Swan, J. H., Wellin, V., Clemena, W., & Carrillo, H. M. (1999). 1998 State Data Book on 
Long Term Care Program and Market Characteristics. San Francisco: University of California, San Francisco. 
 
5.1.1.  Staffing  
As described in Chapter IV, staffing information available from OSCAR is at the 
facility-year level, and measures of staffing available for the individual residents at different 
points in time are not available.  Each facility reports the number of full-time equivalent 
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positions in the facility (employees or contract workers) over the previous 14 days.  For this 
analysis, the staffing level variables are constructed by hours per resident day by licensure 
type (i.e., RNs, LPNs, and NAs) and total nursing staff.  To convert the measures to hours 
per resident day, the total number of staffing payroll hours reported in a two-week period are 
multiplied by 70 hours and then divided by the total number of residents and by the 14 days 
in the reporting period.  This approach is currently used by CMS and other nursing home 
studies (Harrington, 2002; Zhang and Grabowski, 2004).   
 
5.1.2. Quality of care 
A variety of quality measures have been recommended by the IOM as a component of 
a nursing home quality assurance system (IOM, 1986) and by several empirical studies (Abt, 
2003; Grabowski et al., 2004a; Rantz et al., 2004; Zimmerman et al., 1995; Zinn et al., 1999).  
The quality measures in this study were chosen based on the standard measures used in 
nursing home research following these recommendations (Castle and Engberg, 2005; 
Grabowski, 1999; Harrington et al., 2000b) and on availability in the OSCAR data. 
The six quality measures in the first analysis (i.e., effects of MSS on staffing and 
quality of care) were selected in order to capture multidimensional aspects of quality: 
resident outcomes, process of care, and overall facility quality.  In many aspects, resident 
outcome measures are the single most important measure of quality of care in that such 
measures are resident-oriented, representing the actual impact of the nursing home staffing 
on the residents’ physical, mental, and emotional wellbeing.  Resident outcomes are therefore 
measured by the rates of pressure sores, contractures, and bladder incontinence.   
  68
Pressure sores are a particularly good outcome measure of quality because they are 
preventable and treatable conditions.  Furthermore, they are thought of as an adverse 
outcome, regardless of the underlying health of the resident (Grabowski, 1999).  Contractures 
are a special condition related to having a restriction of full passive range of motion of any 
joint due to deformity, disuse, pain, etc., including fingers, wrists, elbows, shoulders, hips, 
knees, and ankles (Cowles, 2002).  Lack of movement can cause contractures, so the rate of 
contractures may be a valid indicator of staff availability to improve quality of care as well.   
Process of care refers to the actual care the nursing home resident receives and 
pertains to the appropriate and correct performance of specific technical procedures and 
services.  Processes of care measures include the rates of catheter use and restraint use.  
Urethral catheterization places the resident at greater risk for urinary track infection; other 
long-term complications include bladder and renal stones, abscesses, and renal failure 
(Cawley et al, 2004).  Physical restraints may increase the risk of pressure sores, depression, 
mental and physical deterioration, and mortality (Zinn, 1993).  Materials-intensive methods 
of care have been known to be associated with greater risks of morbidity and mortality 
among nursing home residents (Cawley et al., 2004; Zinn, 1993).  Finally, overall facility 
quality is measured by total number of facility survey deficiencies.   
For the third analysis assessing the relationship between staffing and quality of care, 
onset or prevention of certain conditions is of primary interest.  Therefore, only four quality 
measures were used for the third analysis.  Resident outcomes are measured by the incidence 
rates of pressure sores and contractures, while processes of care measures include the 
incidence rates of catheter use and restraint use.  The current condition of residents at the 
time of survey might simply reflect the resident case mix and severity rather than onset of or 
  69
prevention of these conditions due to quality of care.  To avoid this problem, the rates of 
onset of the four adverse outcomes since admission are constructed by subtracting the 
percentage of residents with either of four conditions on admission from the current rates.  
OSCAR requires the facility to provide both the number of residents with pressure sores, 
contractures, catheters, or restraints at the time of survey, and the number of residents with 
the conditions on admission among those who have either of four conditions.  To prevent 
skewed results, erroneous negative values are recoded to zero, and unrealistically high 
incidence rates are recoded to the 99th percentile values of the data.  Each quality measure is 
treated as a continuous variable. 
 
5.1.3. Financial performance 
 All the financial accounting elements were extracted from the MCR’s worksheets G 
and S.  Worksheet G contains a balance sheet, a statement of changes in net assets, and a 
statement of patient revenues and operating expenses, while worksheet S provides 
operational data.  Financial performance indicators are subdivided into three categories: 
profit, revenue, and cost.  Table 5.2 shows the definitions and MCR sources for the 
constructed financial performance indicators.  
Profit level is measured by total margin.  This indicator has been frequently used as a 
measure of financial performance in health services research (GAO, 2003; McCue et al., 
2003; Wang et al., 2001; Weech-Maldonado et al., 2004).  This indicator is calculated by 
dividing net income from both operations and non-operations (e.g., donations and gains or 
losses on investments in securities, real estate, or operating subsidiaries) by total health care 
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revenues.  The ratio is expressed as a percentage and reflects profits from both operations and 
non-operations.   
Net revenue per resident day is used to measure revenue performance.  Net revenue is 
the total net patient revenue after the deduction from the gross routine and ancillary services 
revenue of contractual adjustments, allowance for bad debts, and charity care.  Cost 
performance is measured by net expense per resident day.  The annual Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics is used to convert all dollar amounts to 
constant 2001 dollars. 
Table 5.2  Financial Performance: Definitions and Medicare Cost Report Sources 
Financial Performance Definition Medicare Cost Report Sources 
Profit   
   Total margin  [(Net patient revenues + Other 
operating and non-operating 
revenues – Total operating 
expenses – Other expenses) / 
(Net patient revenues + Other 
operating and non-operating 
revenues)] × 100 
[(Worksheet G-3, Line 3 + Worksheet 
G-3, Line 26 - Worksheet G-2, Part II, 
Line 15 - Worksheet G-3, Line 31) / 
(Worksheet G-3, Line 3 + Worksheet 
G-3, Line 26)] × 100 
Revenue   
    Revenue per diem Net patient revenues / Total 
resident days 
Worksheet G-3, Line 3 / (Worksheet S-
3, Part I, Line 1, Column 7 + 
Worksheet S-3, Part I, Line 3, Column 
7) 
Cost   
    Expense per diem Total operating expenses / Total 
resident days 
Worksheet G-2, Part II, Line 15 /  
(Worksheet S-3, Part I, Line 1, Column 
7 + Worksheet S-3, Part I, Line 3, 
Column 7) 
Note: FTE=full-time equivalent   
Source: SNF Medicare Cost Report elements from CMS form 2540-96  
 
5.1.4. Transition and steady state effects  
The explanatory variables of key interest are the policy variables indicating staffing 
standard changes.  State minimum staffing standards variables are constructed from various 
published sources.  Dummy variables are used to indicate whether the state established or 
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increased minimum staffing standards for nursing staff for a given year by exploiting 
differences in the timing of standard changes for the 50 states and the District of Columbia 
from 1998 to 2001.  Two dummy variables are constructed to specify two different levels of 
treatment effects: ‘transition effects’ and ‘steady state effects’.  The persistent (steady state) 
effect of policy changes is expected to be apparent after a while, thus the persistent effects of 
state policy changes are estimated with a one year lag specification.  In particular, OSCAR 
measurement of staffing may occur before or after the actual start of the new standards in a 
calendar year.  Therefore, estimating transition year effects separately should help to reduce 
possible measurement error.   
Each facility-year observation could be a control or treatment group for estimating 
two different policy effects.  For example, the information for year 2000 for facility “A” in a 
state that changed its policy in 1998 could be used as a control group for the transition effects 
and a treatment group for steady state effects.   
 
5.1.5. Other explanatory variables 
Several facility, market, and state level time-varying variables are used to control for 
changes in facility, market, and state characteristics over time.  Time-varying facility 
characteristics available from OSCAR include ownership (i.e., for-profit, nonprofit, 
government), whether the facility is part of a chain, percent of residents on Medicare, bed 
size, occupancy rate, and information on resident case mix.  The unit of analysis is the 
facility, and the resident characteristics are measured each year at the facility level.  Resident 
case mix is represented by the sum of average ADL index and skilled service index (Cowles, 
2002).  The ADL index is the average of the percent of residents who are bedfast or 
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chairbound or need assistance with eating, toileting, and transferring, weighted by the 
amount of assistance needed.  The skilled service index is a sum of the percentage of 
residents utilizing intravenous therapy, suctioning, respiratory therapy, tracheostomy care, 
and parenteral feeding.  In addition, the rates of pressure sores, contractures, catheter use and 
restraint use on admission are included in each quality regression (in the first analysis) to 
capture baseline case mix differences between the facilities. 
Market-level variables are used to provide additional controls over time.  The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is a proxy for a market competition with other nursing 
homes in the market.  HHI is constructed by combining the squared market shares of all 
facilities in the county and determining each facility’s percentage share of beds in the county 
(Castle, 2002).  The index varies from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating perfect competition and 1 
indicating monopoly (only one facility in the market).  The identification of excess demand 
conditions has been a critical issue in the nursing home literature (Cohen and Spector, 1996; 
Grabowski, 2001b; Mukamel et al., 2005; Nyman, 1985).  Using the presence of CON or 
construction moratoria regulation, however, does not capture the historical influence of 
policies to limit bed supply (Castle, 2002).  Decreases in demand and increases in bed supply 
have eliminated the excess demand and forced nursing home markets to be more competitive 
(Mukamel et al., 2005).  However, within-state variation in these policies is limited 
(Grabowski, 2004).  As in several previous studies (Cohen and Spector, 1996; Grabowski, 
2001a; Mukamel et al., 2005), excess demand was defined as the average number of empty 
beds in the county in which the facility was located.  For this study, the average number of 
empty beds per 1,000 community-dwelling elderly (65+) in the county serves as a proxy for 
market demand, and indirectly captures the effects of facility occupancy and other long-term 
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care providers in the market.  The annual average per capita income and the unemployment 
rate are included to control for county economic conditions.  Total population aged 85 and 
over and female population aged 15-44 for each county are used to control for county 
demographic conditions. 
Many of the study states implemented other quality initiatives at the same time they 
changed their minimum staffing requirements.  State quality improvement such as Medicaid 
per-diem rates is included in the analysis.  State Medicaid average per-diem rates over 1998-
2001 are adjusted by the annual CPI and used as a continuous measure in 2002 dollars. 
Consistent with empirical specification of prior cost and profits studies, the natural 
log of total resident days is included in the financial analysis as an output production, and the 
natural log of CMS SNFs wage index is used as an input price to measure variation in SNFs 
wage in a given year. 
 
5.2. Descriptive Statistics for Identification of Low-Staff Facilities 
As of 2001, a total of 30 states required total staffing standards, while 32 states 
required state-specific LN standards.  Current federal standards require only minimum 
standards for LN.  The federal LN requirements were applied for 19 states which did not 
have state-specific requirements.  Seven states had established minimum state requirements 
for RN, whereas 10 states for NA. 
 
5.2.1. Calculated MSS for a 100-bed nursing facility 
State minimum staffing standards vary considerably in how they are described and 
are sometimes difficult to interpret.  In order to assess the compliance rates with specific state 
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MSS and compare with actual staffing hours in nursing homes in each state, continuous 
measures of nurse staffing standards are constructed.  Since each state has different types of 
regulations by size of facility or work shift, staffing standards need to be standardized to get 
a uniform measure.  In this study, state minimum staffing standards are converted to staff 
hours per resident day for a 100-bed (approximately the average size of a facility) nursing 
facility with at least two units using Harrington’s rule (Harrington, 2002).  For simplicity, 
each full-time staff member is considered to work 8 hours per day, and one full-time DON is 
assumed to work 40 hours per week.  If the state has staffing ratio regulations such as 1:10 
full-time staff by shift (8hours/day), then it is converted to 0.8 HPRD (8 hours divided by the 
number of residents).  All three shifts during a day are added (e.g., to equal 0.24 HPRD). 
To meet the federal requirements, for example, a 100-bed nursing facility would need 
to have one RN and one LN on the day shift and one LN on the evening shift and one LN the 
night shift.  This would be a total of 24 LN hours per day (equivalent to 0.24 HPRD for 100 
residents) and 0.06 RN DON HPRD (40 hours divided by 7 days divided by 100 residents).  
Current federal LN requirements, therefore, would be approximately 0.30 HPRD, but federal 
standards do not require minimum standards for total nursing staff, direct care staff, or 
certified nurse assistants.   
 
5.2.2. To identify facilities most likely to be affected by MSS: low-staff facilities 
Nursing homes with staffing levels below or close to new standards in the period 
preceding the new standards are more likely to have responded to the increased state 
standards than facilities with prior staffing considerably higher than the new standards.  To 
the extent that the effect of minimum staffing standards is heterogeneous, the magnitude and 
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direction of effects may be different.  To create the indicator of low-staff facility, both 
licensed and unlicensed staffing in each year were compared to the required staffing in the 
next (subsequent) year to see if current staffing was lower than what was required in the next 
year.  A facility was defined as low-staff if current (t) staffing was less than next year (t+1) 
required staffing in any one year.  
It is important to remember that the low-staff variable in this study does not represent 
facilities that were below current standards, but instead identifies facilities that had to 
increase staffing to become compliant with new standards in the next period based on the 
standards as calculated for a 100-bed facility.  Table 5.3 shows the percent of low-staff 
facilities by state in this study over the study period.  Forty-nine percent of the facilities 
(N=7,460) were low-staff, while 51 percent of the facilities (N=7,765) were consistently 
above subsequent year standards over the study period.  
Table 5.3  Low-Staff Facilities by State, 1998-2001 
State Number of Facilities (4-Year Average) % of Low-Staff Facilities 
AK 5 0.00 
AL 199 0.11 
AR 254 0.96 
AZ 126 0.34 
CA 1,053 0.86 
CO 187 0.14 
CT 257 0.29 
DC 17 0.00 
DE 35 0.48 
FL 662 0.85 
GA 308 0.94 
HI 29 0.15 
IA 458 0.63 
ID 60 0.30 
IL 777 0.75 
IN 538 0.73 
KS 350 0.48 
KY 252 0.41 
LA 360 0.75 
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MA 517 0.30 
MD 228 0.15 
ME 120 0.17 
MI 416 0.18 
MN 373 0.16 
MO 507 0.74 
MS 162 0.68 
MT 62 0.15 
NC 353 0.07 
ND 69 0.26 
NE 206 0.63 
NH 78 0.29 
NJ 326 0.26 
NM 70 0.57 
NV 37 0.79 
NY 593 0.32 
OH 966 0.26 
OK 427 0.85 
OR 148 0.16 
PA 641 0.39 
RI 95 0.47 
SC 147 0.23 
SD 96 0.56 
TN 297 0.21 
TX 1,183 0.68 
UT 79 0.33 
VA 265 0.39 
VT 42 0.42 
WA 256 0.15 
WI 395 0.29 
WV 117 0.09 
WY 27 0.46 
Total 15,225 0.49 
 
5.2.3. Assessment of facilities compliant with MSS after implementation of new standards 
 While the process described in the previous section is used to identify the facilities 
most likely to be affected by MSS for the analyses, it is also of interest to assess the degree of 
compliance after implementation of MSS using the same approach.  Therefore, total nurse 
hours were compared with constructed state staffing standards after implementation of MSS 
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(Table 5.4).  Because many states account for the size of facility in setting staffing standards, 
the standards were calculated for a facility with 100 beds.  To avoid errors in this comparison 
due to facility size relative to the actual standards, the comparison is limited to facilities with 
80-120 beds. 
 States vary widely in their nursing homes’ willingness and/or ability to meet the 
staffing standards.  Most homes in most states met and exceeded the minimum staffing 
standards.  In some states however (e.g., Arkansas, California, Illinois, Louisiana, Nevada), 
actual total staffing levels were substantially below the minimum staffing standards.  A study 
by Harrington and O’Meara (2006) using California data also reported that a number of 
facilities operated at staffing levels below the mandated levels: 64% of nursing homes did not 
meet the mandatory standards in 2000, and 27% of facilities failed to comply by 2003, 
although the actual median nurse staffing level in nursing homes was substantially higher 
than each state’s staffing standards.   
Table 5.4  Compliance Rates to MSS for Total Staff: Facilities with 80-120 Beds 
  Year 
State  1998 1999 2000 2001 
  (26 States) (27 States) (29 States) (30 States) 
AR Calculated MSS 3.17 3.17 3.17 3.9 
 Mean of total HPRD 2.65 2.65 2.82 2.73 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.1 0.17 0.18 0.04 
      
CA Calculated MSS 3.06 3.06 3.26 3.26 
 Mean of total HPRD 2.93 2.9 2.91 2.97 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.33 0.3 0.21 0.24 
      
CO Calculated MSS 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 
 Mean of total HPRD 2.87 2.87 2.78 2.83 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.91 
      
CT Calculated MSS 1.96 1.96 1.96 1.96 
 Mean of total HPRD 3.29 3.18 3.19 3.19 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.88 0.89 0.89 0.89 
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DE Calculated MSS 2.56 2.56 2.56 3.06 
 Mean of total HPRD 3.91 4.19 3.9 3.51 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.87 0.88 0.94 0.63 
      
FL Calculated MSS 2.3 2.3 2.3 3.6 
 Mean of total HPRD 3.4 3.25 3.08 3.08 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.13 
      
GA Calculated MSS 2.56 2.56 2.56 2.56 
 Mean of total HPRD 2.83 2.78 2.87 2.88 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.73 0.64 0.70 0.70 
      
IA Calculated MSS   2 2 
 Mean of total HPRD   2.5 2.52 
 % Facilities met MSS   0.82 0.82 
      
ID Calculated MSS 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 
 Mean of total HPRD 3.32 3.07 3.35 3.35 
 % Facilities met MSS 1.00 0.85 0.93 0.88 
      
IL Calculated MSS 2.56 2.56 2.56 2.56 
 Mean of total HPRD 2.53 2.59 2.68 2.65 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.44 
      
KS Calculated MSS 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 
 Mean of total HPRD 2.29 2.33 2.41 2.47 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.68 0.63 0.81 0.81 
      
LA Calculated MSS 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 
 Mean of total HPRD 2.63 2.59 2.57 2.55 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.35 
      
MA Calculated MSS 2.66 2.66 2.66 2.66 
 Mean of total HPRD 3.19 3.43 3.16 3.2 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.88 0.86 0.82 0.82 
      
MD Calculated MSS 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 
 Mean of total HPRD 2.94 2.89 2.8 2.88 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.97 0.94 0.88 0.92 
      
MI Calculated MSS 2.31 2.31 2.31 2.31 
 Mean of total HPRD 3.07 3.05 2.98 3.06 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.95 0.93 0.88 0.91 
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MN Calculated MSS 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 
 Mean of total HPRD 2.75 2.82 2.74 2.75 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 
      
MS Calculated MSS 2.26 2.26 2.86 2.86 
 Mean of total HPRD 2.71 2.71 2.9 2.91 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.80 0.86 0.41 0.50 
      
MT Calculated MSS 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
 Mean of total HPRD 3.09 3.12 3.09 3.11 
 % Facilities met MSS 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
      
NC Calculated MSS 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.16 
 Mean of total HPRD 3.32 3.23 3.19 3.27 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.97 0.94 0.96 0.98 
      
NJ Calculated MSS 2.56 2.56 2.56 2.56 
 Mean of total HPRD 3.19 3.14 3.12 3.09 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.87 
      
NM Calculated MSS   2.56 2.56 
 Mean of total HPRD   2.93 2.95 
 % Facilities met MSS   0.82 0.81 
      
NV Calculated MSS 3.06 3.06 3.06 3.06 
 Mean of total HPRD 2.82 3.04 2.76 2.81 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.30 0.22 0.40 0.40 
      
OR Calculated MSS 1.95 1.95 1.95 1.95 
 Mean of total HPRD 2.87 2.87 2.85 2.82 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.91 
      
PA Calculated MSS  2.76 2.76 2.76 
 Mean of total HPRD  3.12 3.1 3.08 
 % Facilities met MSS  0.75 0.79 0.75 
      
SC Calculated MSS 2.16 2.41 2.41 2.41 
 Mean of total HPRD 3.17 3.04 3.19 3.21 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.98 0.88 0.96 0.98 
      
TN Calculated MSS 2 2 2 2 
 Mean of total HPRD 2.76 2.57 2.58 2.69 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.93 0.92 0.88 0.89 
      
UT Calculated MSS 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 
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 Mean of total HPRD 2.57 2.81 2.64 2.78 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.73 0.9 0.88 0.88 
      
VT Calculated MSS    3.06 
 Mean of total HPRD    3.54 
 % Facilities met MSS    1.00 
      
WI Calculated MSS 2.31 2.56 2.56 2.56 
 Mean of total HPRD 2.97 3.07 3.06 3.07 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.96 0.85 0.86 0.86 
      
WV Calculated MSS 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06 
 Mean of total HPRD 3.06 3.13 3.28 3.4 
 % Facilities met MSS 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 
Notes: MSS=Minimum Staffing Standards, HPRD=hours per resident day 
  
Figure 5.1 depicts compliance rates to MSS for total staff by ownership type among 
facilities with 80-120 beds.  Most nonprofit nursing homes (about 84.4%) met the minimum 
staffing standards, while only 61.7% of for-profit homes complied with standards.  The 
compliance rates have decreased slightly over the four-year study period.  The post-MSS-
implementation compliance results suggest that the licensing and certification programs 
responsible for regulating nursing homes have not effectively enforced the standards in some 
states although this analysis did not have data on exemptions processes that may have been 
used.   
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Figure 5.1  Compliance Rates to MSS for Total Staff: Facilities with 80-120 Beds, By Ownership, 1998-
2001 
Compliance Rates (%) to MSS for Total Staff
: Facilities with 80-120 Beds, By Ownership, 1998-2001
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CHAPTER VI 
THE EFFECTS OF STATE MINIMUM STAFFING STANDARDS ON NURSING 
HOME STAFFING AND QUALITY OF CARE 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
Quality of nursing home care is an important public policy issue, especially given the 
aging of the population.  Public concerns about the quality of care led researchers and 
policymakers to develop and implement staffing standards to ensure higher quality of nursing 
home care.   
Considerable research has been devoted to the issues of the number and composition 
of nursing staff required to meet the needs of nursing home residents (Abt, 2001; Carter and 
Porell, 2003; Castle, 2000; Cohen and Spector, 1996; GAO, 2002a; Harrington et al., 2000b; 
Kayser-Jones et al., 2003; Weech-Maldonade et al., 2004).  Not surprisingly, most findings 
have suggested that a higher nursing staff level (i.e., more care hours per resident day) and 
more highly skilled nursing staff mix (i.e., a greater proportion of professional nursing staff 
such as registered nurses) are associated with higher quality of care in nursing homes 
measured by various process and outcome indicators.   
Despite the public policy importance, there has been little research on the effect of 
state minimum staffing standards to date.  The role of state staffing standards was not directly 
considered in the earlier staffing-quality studies, and little is known about whether the 
increased state staffing requirements lead to higher staffing and better outcomes.  This 
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chapter presents an empirical analysis of whether state minimum staffing standards improved 
the level of staffing and quality of nursing home care during the period 1998 to 2001.   
 
6.2.  Data and Study Sample 
6.2.1.  Data sources  
As described in more detail in Chapter IV, the data on facility characteristics, staffing, 
and quality measures came from the OSCAR system from 1998 through 2001.  The OSCAR 
data are from state surveys of all federally certified Medicare skilled nursing facilities and 
Medicaid nursing facilities in the U.S.  The OSCAR system includes about 96% of nation’s 
nursing homes, and information from the system is used to determine whether nursing homes 
are complying with federal regulations (Grabowski, 1999).  Although most OSCAR data 
elements are self-reported, OSCAR is the most comprehensive national source of facility-
level information on the operations, resident characteristics, and regulatory compliance of 
nursing homes in the U.S. (Cawley et al., 2004; Zinn 1993).  
The OSCAR data were linked to the data on specific state staffing standards, state 
Medicaid per-diem rates, and market conditions.  State minimum staffing standards and 
Medicaid policy variable were constructed from various published sources.  State minimum 
staffing standards came from two published reports which have collected state nurse staffing 
standards for nursing homes from state statutes, regulations, and administrative policies via 
the Internet and telephone survey.7  State Medicaid per-diem rates were obtained from the 
Brown University Survey of State policies (1999-2002) and Harrington’s 1998 State Data 
                                                 
7 (1) Harrington, C. (2002). Nursing Home Staffing Standards. The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured.  (2) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation Office of Disability (2003). State Experiences With Minimum Nursing Staff Ratio For Nursing 
Facilities: Finding From Case Studies of Eight States. 
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Book on Long-Term Care Program and Market Characteristics: State Medicaid Policy.  
Market-level variables were obtained from the ARF, which is a publicly available dataset 
containing more than 7,000 economic and demographic variables for each of the nation’s 
counties.  Data on the population for each county came from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
6.2.2.  Study sample 
The quality of measures in the OSCAR has been issued in previous studies (Abt, 
2000, 2001; Zhang and Grabowski, 2004).  In particular, staffing data have skewed 
distributions.  To eliminate possibly erroneous outliers for the analytic data, the exclusion 
criteria developed by CMS (Abt, 2000) for its study of minimum nurse staffing ratios were 
adopted in this study.   
All facilities that reported more residents than beds were excluded.  Current federal 
regulations require that all certified nursing homes with 60 or more beds have a registered 
nurse on duty for 8 hours a day seven days a week and a licensed nurse on duty evenings and 
nights.  Facilities with fewer than 60 beds can obtain a waiver that exempts them from this 
requirement.  Thus, all facilities that reported no registered nurse hours and had 60 or more 
beds were also excluded.  The facilities that reported more than 12 hours per resident day and 
less than 0.5 total hours per resident day were eliminated to avoid the unrealistically high or 
low staffing hours.  Facilities that reported zero residents were excluded, and facilities with 
incomplete information were also removed from the analysis.  The original database included 
18,275 facilities; on the basis of the criteria above, 436 facilities (2.39 %) were excluded.   
Since hospital-based nursing facilities are very different in terms of resident severity 
and care practice, an additional 2,271 hospital-based facilities were also eliminated.  
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Although Medicare-only-certified facilities are affected by state regulations, those facilities 
are primarily for short-stay residents after hospitalization.  Thus, an additional 343 Medicare-
only facilities were eliminated, so that only nursing homes with Medicaid-only or dually 
certified facilities were analyzed.  Eight more facilities were excluded due to missing values.  
As a result of cleaning process, a total of 55,248 facility-year observations from 15,217 
facilities were analyzed.   
 
6.2.3. Descriptive statistics 
The first three columns in Table 6.1 show summary statistics for all facilities.  The 
values for the quality, staffing and other covariates are similar to values reported by other 
studies using these variables (Castle and Engberg, 2005; Cowles, 2002; Grabowski, 2004; 
Harrington et al., 2000b).  It is important to remember that the low-staff variable in this study 
does not represent facilities that were below current standards, but instead identifies facilities 
that had to increase staffing to become compliant with new standards in the next period.  By 
this definition, 49 percent of the facilities (N=7,248) were low-staff, while 51 percent of the 
facilities (N=7,969) were consistently above subsequent year standards over the study 
period.  The rightmost three columns in Table 6.1 compare the mean values of all variables 
for facilities with relatively low staffing and those with relatively high staffing.  The low-
staff facilities were more likely for-profit and chain-affiliated, and had slightly fewer 
residents on Medicare and fewer beds than their counterparts.  The low-staff facilities were 
more likely to be in counties with relatively greater elderly and female population, while the 
states where low-staff facilities were located were more likely to increase staffing standards 
and have less generous Medicaid reimbursement rates. 
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Table 6.1  Summary Statistics by Staffing Status, 1998-2001 
 Full Sample  Low-Staff  
   No(=0) Yes(=1)  
Variables Mean Range SD  Mean Mean t-test 
Staffing:        
   RN HPRD 0.34 (0, 10.23) 0.32  0.42 0.26 *** 
   LPN HPRD 0.65 (0, 9.64) 0.38  0.71 0.60 *** 
   NA HPRD 1.94 (0, 10.65) 0.68  2.20 1.66 *** 
   Total HPRD 2.93 (0.5, 11.98) 0.95  3.33 2.51 *** 
Quality of Care:        
   % Pressure sores 6.47 (0, 100) 4.77  6.38 6.57 *** 
   % Contractures 25.72 (0, 100) 20.47  27.98 23.38 *** 
   % Incontinence 54.50 (0, 100) 15.91  56.33 52.61 *** 
   % Catheter use 6.05 (0, 100) 4.91  6.07 6.04  
   % Restraint use 11.87 (0, 100) 13.02  11.34 12.43 *** 
   Total deficiencies 5.91 (0, 50) 5.88  5.16 6.68 *** 
Policy: Staffing Standards        
   Transition effect 0.101  0.301  0.083 0.119 *** 
   Steady state effect 0.103  0.304  0.070 0.136 *** 
Facility:        
   Ownership        
      For-profit 0.73  0.44  0.64 0.82 *** 
      Nonprofit 0.23  0.42  0.30 0.15 *** 
      Government 0.04  0.21  0.06 0.03 *** 
   Chain 0.58  0.49  0.53 0.63 *** 
   Payer mix        
      % residents paid by Medicare 7.48 (0, 100) 8.68  8.37 6.56 *** 
      % residents paid by Medicaid 67.89 (0, 100) 19.82  65.58 70.28 *** 
      % residents paid by others 24.63 (0, 100) 18.78  26.06 23.16 *** 
   Total beds 114.82 (5, 1231) 65.98  118.57 110.95 *** 
   Occupancy rate 84.63 (1.56, 100) 15.28  85.29 83.95 *** 
   Case mix        
      Acuity index 10.08 (3, 21.70) 1.54  10.28 9.86 *** 
      % Pressure sores on admission 3.10 (0, 100) 4.17  3.105 3.102  
      % Contractures on admission 16.21 (0, 100) 17.13  17.88 14.49 *** 
      % Catheter use on admission 4.24 (0, 93.02) 4.30  4.24 4.23  
      % Restraint use on admission 3.82 (0, 100) 8.17  3.46 4.19 *** 
   Low-staff 0.49  0.50  0 1  
Market:        
   Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.196 (0.004, 1) 0.228  0.190 0.203 *** 
   Empty beds per 1,000 elderly (65+) 13.08 (0, 173.91) 13.06  11.28 14.93 *** 
   Per capita income (in $1,000s) 26.87 (0, 92.98) 7.62  27.59 26.13 *** 
   Unemployment rate (16+) 4.51 (0.70, 29.90) 2.10  4.42 4.61 *** 
   Population 85+ (in 1,000s) 9.88 (0.01, 114.98) 19.63  7.64 12.20 *** 
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   Female population 15-44 (in 1,000s) 160.84 (0.12, 2210.65) 373.79  114.91 208.28 *** 
State:        
   Medicaid rate 108.70 (69.55, 285.01) 23.18  115.37 101.80 *** 
Number of observations 55,248    28,073 27,175  
Number of facilities 15,217    7,969 7,248  
Notes: HPRD=hours per resident day.  SD indicates standard deviation.   
Mean comparison tests (t-test) by low-staff status.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%     
 
6.3.  Empirical Models 
A big challenge to estimating the effect of minimum staffing standards is controlling 
for the unobserved heterogeneity at the facility, market, and state level associated with 
staffing/quality changes over time.  The observed differences in staffing/quality are likely to 
be influenced by unobserved characteristics such as the organizational cultures, practice skill 
of the nurse workforce, overall population health needs, and state political, regulatory, or 
fiscal conditions.  Ignoring this heterogeneity may result in biased estimates if these 
unmeasured factors are correlated with the variation in minimum staffing standards.   
If an unobserved measure of state political culture or ideology is positively associated 
with staffing/quality of care but negatively related to the implementation of staffing standards, 
then the estimated effect of staffing standard changes on staffing/quality of care will be 
understated due to downward bias.  Although state fixed effects would control for 
unobserved time-invariant factors at the state level, the estimates are biased if unobserved 
heterogeneity remains at either the level of the service area (e.g., county) or facility.  For 
example, if unobserved time-invariant county specific health needs or treatment norms for 
vulnerable people are positively correlated with implementation or expansion of staffing 
standards and staffing/quality of care, the coefficient of the policy variable will be biased 
upward and the true effect of the policy will be understated.  Alternatively, the existence of 
unobserved administrative efficiency associated with staffing choice or quality of care will 
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also cause bias.  Therefore, a facility-level fixed effects model was chosen to account for as 
many sources of heterogeneity as possible.   
Since the policy changes occurred at diverse times across states, the present study 
provides unique new evidence by exploiting a natural experiment approach.  Over the last 
decade, natural experiments have become especially popular in analyzing the effects of 
policy changes (Dow and Schmeer, 2003: Konetzka et al., 2004a, 2004b).  The approach 
used in this study is a difference-in-differences (DD) model to estimate the effect of staffing 
standard changes on staffing/quality of care with pre-post and treatment-control groups.  The 
average treatment effect can be calculated as the pre-post difference between the treatment 
and control group mean difference, assuming that the pre-difference is a good estimate of 
what the post-difference would have been had the treatment group not actually been treated 
(Woodridge, 2001).  To avoid possible omitted variable bias, a set of facility, market, and 
state level time-varying covariates were added to the model.  To explore variation in the 
effect of MSS by facility staffing level, the extended model included two policy variables 
and their interactions with the indicator of low-staff facility.8  Furthermore, additional triple 
interaction terms with facility ownership (i.e., for-profit status) were included to assess the 
differential behavior of nursing homes in response to policy changes.  The model 
specification is as follows: 
 
istitiststist YearDXMSSY εμδγβα +++++= 0     (6.1) 
 
                                                 
8 The identification here is not the same as a difference-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) strategy.  A key 
assumption of DDD approach is that the policy changes should not affect the staffing level among the third 
control group. 
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where the subscript i  indexes the nursing home, s  indexes state, and t  indexes year.  istY  is 
the actual level of nursing home staffing (i.e., RNs, LPNs, NAs, and total staff) or measures 
of quality of care.  stMSS  is a vector of the main treatment effects specified by two policy 
variables (transition and steady state effects) and their interactions with the indicators of low-
staff facility and for-profit status.  istX  is a vector of facility, county, and state level time-
varying covariates.  A vector of year dummy variables ( tYearD ) accounts for unobserved 
time fixed effects that might have an effect on staffing/quality of care and are possibly 
correlated with the implementation or expansion of state staffing standards.  The error term 
consists of a facility-specific error component ( iμ ) to control for time-invariant facility and 
area characteristics and a mean zero random error component ( istε ). 
Statistical tests were used to compare fixed and random effects specifications.9  The 
parameters of Equation (6.1) were estimated by using an ordinary least squares (OLS) model 
for the rates of pressure sores, contractures, bladder incontinence, catheter use, and restraint 
use.  A negative binomial (NB) model was used for the total number of deficiencies which is 
a count of specific negative events since OLS does not generate consistent estimates given 
the skewed nature of count data.       
 
6.4.  Results  
6.4.1.  Effect of state minimum staffing standards on staffing  
Table 6.2 provides OLS regression estimates for the models using staffing levels 
(hours per resident day by type of staff) as the dependent variables.  The significant positive 
                                                 
9 The Breush-Pagan and the Hausman specification tests strongly suggested that there were the facility-specific 
effects, thus fixed effects models were analyzed in order to control for time-invariant facility characteristics.   
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coefficients on the interaction terms between policy changes and a low-staff indicator on NA 
hours and total staff hours indicated that increased minimum staffing standards were more 
likely to influence the facilities with relatively low staffing levels than those facilities that 
already operated at or above the mandated levels.  However, the opposite signs on the triple 
interaction terms indicated that the response might differ by facility ownership type.   
As expected, having a higher proportion of Medicare residents and a higher severity 
index value had significant positive impacts on staffing levels.  High occupancy rates were 
negatively associated with all of the staffing types.  The size of the female population in the 
market which may represent availability of long-term care workers were positively 
associated with higher LPN and total staffing levels. 
Table 6.2  Effect of State Minimum Staffing Standards on Staffing: DD Models 
 RN HPRD LPN HPRD NA HPRD Total HPRD 
Policy: Staffing Standards     
     Transition effect 0.013* -0.002 -0.000 0.011 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.017) (0.021) 
     Steady state effect 0.016* 0.006 -0.029 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.021) (0.026) 
     Transition × Low-staff 0.005 0.009 0.065** 0.079** 
 (0.011) (0.016) (0.028) (0.035) 
     Steady × Low-staff 0.018 0.021 0.174*** 0.212*** 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.032) (0.041) 
     Transition × For-profit  -0.015* -0.007 -0.014 -0.036 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.022) (0.027) 
     Steady × For-profit -0.027** -0.021 0.006 -0.042 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.028) (0.035) 
     Transition × Low-staff × For-profit  -0.006 -0.006 -0.040 -0.052 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.033) (0.041) 
     Steady × Low-staff × For-profit 0.002 -0.006 -0.126*** -0.130*** 
 (0.016) (0.022) (0.039) (0.049) 
Facility:     
     For-profit -0.010 0.022 0.029 0.041 
 (0.013) (0.017) (0.031) (0.039) 
     Chain -0.010* 0.015* 0.007 0.012 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.014) (0.017) 
     % Medicare 0.001*** 0.000** 0.003*** 0.005*** 
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 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
     Total beds -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.009*** -0.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
     Total beds × Total beds 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     Occupancy rate -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.027*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     Acuity index 0.000 0.003** 0.018*** 0.022*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Market::     
     Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.026 0.051 -0.052 0.026 
 (0.049) (0.066) (0.120) (0.151) 
     Empty beds per 1,000 elderly (65+) -0.000** 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
     Per capita income (in $1,000s) -0.002** 0.003*** -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
     Unemployment rate (16+) -0.006*** -0.003* -0.004 -0.013*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
     Population 85+ (in 1,000s) -0.002* 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
     Female population 15-44 (in 1,000s) 0.000 0.001*** 0.001 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
State:     
     Medicaid rate -0.000** -0.000 -0.001** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Year:     
     1999 -0.006*** -0.003 -0.013** -0.023*** 
      (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) 
     2000 -0.020*** -0.003 -0.021*** -0.045*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.009) 
     2001 -0.019*** -0.002 -0.018** -0.039*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.011) 
Constant 1.258*** 1.324*** 3.728*** 6.310*** 
 (0.060) (0.081) (0.146) (0.184) 
Mean (HPRD) 0.34 0.65 1.94 2.93 
Number of observations 55,248 55,248 55,248 55,248 
Number of facilities 15,217 15,217 15,217 15,217 
R-squared 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.11 
Notes:  HPRD=hours per resident day.  Standard errors in parentheses.    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Among different levels of policy effects, the main measure of effect pertains to 
whether changes in staffing standards had persistent effects on staffing levels.  Table 6.3 
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presents the marginal steady state effects of state minimum staffing standards on staffing by 
staffing level prior to the new standards and ownership status.  The magnitude of the steady 
state effects was greater than the transition effects (summary results not shown in Table 6.3), 
indicating that the change in staffing standards had a cumulative and persistent effect in 
increasing staffing levels.10  The results showed significant variation in response across the 
subset of facilities.  Only nonprofit facilities increased RN staffing levels in response to the 
change in staffing standards.  The LPN regression showed significant policy effects 
following increased state minimum staffing standards only for the low-staff nonprofit 
facilities.  Nonprofit facilities with relatively low staffing levels made large changes in both 
licensed and unlicensed staffing levels.  Increased minimum staffing standards led to a 
statistically significant steady state increase in RN, LPN, NA and total staff hours by 0.034 
HPRD (2.04 minutes), 0.027 HPRD (1.62 minutes), 0.145 HPRD (8.7 minutes) and 0.206 
HPRD (12.36 minutes), respectively.  About two-thirds of the increase in total staff hours 
was due to an increase in NA hours.  The steady state effect among for-profit facilities with 
relatively high staffing levels, however, was associated with a decrease in total staffing hours 
by 0.049 HPRD (2.94 minutes).  As noted by other authors (Kovner and Heinrich, 2000; 
Mueller et al., 2006), facilities where staffing exceeded the minimums may decrease their 
staffing if those facilities treat the minimum standards as if they were maximum required (i.e., 
that nursing homes assume they only have to comply with the minimum levels to ensure safe 
practice).  The recent introduction of PPS for Medicare skilled nursing care in 1998 may also 
mean that nursing homes may have faced extra pressure to reduce professional staffing levels, 
in particular, to avoid financial shocks from PPS (Konetzka et al., 2004b).   
                                                 
10 For example, policy changes led to a first year (transition) increase in total staff hours by 0.09 HPRD (5.4 
minutes), with a steady state increase of 0.206 HPRD (12.36 minutes).  These results were statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level.   
  93
Table 6.3  Marginal Effect of State Minimum Staffing Standards on Staffing: DD Models 
 RN HPRD LPN HPRD NA HPRD Total HPRD 
Panel A: Low-staff (=1)     
          For-profit 0.009 -0.0004 0.025* 0.033* 
 (0.006) (0.0076) (0.014) (0.017) 
   [1.5min] [1.98min] 
          Nonprofit 0.034*** 0.027* 0.145*** 0.206*** 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.026) (0.033) 
 [2.04min] [1.62min] [8.7min] [12.36min] 
Panel B: Low-staff (=0)     
          For-profit -0.011 -0.015 -0.022 -0.049* 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.020) (0.025) 
    [-2.94min] 
          Nonprofit 0.016* 0.006 -0.029 -0.007 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.021) (0.026) 
 [0.96min]    
Notes: HPRD=hours per resident day.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Minutes in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
6.4.2.  Effect of state minimum staffing standards on quality of care 
Table 6.4 presents the main results from DD models for each quality indicator.  The 
main hypothesis was whether increases in state staffing standards have improved the quality 
of care.  If the hypotheses were correct, coefficients on the policy variables would be 
negative since the quality of care measures were all constructed as adverse outcomes.  The 
magnitude and direction of policy variables could vary since the program effect may be 
apparent after some time.  The magnitude and direction could also vary by different groups 
of facilities based on the various facility, market, and state circumstances. 
Once again, the magnitude of the steady state effects was greater than the transition 
effects for effects that were statistically significant, indicating that the change in staffing 
standards had a cumulative and persistent effect in reducing the number of deficiencies 
(results not shown).  None of the steady state effects for resident outcomes was significantly 
associated with increases in minimum staffing standards (Table 6.5).  This lack of effect for 
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resident outcome measures may be due to the fact that it is difficult to control accurately for 
case mix when using annual facility level data.  Increases in minimum staffing standards 
showed consistent positive effects on the rate of restraint use and the number of total 
deficiencies regardless of the staffing status or ownership type. 
Staffing standards changes led to a steady state reduction in restraint use among 
nonprofit facilities with relatively low staffing levels of 1.27 percentage points.  This result 
was statistically significant at the 1% significance level and was relative to an overall level of 
restraint use of 11.9%.  For low-staff for-profit facilities, the steady state effect was 
associated with facilities being less likely to have total deficiency citations (incidence rate 
ratios (IRR)=0.94, p<0.01) which was relative to an overall mean number of survey 
deficiencies of 5.9.  The deficiency results for facilities with relatively high staffing levels 
showed similar results to the low-staff.  The effect of increases in minimum staffing 
standards on substandard care11 and nursing deficiencies12 showed the same effects (results 
not shown).   
Some facility, market, and state control variables had statistically significant effects, 
but the effects differed substantially across the different quality regressions (Table 6.4).  
Although not all of those variables showed consistent effects on quality of care, the negative 
coefficients on the number of total beds showed some evidence of the economies of scale for 
resident outcomes.  As expected, resident case mix variables had significant negative impacts 
                                                 
11 A deficiency in any of the three Quality of Care (quality of care=F309-333, quality of life=F240-256, resident 
behavior and facility practices= F221-226) categories that has a scope and severity ratings such as F, H, I, J, K, 
and L (Cowles, 2002).  
 
12 Any of the 48 F tags (F154, 164, 176, 221-224, 240-242, 246, 252, 272, 276, 279, 280, 283, 284, 309-333, 
369, 444) which are related to quality of care, modeled after Jean Johnson-Pawlson’s doctoral dissertation 
(Cowles, 2002). 
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on quality of care and should be taken into account in implementing or expanding staffing 
standards.    
If nursing homes compete on the basis of quality, facilities in more competitive areas 
may maintain higher quality than those in low-competition areas.  The coefficients on HHI, 
as a proxy variable for market competition, did not have statistically significant effects for 
any of the quality measures in this study.  
Occupancy rate and the empty beds per 1,000 elderly (65+), as proxies for market 
tightness, showed mixed results across quality measures.  Facilities with higher occupancy 
rates, indicating a tighter nursing home market, may have less incentive to provide high 
quality of care.  High occupancy rates were negatively associated with the rate of restraint 
use and total deficiency citations, but were positively associated with the outcome-based 
quality measures.  Similarly, the number of empty beds per 1,000 elderly in the county has 
been used to identify excess demand or market tightness, and having more empty beds in the 
county would be expected to be associated with higher quality of care.  The result for the 
analyses showed unexpected significant negative effects of this variable on the care process 
and overall quality indicators.  The demand for nursing home services would be thought to be 
higher in areas with high per capita income.  The wealthier, more economically developed 
areas are more likely to support the provision of needed services.  As expected, higher per 
capita income in the county suggested better quality of care as reflected by lower levels of 
contractures and restraint use. 
Among other market factors, higher unemployment rates reduced the total number of 
deficiency citations, possibly because higher unemployment rates could probably encourage 
more nursing staff into nursing home labor market.  Since the demand for and use of nursing 
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home services increase for those aged 85 and older, the size of the elderly population may be 
positively related to quality of care.  The size of the elderly population in the county was 
positively associated with the outcome-based quality measures and the number of 
deficiencies. 
Medicaid program generosity may be positively related to outcomes.  Results for the 
analyses of Medicaid rate were mixed and inconclusive across quality measures, but showed 
small positive effects on total deficiency citations which were consistent with the recent 
studies about Medicaid rate and quality of care (Cohen and Spector, 1996; Grabowski, 2001a, 
2001b, 2002, 2004). 
  
Table 6.4  Effect of State Minimum Staffing Standards on Quality of Care: DD Models 
 Resident Outcome  Care Process  Overall 
 Pressure Sores Contractures Incontinence  Catheter Use Restraint Use  Deficiencies† 
Policy: Staffing Standards         
     Transition year effect 0.138 0.074 -0.690  0.036 -1.156***  -0.054* 
 (0.132) (0.392) (0.428)  (0.107) (0.310)  (0.029) 
     Steady state effect 0.263 0.530 -0.598  -0.052 -2.450***  -0.182*** 
 (0.162) (0.481) (0.526)  (0.131) (0.380)  (0.037) 
     Transition × Low-staff -0.128 -0.415 0.686  0.170 0.326  0.030 
 (0.221) (0.659) (0.719)  (0.179) (0.520)  (0.046) 
     Steady × Low-staff -0.397 -0.374 0.100  0.147 1.183**  0.034 
 (0.253) (0.753) (0.822)  (0.205) (0.594)  (0.054) 
     Transition × For-profit  -0.164 -0.191 0.880  0.034 0.377  0.023 
 (0.170) (0.506) (0.552)  (0.138) (0.399)  (0.037) 
     Steady × For-profit -0.244 -0.670 0.826  0.099 1.297**  0.023 
 (0.217) (0.646) (0.705)  (0.176) (0.510)  (0.047) 
     Transition × Low-staff × For-profit  0.433* -0.264 -1.270  -0.234 0.016  -0.030 
 (0.259) (0.770) (0.841)  (0.210) (0.608)  (0.053) 
     Steady × Low-staff × For-profit 0.548* 0.080 -0.396  -0.272 -0.713  0.064 
 (0.307) (0.913) (0.997)  (0.248) (0.721)  (0.064) 
Facility:         
     For-profit -0.174 -0.329 0.889  0.123 -0.173  -0.012 
 (0.242) (0.722) (0.788)  (0.196) (0.570)  (0.029) 
     Chain 0.402*** -0.156 0.069  -0.004 -0.221  0.014 
 (0.109) (0.324) (0.354)  (0.088) (0.256)  (0.018) 
     % Medicare 0.025*** -0.001 -0.107***  0.021*** -0.034***  0.003*** 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.011)  (0.003) (0.008)  (0.001) 
     Total beds -0.010** -0.024* -0.038**  -0.001 0.048***  0.002*** 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.016)  (0.004) (0.011)  (0.000) 
     Total beds × Total beds 0.000* 0.000 0.000  0.000 -0.000***  -0.000* 
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 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
     Occupancy rate -0.005* -0.042*** -0.050***  -0.002 0.021***  0.008*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.002) (0.006)  (0.000) 
     Acuity index 0.329*** 0.790*** 2.298***  0.285*** 0.487***  0.019*** 
 (0.023) (0.070) (0.076)  (0.019) (0.055)  (0.004) 
     % on admission 0.332*** 0.733***   0.421*** 0.594***   
 (0.005) (0.005)   (0.005) (0.006)   
Market:         
     Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.609 0.576 -0.595  0.864 2.018  0.004 
 (0.942) (2.806) (3.063)  (0.763) (2.215)  (0.068) 
     Empty beds per 1,000 elderly (65+) -0.003 -0.010 -0.003  0.010*** 0.018*  0.002*** 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.015)  (0.004) (0.011)  (0.001) 
     Per capita income (in $1,000s) -0.002 -0.212*** -0.086  0.007 -0.186***  -0.002 
 (0.018) (0.054) (0.058)  (0.015) (0.042)  (0.002) 
     Unemployment rate (16+) 0.021 0.029 -0.107  0.006 -0.017  -0.016*** 
 (0.024) (0.070) (0.077)  (0.019) (0.056)  (0.004) 
     Population 85+ (in 1,000s) -0.045** -0.177*** -0.079  -0.007 -0.046  -0.011*** 
 (0.019) (0.057) (0.063)  (0.016) (0.045)  (0.002) 
     Female population 15-44 (in 1,000s) -0.002 -0.026* -0.014  -0.003 -0.009  0.001*** 
 (0.005) (0.015) (0.017)  (0.004) (0.012)  (0.000) 
State:         
     Medicaid rate -0.000 0.049*** -0.008  -0.008*** 0.021**  -0.005*** 
 (0.004) (0.011) (0.012)  (0.003) (0.009)  (0.001) 
Year:         
     1999 0.072 0.805*** 1.375***  -0.050 -0.886***  0.168*** 
      (0.045) (0.135) (0.147)  (0.037) (0.107)  (0.009) 
     2000 0.150*** 2.026*** 2.061***  -0.061 -1.655***  0.304*** 
 (0.055) (0.165) (0.180)  (0.045) (0.131)  (0.010) 
     2001 0.165** 2.642*** 2.181***  -0.073 -1.512***  0.388*** 
 (0.071) (0.212) (0.232)  (0.058) (0.168)  (0.012) 
Constant 3.732*** 17.112*** 44.973***  2.420*** 4.153  0.669*** 
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 (1.148) (3.419) (3.733)  (0.930) (2.699)  (0.112) 
Mean 6.5% 25.7% 54.5%  6.1% 11.9%  5.9 
Number of observations 55,248 55,248 55,248  55,248 55,248  52,679 
Number of facilities 15,217 15,217 15,217  15,217 15,217  13,868 
R-squared 0.11 0.39 0.03  0.19 0.21   
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses.   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
†Estimates were generated with NB rather than OLS. 
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Table 6.5  Marginal Effect of State Minimum Staffing Standards on Quality of Care: DD Models 
 Resident Outcome  Care Process  Overall 
 Pressure Sores Contractures Incontinence  Catheter Use Restraint Use  Deficiencies† 
Panel A: Low-staff (=1)         
For-profit 0.170 -0.434 -0.067  -0.077 -0.682***  -0.062*** 
 (0.108) (0.322) (0.351)  (0.088) (0.254)  (0.020) 
        [0.94] 
    Nonprofit -0.134 0.156 -0.497  0.095 -1.266***  -0.149*** 
 (0.204) (0.606) (0.662)  (0.165) (0.479)  (0.042) 
        [0.86] 
Panel B: Low-staff (=0)         
         For-profit 0.019 -0.140 0.228  0.047 -1.152***  -0.159*** 
 (0.157) (0.467) (0.510)  (0.127) (0.369)  (0.032) 
        [0.85] 
Nonprofit 0.263 0.530 -0.598 -0.052 -2.450*** -0.182*** 
 (0.162) (0.481) (0.526) (0.131) (0.380) (0.037) 
        [0.83] 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.   Incidence rate ratios in brackets.     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
†Estimates were generated with NB rather than OLS. 
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6.5.  Discussion 
The findings for effect of state minimum staffing standards on staffing levels suggest 
that increased staffing standards matter particularly for the subset of nursing homes with 
staffing levels previously below or close to new standards.  Mandated staffing standards 
seem to only affect staffing at facilities at the low-end of staffing spectrum.  Among those 
facilities with relatively low staffing levels, only nonprofit facilities appear to respond to 
regulatory pressures by increasing both licensed and unlicensed staffing levels consistent 
with many of the expectations from property rights theory.   
Reduced-form analyses of the total effects of state minimum staffing standards show 
that increased staffing standards result in better quality of care at all facilities as measured by 
the rate of restraint use or the deficiency.  Resident outcomes, however, show no change in 
response to increased staffing standards.  There may be several reasons in the lack of 
consistent findings across quality measures.  On the one hand, staffing may be a better 
predictor of high-quality facility care processes than the clinical resident outcomes examined.  
On the other hand, quality and resident outcome characteristics aggregated at the facility 
level may not reflect the true resident-level case mix and severity, or quality of care.   
Contrary to the staffing findings, more interestingly, effects for the facility quality 
measures do not vary by the staffing status or ownership type.  In other words, even though 
facilities with relatively high staffing levels do not show the evidence of improving staffing 
levels in response to new staffing standards, the results for those facilities show much greater 
quality improvements than facilities with relatively low staffing levels.   
The findings for improvement in quality even without increases in staffing are 
possibly due to a general response to increased standards or to other quality improvements 
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implemented at the same time as minimum staffing standards.  Many states indeed put in 
place other quality initiatives at the same time as they changed their staffing standards, and 
major payment changes in Medicaid and Medicare also occurred during the study period.   
Results also may be explained by the fact that the amount of nursing staff alone is not 
the only factor contributing to quality of care received by residents.  Quality of nursing home 
care is influenced by other factors such as physical environment, different methods of 
treatment, efficient use of staff and non-staff inputs, and their productivity differences.   
The nursing homes which had relatively high staffing levels and did not increase 
staffing levels in response to new staffing standards may, for example, improve the 
productivity level of their nursing home workers by increasing job satisfaction or decreasing 
turnover rates, particularly under the nursing shortage and staff recruitment and retention 
difficulties.  In this case, nursing homes could increase service quality without changing the 
resources needed to produce nursing services.  
Nursing homes may be forced to become more efficient under the recent competitive 
nursing home market.  From the perspective of providers, both profit and quality are 
fundamental but also potentially conflicting objectives.  Implementation or expansion of 
staffing standards in nursing homes may place further financial pressures on nursing homes.  
Nursing homes may respond to the staffing standard changes and environmental pressures 
differently not only by altering the amount of input use but also by utilizing their scarce 
resources more efficiently.  For example, nonprofit homes may respond to environmental 
pressures by increasing staffing levels or other resources to improve quality of care, whereas 
for-profit facilities may choose to operate at a high level of efficiency in response to the 
environmental and regulatory pressures.  For this reason, those facilities may want to 
  103
maintain or achieve a higher level of quality as a means of improving their financial 
performance.  Differences in efficiency may result in the observed differences in quality of 
care produced.   
Further understanding of the effects of minimum staffing standards may be obtained 
by assessing financial performance in response to staffing standard changes and by exploring 
the causal pathways between nursing home staffing and quality outcomes as well.  
Assessment on how staffing standard changes affect the financial performance is provided in 
Chapter VII, and the relationship between nursing home staffing and quality is further 
explored in Chapter VIII. 
 
 
CHAPTER VII 
THE EFFECTS OF STATE MINIMUM STAFFING STANDARDS ON FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE IN SKILLED NURSING FACILITIES 
 
 
7.1. Introduction 
While many states have set minimum requirements for nursing staff, the cost of 
increasing staffing levels under the current nursing workforce shortage can be substantial for 
both the government and nursing facilities.  As described earlier, the government is the 
dominant purchaser of nursing home care by means of Medicare and Medicaid programs, 
with state Medicaid programs covering approximately 50% of all nursing homes 
expenditures and 70% of all bed days (Zhang and Grabowski, 2004).  The call for greater 
staffing suggests that additional government funds could be required.  Many states increased 
Medicaid rates in an attempt to encourage nursing facilities to increase their nursing staff.  
For example, California increased Medicaid rates of approximately $2.96 per resident day to 
pay for increased labor costs required to meet the new mandatory staffing standards in 2000 
(Horowitz et al., 2003).   
Moreover, staffing is the main input in the production of care, accounting for nearly 
two-thirds of all nursing home costs.  By increasing demand for nurses (at least at some 
facilities), increased mandated staffing standards may generate an industry-wide cost 
increase and cause at least some facilities to face severe financial constraints.  With a limited 
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supply of nursing staff, overall improvement in wages or benefits may also be required to 
retain current nursing staff and to keep salaries or benefits competitive.   
Several early studies examined the impacts of state staffing standards on non-
financial outcomes such as the level of staffing or quality of care (Harrington, 2005a, 2005b; 
Mueller et al., 2006), but no studies directly examine whether or to what extent state staffing 
standards affect financial performance in nursing homes.  This study analyzes data from the 
1998-2001 freestanding SNF MCR, and investigates how recent changes in state minimum 
staffing standards affect the financial performance in SNFs by comparing financial measures 
before and after the changes in staffing standards.   
The purpose of this analysis is as follows: first, to assess the effects of state minimum 
staffing standards on the financial performance as reflected by profit, revenue, and cost 
during the period 1998 to 2001; and second, to determine whether the behavior of skilled 
nursing facilities in response to policy changes differed by staffing level prior to the new 
standards or ownership type.   
 
7.2. Data and Study Sample 
7.2.1. Data sources 
All Medicare-certified SNFs are required to file cost reports annually in order to 
receive payments for treating Medicare residents.  The MCR data contain provider 
information such as facility characteristics, utilization data, cost and charges by cost center 
(in total and Medicare), Medicare settlement data, and financial statement data 
(http://www.cms.hhs.gov).  The data used for the financial performance analysis came from 
1998 through 2001 freestanding SNF MCR that were in the CMS files released in June 2004.  
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Since hospital-based nursing facilities are very different in terms of resident severity, care 
practice, and cost accounting system (i.e., allocation of hospital overhead costs to the SNF 
units), this study only analyzes cost report data from freestanding skilled nursing facilities.   
The MCR data were supplemented with a file containing facility characteristics from 
the OSCAR.  The OSCAR data are from state surveys of all federally certified Medicare 
skilled nursing facilities and Medicaid nursing facilities in the U.S.  The OSCAR system 
includes about 96% of nation’s nursing homes, and information from the system is used to 
determine whether nursing homes are complying with federal regulations.  Although most 
OSCAR data elements are self-reported, OSCAR is the most comprehensive national source 
of facility level information on the operations, resident characteristics, and regulatory 
compliance of nursing homes in the U.S. (Cawley et al., 2004; Zinn, 1993).  
The merged MCR and OSCAR were linked to the data on specific state staffing 
standards, state Medicaid per-diem rates, and market conditions.  State minimum staffing 
standards and Medicaid policy variable were constructed from various published sources.  
State minimum staffing standards came from two published reports which have collected 
state nurse staffing standards for nursing homes from state statutes, regulations, and 
administrative policies via the Internet and telephone survey.13  State Medicaid per-diem 
rates were obtained from the Brown University Survey of State policies (1999-2002) and 
Harrington’s 1998 State Data Book on Long-Term Care Program and Market Characteristics: 
State Medicaid Policy.  Market-level variables were obtained from the ARF, which is a 
publicly available dataset containing more than 7,000 economic and demographic variables 
                                                 
13 (1) Harrington, C. (2002). Nursing Home Staffing Standards. The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured.  (2) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation Office of Disability (2003). State Experiences With Minimum Nursing Staff Ratio For Nursing 
Facilities: Finding From Case Studies of Eight States. 
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for each of the nation’s counties.  Data on the population for each county came from the U.S. 
Census Bureau. 
 
7.2.2. Study sample 
By using freestanding SNF MCR, Medicaid-only-certified facilities and hospital-
based SNFs are automatically eliminated from the data file.  The original database merged 
MCR and OSCAR included 12,510 freestanding SNFs, 808 facilities with intermediate care 
facilities for the mentally retarded (ICF/MR), hospice, or other long-term care components 
besides skilled nursing or nursing facility were also excluded from the analysis (6.5%).  If 
facilities were in the top and bottom one percentile of each of three financial variables in a 
given year, which seemed highly unlikely and probably reporting errors, the observations 
were eliminated.  On the basis of theses criteria, 241 facilities were excluded.  Financial 
uncertainty threatened by introducing new staffing standards could cause some facilities to 
leave the market.  In addition, SNFs have faced extra financial pressure due to recent 
introduction of Medicare PPS in 1998.  Only facilities with 4 years of cost reports were 
included in the analysis to prevent possible bias due to market entry-exit during the study 
period.  A total of 28,840 facility-year observations from 7,210 freestanding SNFs were 
analyzed (Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1  Numbers of Observations, MCR 1998-2001 
 Number of Facility-Year Number of Facilities 
Original sample:  
 46,532 12,510 
After dropping facilities with ICF/MR, hospice, 
or other long-term care facilities 
 
40,480 
 
11,702 
 
After dropping 1% on each end (of three 
financial measures) 
 
38,674 
 
11,461 
 
Final sample (with 4 years of cost reports): 28,840 (62%) 7,210 (58%) 
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7.2.3. Descriptive statistics 
 Table 7.2 provides descriptive statistics on the variables in the model.  The values for 
facility characteristics, utilization, and financial information are similar to values reported by 
other studies using MCR and OSCAR data (Castle and Engberg, 2005; Cowles, 2002; GAO, 
2003; Grabowski, 2004; Harrington et al., 2000b).  By the definition of low-staff facilities in 
this study, 48 percent of the facilities (N=3,461) were low-staff, while 52 percent of the 
facilities (N=3,749) were consistently above subsequent year standards over the study 
period.  About 77 percent of freestanding SNFs belonged to for-profit facilities and the 
average occupancy rate was 86 percent.  The rightmost three columns in Table 7.2 compare 
the mean values of all variables for facilities by ownership type.  Compared to for-profit 
homes (N=5,616), on average, nonprofit homes (N=1,691) experienced 0.64 percent annual 
total margin losses because of their higher cost structure.  Interestingly, nonprofit homes had 
a lower proportion of Medicaid and a higher proportion of private pay residents than for-
profit homes.   
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Table 7.2  Summary Statistics by Ownership Type, 1998-2001 
 Full Sample  NFP FP  
Variables Mean Range SD  Mean Mean t-test 
Financial Performance:        
   Total margin 0.62 (-63.91, 26.78) 10.57  -0.64 1.00 *** 
   Revenue per diem 141.61 (75.04, 428.93) 40.95  150.17 139.09 *** 
   Expense per diem 144.14 (75.15, 568.45) 46.70  163.52 138.44 *** 
Policy: Staffing Standards        
   Transition effect 0.10    0.11 0.10  
   Steady state effect 0.11    0.12 0.11  
Output:        
   Total resident days 39125 (785, 323352) 22613  46490 36956 *** 
Input Price:        
   CMS SNF wage index 0.99 (0.62, 1.56) 0.17  1.02 0.98 *** 
Facility:        
   Ownership        
      For-profit 0.77       
      Nonprofit 0.19       
      Government 0.03       
   Chain 0.65    0.41 0.73 *** 
   Payer mix        
      % residents paid by Medicare 9.81 (0, 100) 10.66  8.42 10.22 *** 
      % residents paid by Medicaid 66.69 (0, 100) 19.55  61.96 68.09 *** 
      % residents paid by others 23.50 (0, 100) 17.28  29.62 21.70 *** 
   Total beds 126.26 (15, 1920) 69.78  141.22 121.85 *** 
   Occupancy rate 85.87 (0.81, 100) 14.58  89.38 84.84 *** 
   Acuity index 10.31 (3, 19.41) 1.35  10.20 10.34 *** 
   Low-staff 0.48    0.30 0.54 *** 
Market:        
   Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.174 (0.004, 1) 0.216  0.18 0.17  
   Empty beds per 1,000 elderly (65+) 10.84 (0, 163.93) 10.86  9.51 11.24 *** 
   Per capita income (in $1,000s) 27.90 (0, 92.98) 8.11  28.29 27.78 *** 
   Unemployment rate (16+) 4.50 (0.9, 29.9) 2.13  4.30 4.55 *** 
   Population 85+ (in 1,000s) 11.70 (0.006, 114.98) 21.30  8.97 12.50 *** 
   Female population 15-44 (in 1,000s) 190.19 (0.18, 2210.64) 409.21  131.15 207.57 *** 
State:        
   Medicaid rate 112.72 (69.55, 178.70) 24.18  119.27 110.80 *** 
Number of observations 28,840    6,560 22,280  
Number of facilities 7,210    1,691 5,616  
Notes: NFP=nonprofit.  FP=for-profit.  SD indicates standard deviation.   
Mean comparison tests (t-test) by ownership type.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% 
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7.2.4.  Validation of MCR  
Since the MCR has been underutilized in nursing home research and concerns about 
the usefulness of some of the data from the MCR (as described in Section 4.2.) also exist, it 
is important to check whether the MCR is a valid and reliable dataset for this study.     
The financial information is also found in yearly state cost reports (SCR) that nursing 
homes are required to file with the state health department.  The MCR data quality was 
checked by comparing with the SCR.  To check the validity and reliability of the MCR data 
and determine whether the different types of cost reports (Medicare and state) were filled out 
consistently, three financial measures from the MCR and the SCR for California and Texas 
were compared.  California and Texas were selected for comparison because California and 
Texas led in the nation in the number of nursing homes.14  Furthermore, cost reports data are 
publicly available from those two states.  The SCR data are cleaned and reviewed by state 
officials, and are generally considered to be accurate and among the best and most 
comprehensive available in any states.   
The numbers of observations before and after cleaning data (i.e., eliminating extreme 
outliers on key variables) are presented in Table 7.3.  In California, the comparison is limited 
to exactly the same facility and year observations.  An exact facility comparison is not 
possible for Texas due to the lack of common facility identifying numbers between the MCR 
and the SCR. 
                                                 
14 The numbers of California and Texas nursing homes in 2003 are 1,291 and 1,094, respectively, which 
represent almost one-fifths of nation’s nursing homes.   
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Table 7.3  Numbers of Facility-Year Observations: California and Texas 
 California Texas 
 MCR SCR MCR SCR 
 (CY98-CY01) (CY98-CY01) (CY99-CY00) (FY99-FY00) 
Before exclusion 3,971 4,156 2,469 2,050 
After exclusion   1,532 (62%) 1,923 (94%) 
Limited to the same facility-year 3,425 (86%) 3,425 (82%) N/A N/A 
Notes: In Texas state cost reports, year refers to fiscal year.  CY=calendar year.  FY=fiscal year. 
 
 Tables 7.4 and 7.5 show the three financial measures from the MCR and the SCR for 
California and Texas: (1) total margin, (2) revenue per diem, and (3) expense per diem 
(Texas only has the revenue and expense measures).  Total resident days are also compared.  
Overall, the validity analyses support that the MCR and the SCR for two states are relatively 
consistent in terms of mean values of three measures and total resident days for many 
facilities.  Ranges on the variables also seem reasonable.  The MCR, therefore, seems to be 
best national data for assessing the effects of minimum staffing standards on financial 
performance.   
Table 7.4  Financial Performance from MCR and SCR: California 
 MCR (CY98-CY01) SCR (CY98-CY01) 
 Mean Range SD Mean Range SD 
Total margin 1.24 (-98.20, 89.90) 10.89 1.13 (-89.91, 79.87) 10.28 
Revenue per diem 137.59 (65.83, 1154.61) 41.37 133.94 (50.93, 222.93) 24.88 
Expense per diem 137.49 (64.44, 1031.31) 44.11 134.34 (53.92, 266.96) 27.86 
Total resident days 32,588 (1798, 106075) 15,079 33,288 (5200, 106964) 15,055 
# facility-year 3,425   3,425   
# facility 872   872   
Notes: CY=calendar year.  FY=fiscal year.  SD indicates standard deviation. 
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Table 7.5  Financial Performance from MCR and SCR: Texas 
 MCR (CY99-CY00) SCR (FY99-FY00) 
 Mean Range SD Mean Range SD 
Revenue per diem 105.54 (42.99, 509.01) 35.75 98.02 (68.86, 131.14) 11.77 
Expense per diem 112.39 (41.29, 557.82) 47.23 93.57 (53.75, 139.04) 14.75 
Total resident days 31,056 (4373, 100753) 14,735 29,541 (1436, 103125) 14,456 
# facility-year 1,532   1,923   
# facility 861   1,090   
Notes: In Texas state cost reports, year refers to fiscal year.  CY=calendar year.  FY=fiscal year.  SD indicates 
standard deviation. 
 
 In addition, the formula for calculating and analyzing SNF total margin is the same as 
developed by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) and CMS’s Office of 
the Actuary (OACT).  A GAO analysis with the MCR data (2002b) used the similar methods 
developed by MedPAC and CMS’s OACT and reported freestanding SNF median total 
margin from FY1999 and FY2000.  The median values are not substantially different from 
total margin calculated in this study (Table 7.6).  This comparison also confirms that the 
MCR provide the best national data for this analysis and financial measures constructed in 
this study are comparable across other studies using MCR.   
Table 7.6  Comparison of Median Total Margin with a GAO Report 
 MCR   GAO Analysis with MCR* 
 After dropping 1% on each end 
Keeping facilities with 4 
years of cost reports    
CY98 1.91 2.28    
CY99 1.20 1.50  FY99 1.3 
CY00 1.08 1.42  FY00 1.8 
CY01 1.49 1.67    
Notes: Year from a GAO analysis refers to fiscal year.  CY=calendar year.  FY=fiscal year. 
Source: GAO (2002b). Skilled Nursing Facilities: Medicare Payments Exceed Costs for Most but Not All 
Facilities. Washington DC. 
 
7.3. Empirical Models 
A big challenge to estimating the effect of minimum staffing standards is controlling 
for the unobserved heterogeneity at the facility, market, and state level associated with 
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financial performance changes over time.  The observed differences in financial performance 
are likely to be influenced by unobserved characteristics such as the organizational cultures, 
practice skill of the nurse workforce, overall population health needs, and state political, 
regulatory, or fiscal conditions.  Ignoring this heterogeneity may result in biased estimates if 
these unmeasured factors are correlated with the variation in minimum staffing standards.   
If an unobserved measure of state political culture or ideology is positively associated 
with financial performance but negatively related to the implementation of staffing standards, 
then the estimated effect of staffing standard changes on financial performance will be 
understated due to downward bias.  Although state fixed effects could control for unobserved 
time-invariant factors at the state level, the estimates are biased if unobserved heterogeneity 
remains at either the level of the service area (e.g., county) or facility.  For example, if 
unobserved time-invariant county specific health needs or treatment norms for vulnerable 
people are positively correlated with implementation or expansion of staffing standards and 
financial performance, the coefficient of the policy variable will be biased upward and the 
true effect of the policy will be understated.  Alternatively, the existence of unobserved 
administrative efficiency associated with financial performance will also cause bias.  
Therefore, a facility-level fixed effects model was chosen to account for as many sources of 
heterogeneity as possible.   
Since the policy changes occurred at diverse times across states, the present study 
provides unique new evidence by exploiting a natural experiment approach.  Over the last 
decade, natural experiments have become especially popular in analyzing the effects of 
policy changes (Dow and Schmeer, 2003: Konetzka et al., 2004a, 2004b).  The approach 
used in this study is a DD model to estimate the effect of staffing standard changes on 
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financial performance with pre-post and treatment-control groups.  The average treatment 
effect can be calculated as the pre-post difference between the treatment and control group 
mean difference, assuming that the pre-difference is a good estimate of what the post-
difference would have been had the treatment group not actually been treated (Woodridge, 
2001).  To avoid possible omitted variable bias, a set of facility, market, and state level time-
varying covariates were added to the model.  To explore variation in the effect of MSS by 
facility staffing level, the extended model included two policy variables and their interactions 
with the indicator of low-staff facility.15  Furthermore, additional triple interaction terms with 
facility ownership (i.e., for-profit status) were included to assess the differential behavior of 
nursing homes in response to policy changes.  The model specification is as follows: 
 
istitiststist YearDXMSSY εμδγβα +++++= 0     (7.1) 
 
where the subscript i  indexes the nursing home, s  indexes state, and t  indexes year.  istY  is 
indicators of financial performance classified into profit, revenue, and cost.  stMSS  is a 
vector of the main treatment effects specified by two policy variables (transition and steady 
state effects) and their interactions with the indicators of low-staff facility and for-profit 
status.  istX  is a vector of facility, county, and state level time-varying covariates.  A vector 
of year dummy variables ( tYearD ) accounts for unobserved time fixed effects that might 
have an effect on financial performance and are possibly correlated with the implementation 
or expansion of state staffing standards.  The error term consists of a facility-specific error 
                                                 
15 The identification here is not the same as a difference-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) strategy.  A key 
assumption of DDD approach is that the policy changes should not affect the staffing level among the third 
control group. 
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component ( iμ ) to control for time-invariant facility and area characteristics and a mean zero 
random error component ( istε ).  Statistical tests were used to compare fixed and random 
effects specifications.16  The parameters of Equation (7.1) were estimated by using an OLS 
model.       
 
7.4.  Results 
 As described in Section 6.4, the main measure of effect pertains to whether changes 
in staffing standards had persistent effects (i.e., steady state effects) on financial performance.  
Table 7.7 presents the full results from DD models for 3 financial indicators.  The marginal 
steady state effects of MSS on financial performance vary by facility staffing status prior to 
new MSS and ownership type (Table 7.8).  Increases in MSS resulted in a decline in total 
margin by 1.61 percentage points only at nonprofit facilities with relatively low staffing prior 
to new MSS (p<0.05).  No significant MSS effects on total margin were shown at for-profit 
facilities or facilities with already high staffing prior to new MSS.   
New staffing standards led to much greater increases in net expense per diem than net 
revenue per diem at nonprofit facilities.  Among nonprofit facilities with relatively low 
staffing prior to new MSS, the effect of new staffing standards was about 5.8% (i.e., $9.49 
increase relative to the mean of $163.52) increases in net expense per diem, whereas 2.7% 
(i.e., $4.03 increase relative to the mean of $150.17) increases in net revenue per diem.  With 
relatively greater increases in costs (possibly in part due to increasing labor costs), those 
                                                 
16 The Breush-Pagan and the Hausman specification tests strongly suggested that there were the facility-specific 
effects, thus fixed effects models were analyzed in order to control for time-invariant facility characteristics.   
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facilities were likely to experience declines in margins even with an increase in net revenue 
per day.   
 With respect to results for other variables, some facility, market, and state control 
variables had statistically significant effects, but the effects differed substantially across the 
different regressions (Table 7.7).  Higher proportion of Medicare residents and higher 
occupancy rate had significant impacts on higher profitability.  Output products reflected by 
the natural log of total resident days showed significant positive association with total margin, 
whereas the price of inputs was not statistically associated with any of financial measures.   
Better financial performance would be expected in more competitive market, the 
coefficients on HHI, as a proxy variable for market competition, showed mixed results across 
financial measures.  Similarly, the number empty beds per 1,000 elderly in which the facility 
was located would represent the market demand, market tightness, or availability of other 
long-term care providers in the market.  Having more empty beds in the county would be 
expected to be negatively associated with financial performance.  As expected, the result for 
the analysis showed significant negative effect of this variable on total margin.  Among other 
market factors, the size of the elderly population as a proxy for the demand for and use of 
nursing home services was positively associated with total margin.  Higher Medicaid 
reimbursement rate had statistically significant positive impact on total margin.  
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Table 7.7  Effect of State Minimum Staffing Standards on Financial Performance: DD Models 
 Total Margin Revenue Per Diem Expense Per Diem 
Policy: Staffing Standards    
     Transition effect 0.552 5.153*** 4.740*** 
 (0.456) (0.771) (0.880) 
     Steady state effect 0.405 7.924*** 8.642*** 
 (0.538) (0.910) (1.038) 
     Transition × Low-staff -2.109*** -2.611** 2.406 
 (0.768) (1.299) (1.482) 
     Steady × Low-staff -2.017** -3.890*** 0.849 
 (0.873) (1.477) (1.685) 
     Transition × For-profit  0.053 -4.880*** -5.342*** 
 (0.567) (0.959) (1.095) 
     Steady × For-profit 0.241 -7.594*** -9.432*** 
 (0.667) (1.128) (1.287) 
     Transition × Low-staff × For-profit  1.434 2.475* -1.519 
 (0.876) (1.481) (1.691) 
     Steady × Low-staff × For-profit 1.493 6.111*** 1.976 
 (1.007) (1.703) (1.944) 
Output:    
     Ln (total resident days) 3.860*** -4.921*** -10.971*** 
 (0.218) (0.368) (0.420) 
Input Price:    
     Ln (CMS SNF wage index) 2.871 -5.336 -7.625 
 (2.894) (4.894) (5.585) 
Facility:    
     For-profit 2.151** 1.958 -1.041 
 (0.839) (1.419) (1.619) 
     Chain -0.545 0.705 1.899*** 
 (0.346) (0.585) (0.668) 
     % Medicare 0.044*** 0.142*** 0.073*** 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.016) 
     Total beds -0.001 -0.011** -0.009 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
     Total beds × Total beds -0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     Occupancy rate 0.117*** -0.082*** -0.242*** 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.015) 
     Acuity index -0.120 0.155 0.252* 
 (0.073) (0.124) (0.142) 
Market::    
     Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.758 14.078** 14.247** 
 (3.556) (6.014) (6.863) 
     Empty beds per 1,000 elderly (65+) -0.057*** -0.008 0.048 
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 (0.018) (0.030) (0.034) 
     Per capita income (in $1,000s) -0.259*** 0.236*** 0.572*** 
 (0.052) (0.087) (0.100) 
     Unemployment rate (16+) 0.015 0.134 0.120 
 (0.079) (0.134) (0.153) 
     Population 85+ (in 1,000s) 0.096* 0.120 0.056 
 (0.058) (0.099) (0.113) 
     Female population 15-44 (in 1,000s) -0.009 -0.142*** -0.119*** 
 (0.015) (0.026) (0.030) 
State:    
     Medicaid rate 0.045*** 0.201*** 0.090*** 
 (0.012) (0.020) (0.023) 
Year:    
     1999 -0.936*** -5.738*** -4.775*** 
      (0.145) (0.245) (0.279) 
     2000 -1.136*** -4.451*** -3.229*** 
 (0.174) (0.295) (0.337) 
     2001 -0.773*** 1.547*** 2.673*** 
 (0.217) (0.368) (0.420) 
Constant -46.320*** 191.311*** 269.833*** 
 (4.120) (6.967) (7.951) 
Number of observations 28,840 28,840 28,840 
Number of facilities 7,210 7,210 7,210 
R-squared 0.04 0.12 0.13 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 7.8  Marginal Effect of State Minimum Staffing Standards on Financial Performance: DD Models 
 Total Margin Revenue Per Diem Expense Per Diem 
Panel A: Low-staff (=1)    
          For-profit 0.12 2.53*** 2.02*** 
 (0.35) (0.59) (0.67) 
          Nonprofit -1.61** 4.03*** 9.49*** 
 (0.71) (1.21) (1.38) 
Panel B: Low-staff (=0)    
          For-profit 0.65 0.34 -0.78 
 (0.44) (0.74) (0.85) 
          Nonprofit 0.41 7.95*** 8.67*** 
 (0.54) (0.91) (1.04) 
Notes: FTE=full-time equivalent.  Standard errors in parentheses.    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
  119
7.5. Discussion 
Consistent with the hypotheses, the main results indicate that increases in minimum 
staffing standards had significant negative impacts on total margin for some facilities.  In 
particular, an increase in MSS results in a decline in total margin by 1.61 percentage points at 
nonprofit facilities with relatively low staffing prior to new MSS (p<0.05).   
An increase in staffing inputs in face of increased staffing standards increases a direct 
component of nursing home costs.  The analyses presented here depict worse financial status 
for some facilities (e.g., nonprofit with low staffing) by introducing new mandatory staffing 
regulations.  Many states increased Medicaid nursing home reimbursement rates at the same 
time as introducing new minimum staffing standards through a variety of mechanisms.  For 
example, California increased Medicaid rates of approximately $2.96 per resident day to pay 
raises for staffing in 2000 (Horowitz et al., 2003).  Many states (26 states by 2003) also have 
funded a wage or benefit pass-through to keep salaries or benefits competitive.  But the state 
efforts to increase public funding may be countered by higher labor costs required to meet 
the mandatory staffing standards.  In order to achieve the benefits of mandatory staffing 
standards, the federal and state governments may need to determine the additional costs and 
develop a plan to adequately fund the required increases in staffing levels.       
The declines in profit margin, however, were not found in for-profit facilities 
regardless of their staffing status prior to new standards.  These findings are consistent with 
hypothesis 2c, and support the existence of behavioral differences between nonprofit and for-
profit homes.  As described in Chapter VI, for-profit homes, especially those with high 
staffing, did not show the evidence of improving staffing levels, but they showed quality 
improvements in response to new staffing standards.  Those results together may suggest that 
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for-profit facilities have focused more on enhancing their quality of care as a means of 
improving their financial performance in recent competitive market.  Their efforts to improve 
quality in ways other than increasing staffing levels (e.g., by improving wages or benefits to 
retain highly qualified workers) also may have generated additional costs.  For-profit homes 
might squeeze out more productivity from their staff in order to offset the additional costs or 
maintain profits even if they are affected by the staffing standards.   
Another plausible explanation is that those facilities may generate higher revenues 
especially from their private pay residents to compensate for the additional costs associated 
with new staffing standards.  Private pay resident reimbursement is much greater than the 
reimbursement received from Medicare, Medicaid, and long-term care insurance for the same 
service, therefore, attracting private pay residents can provide a very lucrative means of 
increasing the financial performance of the home.  Consumers satisfied with the quality of 
care are more willing to pay for the benefits they receive and are more likely to tolerate price 
increases (Weech-Maldonado et al., 2004).  However, the data in this analysis do not allow 
for investigating any changes in private payment rates or revenues.    
Conventional wisdom suggests that there may be a trade-off between output quality 
and firm’s financial performance.  Increases in quality may improve financial performance 
up to some point, though declines could set in after that.  The relationship between quality of 
nursing home care and financial performance needs to be investigated as more nursing homes 
focus on enhancing their quality of care as a means of improving their financial performance.  
Further understanding of the effects of minimum staffing standards may be obtained by 
examining the relationship between profit levels and quality in nursing homes. 
CHAPTER VIII 
NURSING HOME STAFFING AND QUALITY OF CARE: AN ANALYSIS OF 
CAUSAL PATHWAYS 
 
 
8.1.  Introduction 
Considerable research has been devoted to the issues of the number and composition 
of nursing staff required to meet the needs of nursing home residents.  An issue of particular 
importance is the relationship between staffing and quality of care.  Not surprisingly, most 
findings have suggested that a higher nursing staff level (i.e., more care hours per resident 
day) and more highly skilled nursing staff mix (i.e., a greater proportion of professional 
nursing staff such as registered nurses) are associated with higher quality of care in nursing 
homes measured by various process and outcome indicators.  Examples include improved 
survival (Cohen and Spector, 1996; Porell et al., 1998), better functional status (Cohen and 
Spector, 1996), less incontinence (Porell et al., 1998), fewer pressure sores (Cohen and 
Spector, 1996; Kayser-Jones et al., 2003; Weech-Maldonade et al., 2004), less hospitalization 
(Carter and Porell, 2003), lower rates of physical restraint use (Castle, 2000; Weech-
Maldonade et al., 2004), and fewer facility deficiencies (Harrington et al., 2000b). 
While most studies have found that higher nursing home staffing leads to higher 
quality of care, whether and to what extent increased staffing improves quality of care is 
inconclusive.  Previous studies have used a variety of staffing and quality measures, data 
sources, and estimation strategies.  More importantly, existing estimates of the effect of 
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staffing on quality may be biased because the relationship between staffing and quality has 
been identified by cross-sectional variation, and the potential endogeneity of staffing has not 
been fully controlled for.   
The lack of valid control for the potential endogeneity of staffing prevents 
determination of consistent estimates of the causal effect of staffing on quality of care and 
misleads policy implications.  Therefore, identification of the unbiased relationship between 
staffing and quality of care becomes an important policy question for the determination of 
specific staffing standards to improve quality of care.   
To address the issues above, this study employs a facility-level fixed effects with 
instrumental variables (IV-FE) approach to test for and correct for the potential endogeneity 
of staffing.  State minimum staffing standards, market (county) level nurse supply and 
demand shifters are chosen as instruments to predict the staffing changes over time.  This 
study helps to resolve the gaps in the previous literature on the underlying relationship 
between staffing and quality of care.  Furthermore, by linking state minimum staffing 
standards to identify the exogenous variation in staffing, this study contributes to an 
improved understanding of the relationship between state minimum staffing standards, the 
level of staffing, and quality of care in nursing homes. 
 
8.2.  Data and Study Sample 
8.2.1.  Data sources 
As described in more detail in Chapter IV, the data on facility characteristics, staffing, 
and quality measures came from the OSCAR system from 1998 through 2001.  The OSCAR 
data are from state surveys of all federally certified Medicare skilled nursing facilities and 
Medicaid nursing facilities in the U.S.  The OSCAR system includes about 96% of nation’s 
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nursing homes, and information on the system is used to determine whether nursing homes 
are complying with federal regulations (Grabowski, 1999).  Although most OSCAR data 
elements are self-reported, OSCAR is the most comprehensive national source of facility-
level information on the operations, resident characteristics, and regulatory compliance of 
nursing homes in the U.S. (Cawley et al., 2004; Zinn, 1993).  
The OSCAR data were linked to the data on specific state staffing standards, state 
Medicaid per-diem rates, and market conditions.  State minimum staffing standards and 
Medicaid policy variable were constructed from various published sources.  State minimum 
staffing standards came from two published reports which have collected state nurse staffing 
standards for nursing homes from state statutes, regulations, and administrative policies via 
the Internet and telephone survey.17  State Medicaid per-diem rates were obtained from the 
Brown University Survey of State policies (1999-2002) and Harrington’s 1998 State Data 
Book on Long-Term Care Program and Market Characteristics: State Medicaid Policy.  
Market-level variables were obtained from the ARF, which is a publicly available dataset 
containing more than 7,000 economic and demographic variables for each of the nation’s 
counties.  Data on the population for each county came from the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 
8.2.2.  Study sample 
The quality of measures in the OSCAR has been issued in previous studies (Abt, 
2000, 2001; Zhang and Grabowski, 2004).  In particular, staffing data have skewed 
distributions.  To eliminate possibly erroneous outliers for the analytic data, the exclusion 
                                                 
17 (1) Harrington, C. (2002). Nursing Home Staffing Standards. The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured. (2) U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation 
Office of Disability (2003). State Experiences With Minimum Nursing Staff Ratio For Nursing Facilities: 
Finding From Case Studies of Eight States. 
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criteria developed by CMS (Abt, 2000) for its study of minimum nurse staffing ratios were 
adopted in this study.   
All facilities that reported more residents than beds were excluded.  Current federal 
regulations require that all certified nursing homes with 60 or more beds have a registered 
nurse on duty for 8 hours a day seven days a week and a licensed nurse on duty evenings and 
nights.  Facilities with fewer than 60 beds can obtain a waiver that exempts them from this 
requirement.  Thus, all facilities that reported no registered nurse hours and had 60 or more 
beds were also excluded.  The facilities that reported more than 12 hours per resident day and 
less than 0.5 total hours per resident day were eliminated to avoid the unrealistically high or 
low staffing hours.  Facilities that reported zero residents were excluded, and facilities with 
incomplete information were also removed from the analysis.  The original database included 
18,275 facilities; on the basis of the criteria above, 436 facilities (2.39 %) were excluded. 
Since hospital-based nursing facilities are very different in terms of resident severity 
and care practice, an additional 2,271 hospital-based facilities were also eliminated.  
Although Medicare-only-certified facilities are affected by state regulations, those facilities 
are primarily for short-stay residents after hospitalization.  Thus, an additional 343 Medicare-
only facilities were eliminated, so that only nursing homes with Medicaid-only or dually 
certified facilities were analyzed.  Eight more facilities were excluded due to missing values.  
As a result of cleaning process, a total of 55,248 facility-year observations from 15,217 
facilities were analyzed.   
 
8.2.3. Instrumental variables 
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Finding good instruments for staffing is the key in instrumental variables estimation.  
The valid instruments should affect staffing significantly, but affect quality of care only 
through their direct effect on staffing.  Two sets of instruments are employed in this analysis.   
Among multiple instruments available in this study, important policy changes in state 
minimum staffing standards are used as the primary instruments for staffing.  Since nursing 
staff is the dominant input in the production of nursing home care and the compliance to 
minimum staffing standards is monitored for the certification purpose, nursing homes are 
most likely to respond to the staffing standard changes.  Several recent studies provide 
evidence that the actual staffing levels vary substantially by state staffing standards, in that 
the facilities in states with high staffing standards had somewhat higher staffing on average 
than states with no standards or low standards (Harrington, 2005a, 2005b; Mueller et al., 
2006).  Thus, state-specific staffing standard changes are hypothesized to most likely affect 
staffing choice, but do not always affect quality of care directly.  In other words, the changes 
in state standards will influence facilities’ choice of staffing and non-staffing inputs under the 
interaction with facilities’ internal resource allocation criteria, and such changes in staffing 
levels will lead to changes in quality of care.  Two dummy variables are created from the 
various timing of implementation or expansion of state minimum staffing standards as 
described in Section 5.1.4: ‘transition effects’ and ‘steady state effects’.   
Since a number of facilities operate at staffing levels far above the mandated levels, 
nursing homes with current staffing levels below or close to new standards are more likely to 
have responded to the increased state staffing standards.  This study exploits this variation by 
allowing the interactions of two policy variables and the indicator of low-staff facility.  To 
create the indicator of low-staff facility, both licensed and unlicensed staffing in each year 
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were compared to the required staffing in the next year to see if current staffing was lower 
than what was required in the next year.  A facility was defined as low-staff if current (t) 
staffing was less than next year (t+1) required staffing in any one year.  These instruments 
may explain some of the actual variation in staffing levels and provide additional information 
on the potential relationship between staffing and quality of care.   
The second set of instruments consists of market-level variables.  In addition to state 
staffing standards, nursing homes respond to the relative competitiveness of the market and 
local resource constraints.  Market supply shifters should have an impact on the relative size 
of the groups in the population constituted by possible long-term care workers, but may not 
necessarily affect quality of care.  These factors include the local unemployment rate and the 
female population aged 15-44 in the county.  The population of the elderly aged 85 and over 
in the county is the primary determinant of potential demand, and is included as a market 
demand shifter for staffing.    
 
8.2.4.  Descriptive statistics 
The first three columns in Table 8.1 show summary statistics for all facilities.  The 
values for the quality, staffing and other covariates are similar to values reported by other 
studies using these variables (Castle and Engberg, 2005; Cowles, 2002; Grabowski, 2004; 
Harrington et al., 2000b).  The rightmost three columns in Table 8.1 compare the mean 
values of all variables for facilities with relatively low staffing and those with relatively high 
staffing.  It is important to remember that the low-staff variable in this study does not 
represent facilities that were below current standards, but instead identifies facilities that had 
to increase staffing to become compliant with new standards in the next period.  By this 
definition, 49 percent of the facilities (N=7,248) were low-staff, while 51 percent of the 
  127
facilities (N=7,969) were consistently above subsequent year standards over the study 
period.  The low-staff facilities were more likely for-profit and chain-affiliated, and had 
slightly fewer residents on Medicare and fewer beds than their counterparts.  The low-staff 
facilities were more likely to be in counties with relatively greater elderly and female 
population, while the states where low-staff facilities were located were more likely to 
increase staffing standards and have less generous Medicaid reimbursement rates. 
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Table 8.1  Summary Statistics by Staffing Status, 1998-2001 
 Full Sample  Low-Staff  
   No(=0) Yes(=1)  
Variables Mean Range SD  Mean Mean t-test 
Staffing:        
   Total HPRD 2.93 (0.5, 11.98) 0.95  3.33 2.51 *** 
Quality of Care:        
   Incidence rate of pressure sores 3.45 (0, 13.73) 2.96  3.36 3.55 *** 
   Incidence rate of contractures 9.52 (0, 60) 12.20  10.06 8.96 *** 
   Incidence rate of catheter use 1.92 (0, 11.76) 2.39  1.89 1.94  
   Incidence rate of restraint use 8.13 (0, 47.73) 9.50  7.93 8.33 *** 
Facility:        
   Ownership        
      For-profit 0.73  0.44  0.64 0.82 *** 
      Nonprofit 0.23  0.42  0.30 0.15 *** 
      Government 0.04  0.21  0.06 0.03 *** 
   Chain 0.58  0.49  0.53 0.63 *** 
   Payer mix        
      % residents paid by Medicare 7.48 (0, 100) 8.68  8.37 6.56 *** 
      % residents paid by Medicaid 67.89 (0, 100) 19.82  65.58 70.28 *** 
      % residents paid by others 24.63 (0, 100) 18.78  26.06 23.16 *** 
   Total beds 114.82 (5, 1231) 65.98  118.57 110.95 *** 
   Occupancy rate 84.63 (1.56, 100) 15.28  85.29 83.95 *** 
   Acuity index 10.08 (3, 21.70) 1.54  10.28 9.86 *** 
Market:        
   Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.196 (0.004, 1) 0.228  0.190 0.203 *** 
   Empty beds per 1,000 elderly (65+) 13.08 (0, 173.91) 13.06  11.28 14.93 *** 
   Per capita income (in $1,000s) 26.87 (0, 92.98) 7.62  27.59 26.13 *** 
State:        
   Medicaid rate 108.70 (69.55, 285.01) 23.18  115.37 101.80 *** 
Instruments:        
   Transition effect 0.101  0.301  0.083 0.119 *** 
   Steady state effect 0.103  0.304  0.070 0.136 *** 
   Low-staff 0.49  0.50  0 1  
   Unemployment rate (16+) 4.51 (0.70, 29.90) 2.10  4.42 4.61 *** 
   Population 85+ (in 1,000s) 9.88 (0.01, 114.98) 19.63  7.64 12.20 *** 
   Female population 15-44 (in 1,000s) 160.84 (0.12, 2210.65) 373.79  114.91 208.28 *** 
Number of observations 55,248    28,073 27,175  
Number of facilities 15,217    7,969 7,248  
Notes: HPRD=hours per resident day.  SD indicates standard deviation.   
Mean comparison tests (t-test) by low-staff status.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% 
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8.3.  Empirical Models 
8.3.1.  Specification 
This study used a facility-level fixed effects and a fixed effects with instrumental 
variables approach in estimates of the effect of staffing on four measures of quality of care: 
the incidence rates of pressure sores, contractures, catheter use, and restraint use.  Although 
state fixed effects could eliminate unobserved time-invariant factors at the state level, the 
estimates are biased if unobserved heterogeneity remains at either the level of the service 
area (e.g., county) or facility.  Therefore, a facility-level fixed effects model was chosen to 
account for as many sources of heterogeneity as possible.  The instrumental variables 
analysis was conducted using a traditional two-stage least squares regressions (2SLS).   
The first stage estimated staffing as a function of instruments and other control 
variables using a facility-level fixed effects model.  Staffing was measured by total nursing 
staff hours per resident day.  Instruments included the variables that are not present in the 
main equation: (1) two dummy indicators of state minimum staffing standard changes and 
their interactions with the indicator of low-staff facility, and (2) market-level nurse supply 
and demand factors.  A vector of facility, county, and state level characteristics was also 
controlled for.   
The quality equations were estimated as a function of predicted staffing from the first 
stage regression, and the same control variables as in the first stage except the instruments.  
The variable of primary interest is the predicted staffing variable, which is assumed to be 
exogenous in the second stage.  Its coefficient indicates the effect of changes in staffing 
identified by the variation of instruments in the first stage (i.e., the exogenous state policy 
shock and the relative competitiveness of the market and local resource constraints) on 
changes in quality of care over time.  The basic model specification is as follows: 
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First stage: istitististist YearDXWS εμδγβα ′+′+′+′+′+′= 0    (8.1) 
Second stage: istitististist YearDXSQ εμδγβα +++++= ˆ0    (8.2) 
 
where the subscript i  indexes the nursing home, s  indexes state, and t  indexes year.  istS  is 
the actual level of total nursing staff hours per resident day.  istQ  is the outcome and process 
measures of quality of care.  istSˆ  is the predicted value of staffing variable.  istW  in the first 
stage regression is the instrumental variables for staffing described above.  istX  is a vector of 
facility, county, and state level time-varying covariates.  tYearD  represents time fixed effects.  
The error term consists of time-invariant facility fixed effects ( iμ ) and a mean zero random 
error component ( istε ).   
 
8.3.2.  Identification and specification tests 
For the IV method to be valid, three conditions should be met.  Specification tests 
were conducted to assess whether: (1) staffing decision is endogenous, (2) the IVs explain 
sufficient variation in the endogenous variable, and (3) the IVs are validly excluded from the 
main equations. 
The Hausman endogeneity tests are used most frequently in the literature.  However, 
since Hausman tests have several practical difficulties in statistical packages, several 
asymptotically equivalent variants of Hausman tests are implemented.  In this study, the 
exogeneity of staffing was tested by an alternative auxiliary equation version F-test along 
with the Hausman tests.  An alternative auxiliary equation estimates a variant of the main 
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equation in which quality is regressed on staffing, predicted staffing (or predicted residuals) 
from the first stage and other exogenous variables, and evaluates the significance on 
predicted staffing (or predicted residuals) with t- or F-tests.  If staffing is exogenous then 
staffing is an appropriate estimator, so the additional predicted staffing (or predicted 
residuals) should have no explanatory power.  The Hausman endogeneity tests (or variants of 
the Hausman tests) reject the null hypothesis that staffing is exogenous in each quality 
equation (Table 8.2).   
The specification tests show that the instruments have strong explanatory power in 
the first stage regression and confirm that the instruments are significant predictors of 
staffing.  A joint F-statistic for the significance of instruments is 11.54 (p<0.01), which 
satisfies the standard of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997).  About 11% of variation 
in staffing is explained by the instruments and other control variables, having R2 in the first 
stage regression 0.11 (Table 8.3).     
 Finding good instruments which are validly excluded from the main equation of 
interest is the most important and contentious assumption in the instrumental variables 
analysis.  A test of over-identification for the IV-FE models allows a further assessment of 
this assumption.  The null hypothesis is that the instruments together should only affect 
quality of care via their impact on staffing, and not through any other pathway independent 
of staffing.  Rejection of the null hypothesis implies that some of the instruments are 
invalidly excluded, but the test is non-constructive in that it does not indicate which 
instruments are problematic.  The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) version of exclusion restriction 
test supports that the instruments together are validly excluded from the second stage 
equation only for the incidence rate of catheter use.   
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Although the instruments do not pass the over-identification test for three other 
quality measures in this study, the specification tests confirm that the endogeneity of staffing 
is a suspected problem and correction of endogeneity is necessary.  Furthermore, the 
instruments together have a strong explanatory power in the first stage regression and have 
theoretically sound justification to be valid instruments for staffing.  Thus the IV-FE models 
are chosen as preferred models for four quality measures, though lack of evidence of over-
identification means caution should be used in interpretation of these results.  For comparison 
purposes, the estimated results with and without instruments, and naïve OLS are also 
reported for each quality measure.    
Table 8.2  Specification Tests 
 Endogeneity Test IV Strength Over-id Test 
Dependent Variables 
(Incidence Rate) 
Hausman χ2 
[p-value] 
Alternative 
auxiliary equation 
version F-test 
[p-value] 
F-test 
[p-value] 
LM test χ2 
[p-value] 
Pressure Sores 9.57[0.793] 8.32[0.004] 11.54[0.000] 22.08[0.001] 
Contractures 27.16[0.018] 20.27[0.000] 11.54[0.000] 19.41[0.004] 
Catheter Use 4.05[0.983] 3.93[0.047] 11.54[0.000] 9.39[0.153] 
Restraint Use 0.18[1.000] 4.65[0.000] 11.54[0.000] 44.55[0.000] 
Note: Instruments include transition effect, steady state effect, transition × low-staff, steady × low-staff, 
unemployment rate (16+), population 85+ (in 1,000s), and female population 15-44 (in 1,000s). 
 
8.4.  Results  
8.4.1.  Staffing result 
Table 8.3 provides the first stage staffing result.  As described earlier, a joint F-
statistic for the significance of instruments is greater than the standard of Staiger and Stock 
(1997).  In addition, a set of four policy variables is jointly significant, and each of market 
level instruments is also individually significant in the first stage regression.  
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The significant positive coefficient on the interaction term between steady state effect 
and a low-staff indicator suggests that increased minimum staffing standards are more likely 
to influence the facilities with relatively low staffing levels than those facilities that already 
operated above the mandated levels.  The statistically significant positive coefficient also 
provides further evidence that the persistent effect of policy changes is apparent after the first 
implementation year.  Overall, the increased minimum staffing standards led to a statistically 
significant steady state increase in total staff hours per resident day by 0.067 (4.02 minutes, 
p<0.01) among low-staff facilities.   
Most of the long-term care (e.g., feeding, dressing, bathing, toileting, assisting with 
medications etc.) needed by impaired persons in nursing homes is provided by unskilled 
nurse aide workers.  Higher unemployment rates could probably encourage more nursing 
staff (especially nurse aide workers) into nursing home labor market.  However, the result 
showed unexpected significant effects in which higher unemployment rates reduced the total 
staff hours per resident day.  There are an array of documented job factors regarding nurse 
aide workforce such as low wages and few benefits, physical demanding work, inadequate 
recognition or appreciation, and lack of opportunity for meaningful input into patient care 
(PHI and NCDHHS, 2004).  Furthermore, wages in other low level jobs (e.g., food service, 
sales person, clerks/receptionists, unskilled factory workers) are often competitive with nurse 
aide wages.  The result may suggest that the nursing home industry likely to be a competing 
employment option for nurse aide workers and would face the same recruitment and 
retention problem for potential aide workers as other competing employment fields in the 
same market.  Since the demand for and use of nursing home services increase for those aged 
85 and older, the size of the elderly population in the county was positively associated with 
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total staffing hours.  The size of the female population in the market which may represent 
availability of long-term care workers were also positively associated with total staffing 
hours. 
As expected, having a higher proportion of Medicare residents and higher severity 
index value had significant positive impacts on staffing levels.  The negative coefficients on 
the number of total beds showed some evidence of the economies of scale.  High occupancy 
rates were negatively associated with total staffing hours.  None of the market variables was 
statistically significant.  
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Table 8.3  First Stage Staffing Result: FE (DD) Model 
Variables Total HPRD 
Policy Instruments: Staffing Standards  
     Transition effect -0.009 
 (0.014) 
     Steady state effect -0.029 
 (0.019) 
     Transition × Low-staff 0.028 
 (0.018) 
     Steady × Low-staff 0.095*** 
 (0.023) 
Market Instruments:  
     Unemployment rate (16+) -0.012*** 
 (0.004) 
     Population 85+ (in 1,000s) 0.009*** 
 (0.003) 
     Female population 15-44 (in 1,000s) 0.002** 
 (0.001) 
Facility:  
     For-profit 0.018 
 (0.039) 
     Chain 0.012 
 (0.017) 
     % Medicare 0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
     Total beds -0.016*** 
 (0.001) 
     Total beds × Total beds 0.000*** 
 (0.000) 
     Occupancy rate -0.027*** 
 (0.000) 
     Acuity index 0.022*** 
 (0.004) 
Market:  
     Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.021 
 (0.151) 
     Empty beds per 1,000 elderly (65+) -0.001 
 (0.001) 
     Per capita income (in $1,000s) -0.001 
 (0.003) 
State:  
     Medicaid rate -0.002*** 
 (0.001) 
Year:  
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     1999 -0.022*** 
      (0.007) 
     2000 -0.043*** 
 (0.009) 
     2001 -0.038*** 
 (0.011) 
Constant 6.371*** 
 (0.184) 
Number of observations 55,248 
Number of facilities 15,217 
R-squared  0.11 
Notes: HPRD=hours per resident day.  Standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
8.4.2.  Quality of care results 
Tables 8.4 to 8.7 present the results from the naïve OLS, FE, and IV-FE regressions 
for four quality measures: incidence rates of pressure sores, contractures, catheter use, and 
restraint use.  If increases in staffing improved the quality of care, the coefficient on the 
staffing variable would be negative since the quality of care measures were constructed as 
adverse outcomes.   
Even though the size of the effect of staffing varied by quality measures, the results 
from the preferred IV-FE models showed that the increased total staff hours significantly 
improved several quality of care measures after controlling for the endogeneity of staffing.  
A one unit increase in total staff hours per resident day18 led to a statistically significant 
decrease in the incidence rates of pressure sores and contractures, by 1.5 percentage points 
(p<0.01) and 9.1 percentage points (p<0.01), respectively.  These results were relative to an 
overall level of incidence rates of pressure sores of 3.45% and contractures of 9.52%, 
respectively.  An increase in total staff time by 1 hour per resident day resulted in a decrease 
                                                 
18 Given the fact that the overall mean of total staff hours per resident day is 2.93 HPRD, a one unit increase in 
total staff hours approximately corresponds to the optimal recommendation level suggested by CMS which 
equals to 3.9 HPRD. 
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in the incidence rate of catheter use by 0.73 percentage points, which was statistically 
significant at the 10% significance level and was relative to an overall mean of incidence rate 
of catheter use of 1.92%.  The incidence rate of restraint use was not significantly associated 
with increases in total staff hours per resident day. 
In particular, when endogeneity was taken into account, the magnitude of effects of 
staffing on quality became larger than estimates from non-IV models.  For pressure sores, the 
effect of total staff hours is about 10 times greater than estimate from the naïve OLS (-0.187 
versus -1.502).  Controlling for endogeneity significantly raises the magnitude of staffing on 
contractures (from -0.196 to -9.115).  The reason why the staffing showed much bigger effect 
on contractures in IV-FE model than non-IV model is unclear.  But given the fact that 
facilities with sicker residents would tend to operate with higher staffing, therefore the 
endogeneity bias would underestimate the effect of staffing on outcomes.  If this endogeneity 
bias is large for contractures, estimates of even larger magnitude would be expected after 
accounting for endogeneity.  However, it is important to note that IV estimates are 
determined by a subset of facilities which changed staffing levels in response to the values of 
IVs not by all facilities in the analysis.   
In sum, findings from IV-FE models provide the support for the importance of total 
staff hours on nursing home quality and provide the evidence that the earlier models which 
did not control for the potential endogeneity of staffing tend to underestimate the effect of 
staffing on quality of care.   
Other facility, market, and state control variables in the IV-FE models did not show 
any distinct effects compared to results from non-IV models.  As expected, resident case mix 
variables had significant negative impacts on quality of care.  Although not all of those 
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variables showed consistent effects on quality of care, the negative coefficients on the 
number of total beds showed some evidence of the economies of scale for resident outcomes 
measured by pressure sores and contractures.  If nursing homes compete on the basis of 
quality, facilities in more competitive areas may maintain higher quality than those in low-
competition areas.  The coefficients on HHI, as proxy variable for market competition, did 
not have statistically significant effects for any of the quality measures in this study.  
Occupancy rate and the empty beds per 1,000 elderly (65+), as proxies for market tightness, 
showed mixed results across quality measures.  Facilities with higher occupancy rates, 
indicating a tighter nursing home market, may have less incentive to provide high quality of 
care.  The result for the analyses showed unexpected significant improvement in resident 
outcomes.  Similarly, the number of empty beds per 1,000 elderly in the county has been 
used to identify excess demand or market tightness, and having more empty beds in the 
county would be expected to be associated with higher quality of care.  However, the result 
for the analyses showed unexpected significant increases in catheter use.  The demand for 
nursing home services may be higher in the areas with high per capita income.  The wealthier, 
more economically developed areas are more likely to support the provision of needed 
services.  As expected, a higher per capita income in the county suggested better quality of 
care as reflected by lower levels of contractures and restraint use.  Medicaid program 
generosity as reflected by Medicaid payment rates was associated with a statistically 
significant decrease in the incidence rate of pressure sores. 
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Table 8.4  Effect of Total HPRD on Incidence Rate of Pressure Sores 
 (1) Naïve OLS (2) FE (3) IV-FE 
Staffing:    
     Total HPRD -0.187*** -0.071*** -1.502*** 
 (0.015) (0.022) (0.522) 
Facility:    
     For-profit 0.006 -0.220 -0.189 
 (0.030) (0.172) (0.181) 
     Chain 0.096*** 0.135* 0.152* 
 (0.027) (0.078) (0.082) 
     % Medicare 0.007*** 0.001 0.008** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
     Total beds 0.002*** -0.002 -0.024*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.009) 
     Total beds × Total beds -0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     Occupancy rate -0.011*** 0.001 -0.038*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.014) 
     Acuity index 0.364*** 0.224*** 0.254*** 
 (0.008) (0.017) (0.021) 
Market:    
     Herfindahl-Hirschman index -0.121* 0.028 0.048 
 (0.063) (0.675) (0.709) 
     Empty beds per 1,000 elderly (65+) 0.002* -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) 
     Per capita income (in $1,000s) 0.005** -0.019 -0.017 
 (0.002) (0.013) (0.013) 
State:    
     Medicaid rate -0.009*** -0.004* -0.005* 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Year:    
     1999 -0.001 0.038 0.014 
      (0.035) (0.032) (0.035) 
     2000 -0.005 0.065* 0.014 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.045) 
     2001 0.035 0.112** 0.059 
 (0.035) (0.049) (0.055) 
Constant 1.848*** 2.381*** 11.715*** 
 (0.151) (0.622) (3.461) 
Number of observations 55,248 55,248 55,248 
Number of facilities  15,217 15,217 
R-squared 0.04 0.02 0.003 
Notes: HPRD=hours per resident day.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8.5  Effect of Total HPRD on Incidence Rate of Contractures 
 (1) Naïve OLS (2) FE (3) IV-FE 
Staffing:    
     Total HPRD -0.196*** -0.110 -9.115*** 
 (0.061) (0.090) (2.239) 
Facility:    
     For-profit -2.035*** -0.717 -0.524 
 (0.123) (0.695) (0.779) 
     Chain -0.675*** 0.011 0.120 
 (0.110) (0.314) (0.352) 
     % Medicare -0.078*** 0.017* 0.059*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) 
     Total beds -0.008*** -0.010 -0.150*** 
 (0.002) (0.014) (0.038) 
     Total beds × Total beds 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     Occupancy rate 0.009** -0.039*** -0.285*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.062) 
     Acuity index 0.490*** 0.507*** 0.699*** 
 (0.035) (0.067) (0.089) 
Market:    
     Herfindahl-Hirschman index 3.319*** -0.685 -0.558 
 (0.262) (2.720) (3.042) 
     Empty beds per 1,000 elderly (65+) 0.050*** -0.024* -0.034** 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.015) 
     Per capita income (in $1,000s) -0.095*** -0.180*** -0.165*** 
 (0.008) (0.051) (0.057) 
State:    
     Medicaid rate 0.036*** 0.022** 0.019* 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.011) 
Year:    
     1999 0.431*** 0.610*** 0.455*** 
      (0.144) (0.129) (0.149) 
     2000 1.472*** 1.735*** 1.416*** 
 (0.146) (0.156) (0.191) 
     2001 1.918*** 2.294*** 1.961*** 
 (0.147) (0.196) (0.234) 
Constant 4.103*** 11.195*** 69.931*** 
 (0.628) (2.507) (14.859) 
Number of observations 55,248 55,248 55,248 
Number of facilities  15,217 15,217 
R-squared 0.03 0.01 0.001 
Notes: HPRD=hours per resident day.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8.6  Effect of Total HPRD on Incidence Rate of Catheter Use 
 (1) Naïve OLS (2) FE (3) IV-FE 
Staffing:    
     Total HPRD -0.025** 0.018 -0.729* 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.386) 
Facility:    
     For-profit 0.035 -0.070 -0.054 
 (0.024) (0.131) (0.134) 
     Chain -0.129*** -0.009 -0.000 
 (0.022) (0.059) (0.061) 
     % Medicare -0.004*** 0.002 0.006** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
     Total beds 0.001*** -0.001 -0.013* 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.007) 
     Total beds × Total beds -0.000 0.000 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     Occupancy rate -0.004*** 0.002 -0.018* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.011) 
     Acuity index 0.170*** 0.118*** 0.134*** 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.015) 
Market:    
     Herfindahl-Hirschman index 0.404*** 0.302 0.312 
 (0.051) (0.512) (0.525) 
     Empty beds per 1,000 elderly (65+) 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.006** 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
     Per capita income (in $1,000s) -0.015*** 0.020** 0.021** 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) 
State:    
     Medicaid rate -0.007*** -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year:    
     1999 -0.031 -0.068*** -0.081*** 
      (0.028) (0.024) (0.026) 
     2000 -0.015 -0.083*** -0.110*** 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) 
     2001 0.001 -0.120*** -0.148*** 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.040) 
Constant 1.536*** 0.083 4.956* 
 (0.123) (0.472) (2.562) 
Number of observations 55,248 55,248 55,248 
Number of facilities  15,217 15,217 
R-squared 0.03 0.004 0.002 
Notes: HPRD=hours per resident day.  Standard errors in parentheses.  
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 8.7  Effect of Total HPRD on Incidence Rate of Restraint Use 
 (1) Naïve OLS (2) FE (3) IV-FE 
Staffing:    
     Total HPRD -0.100** 0.090 -0.532 
 (0.047) (0.066) (1.471) 
Facility:    
     For-profit 0.094 -0.238 -0.225 
 (0.096) (0.510) (0.512) 
     Chain -0.894*** -0.140 -0.132 
 (0.086) (0.231) (0.232) 
     % Medicare -0.069*** -0.026*** -0.023** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) 
     Total beds -0.000 0.046*** 0.036 
 (0.001) (0.010) (0.025) 
     Total beds × Total beds 0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     Occupancy rate -0.020*** 0.020*** 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.041) 
     Acuity index 0.972*** 0.383*** 0.396*** 
 (0.027) (0.049) (0.059) 
Market:    
     Herfindahl-Hirschman index -0.396* 2.006 2.015 
 (0.204) (1.996) (1.999) 
     Empty beds per 1,000 elderly (65+) 0.012*** 0.013 0.012 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.010) 
     Per capita income (in $1,000s) -0.028*** -0.130*** -0.129*** 
 (0.006) (0.037) (0.037) 
State:    
     Medicaid rate -0.026*** 0.013* 0.013* 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) 
Year:    
     1999 -0.686*** -0.541*** -0.552*** 
      (0.112) (0.095) (0.098) 
     2000 -1.324*** -1.197*** -1.219*** 
 (0.113) (0.114) (0.126) 
     2001 -1.315*** -1.215*** -1.238*** 
 (0.114) (0.144) (0.154) 
Constant 5.606*** 0.630 4.688 
 (0.488) (1.840) (9.762) 
Number of observations 55,248 55,248 55,248 
Number of facilities  15,217 15,217 
R-squared 0.04 0.005 0.007 
Notes: HPRD=hours per resident day.  Standard errors in parentheses.  
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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8.4.3.  Robustness checks 
 It is important to remember that the exclusion restriction test only supports for the 
incidence rate of catheter use.  The test does not indicate which instruments are problematic 
for the rest of quality measures.  Therefore, it might be useful to estimate using different sets 
of instruments.  When estimates using different sets of instruments yield substantively 
similar results, this may add to the plausibility of the IV models, as it is much less likely that 
two very different sets of instruments also could cause exactly the same biases.   
The models were re-estimated using two sets of instruments with different theoretical 
justifications in order to check robustness of the main results (Table 8.8).  The F-tests in the 
first stage regression also showed that either separate set of instruments or together are 
significant predictors of staffing in IV models.  As for over-identification tests, market-level 
instruments (i.e., instrument set 2) appeared to be validly excluded.  However, the effects of 
staffing on quality of care seemed robust to the choice of two very different sets of 
instruments with different theoretical justifications, having fairly consistent estimates in both 
magnitude and direction.  
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Table 8.8  Robustness Checks 
Instrument 1: Transition effect, Steady state effect, Transition × Low-staff, Steady × Low-staff 
Instrument 2: Unemployment rate (16+), Population 85+ (in 1,000s), Female population 15-44 (in 1,000s) 
 
    Endogeneity  Test 
IV 
Strength 
Over-id 
Test 
Dependent Variables β  SE Hausman χ2 
[p-value] 
Alternative 
auxiliary 
equation 
version  
F-test 
[p-value] 
F-test 
[p-value] 
LM test  
χ2 
[p-value] 
Incidence Rate of Pressure Sores 
    Naïve OLS  -0.187*** (0.015)     
    FE  -0.071*** (0.022)     
    IV-FE 1 and 2 -1.502** (0.522) 9.57 
[0.793] 
8.32 
[0.004] 
11.54 
[0.000] 
22.08 
[0.001] 
 1 -0.226 (0.690) 0.05 
[0.975] 
0.05 
[0.822] 
10.48 
[0.000] 
8.65 
[0.034] 
 2 -2.217*** (0.653) 17.52 
[0.230] 
13.33 
[0.000] 
19.18 
[0.000] 
4.16 
[0.125] 
Incidence Rate of Contractures 
    Naïve OLS  -0.196*** (0.061)     
    FE  -0.110 (0.090)     
    IV-FE 1 and 2 -9.115*** (2.239) 27.16 
[0.018] 
20.27 
[0.000] 
11.54 
[0.000] 
19.41 
[0.004] 
 1 -5.681* (2.908) 4.61 
[0.991] 
4.03 
[0.045] 
10.48 
[0.000] 
14.98 
[0.002] 
 2 -11.950*** (2.840) 37.82 
[0.001] 
24.96 
[0.000] 
19.18 
[0.000] 
2.73 
[0.256] 
Incidence Rate of Catheter Use 
    Naïve OLS  -0.025** (0.012)     
    FE  0.018 (0.017)     
    IV-FE 1 and 2 -0.729* (0.386) 4.05 
[0.983] 
3.93 
[0.047] 
11.54 
[0.000] 
9.39 
[0.153] 
 1 -1.348** (0.564) 7.79 
[0.900] 
6.83 
[0.009] 
10.48 
[0.000] 
4.47 
[0.215] 
 2 -0.266 (0.448) 0.40 
[1.000] 
0.41 
[0.524] 
19.18 
[0.000] 
0.69 
[0.708] 
Incidence Rate of Restraint Use 
    Naïve OLS  -0.100** (0.047)     
    FE  0.090 (0.066)     
    IV-FE 1 and 2 -0.532 (1.471) 0.18 
[1.000] 
4.65 
[0.000] 
11.54 
[0.000] 
44.55 
[0.000] 
 1 -1.718 (2.058) 0.77 
[1.000] 
7.88 
[0.000] 
10.48 
[0.000] 
41.61 
[0.000] 
 2 -0.538 (1.743) 0.13 
[1.000] 
0.45 
[0.720] 
19.18 
[0.000] 
1.66 
[0.435] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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8.4.4.  Extensions 
Recent studies suggest that the relationship between staffing and quality may not be 
linear and at least some threshold must be reached before the benefits of higher staffing are 
seen (Abt, 2001; Kane, 2004; Mark et al., 2004; Schnelle et al., 2004; Zhang and Grabowski, 
2004).  It is important to explore a possible nonlinear relationship to provide further 
information about the effective staffing levels in ensuring quality of care.  To test for a 
possible nonlinear relationship, the models were also estimated using a piecewise linear 
function of staffing splines.  The cut-off points were selected based on various levels of total 
staff hours recommended by CMS: 2.75 HPRD (CMS minimum), 3 HPRD (CMS preferred), 
and 3.9 HPRD (CMS optimal).  
Instead of using traditional 2SLS, two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) is estimated by 
including four staffing splines and the predicted residuals from the first stage estimation, 
which is similar to the method to deal with endogeneity in nonlinear parametric models 
(Terza, 2006).19  An F-statistic suggests that the effects of total staff hours significantly differ 
between the staffing groups for the incidence rates of pressure sores, contractures, and 
catheter use (Table 8.9).  The beneficial effects on the onset of pressure sores and 
contractures by increasing total staff hours disappeared beyond 2.75 HPRD and 3 HPRD, 
respectively.  The models were re-estimated using squared terms of staffing as well.  The 
overall results, however, were not substantially different from the models with the linear 
splines (results not shown).     
                                                 
19 A Monte Carlo experiment provides the evidence that a 2SRI generates consistent estimates. 
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Table 8.9  2SRI with Staffing Splines 
 Incidence Rate of Pressure Sores 
Incidence Rate of 
Contractures 
Incidence Rate of 
Catheter Use 
Incidence Rate of 
Restraint Use 
Total HPRD     
≤ 2.75 -1.563*** -9.143*** -0.795** -0.426 
 (0.500) (2.016) (0.380) (1.480) 
2.75 – 3.00 0.289 -1.859** -0.074 -0.153 
 (0.229) (0.921) (0.174) (0.677) 
3.00 – 3.90 -0.304 2.961*** 0.346* 0.013 
 (0.250) (1.008) (0.190) (0.740) 
>3.90 0.059 -0.482 -0.235*** -0.101 
 (0.100) (0.404) (0.076) (0.297) 
F-statistic  2.69 10.59 4.34 0.47 
p-value 0.0293 0.0000 0.0016 0.7571 
Notes: HPRD=hours per resident day.  The coefficients represent the change in the slope from the preceding 
group.  F-statistic for testing whether the coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
8.4.5.  Policy simulation 
 As described earlier, the CMS staffing studies recommend the minimum, preferred, 
and optimal staffing to ensure higher quality of care.  The results from a policy simulation 
are useful for understanding the contributions of staffing levels to the quality of nursing 
home care and the potential effects of CMS recommended staffing levels. 
Based on the estimated models controlling for the endogeneity of staffing, quality 
changes were predicted if the facilities with staffing levels below the recommendation levels 
would increase their staffing hours to the various CMS recommendation levels.  The 
simulation is restricted to the year 2001 only.   
A policy simulation illustrates that increasing total staff hours to CMS minimum 
(2.75 HPRD), preferred (3 HPRD), and optimal (3.9 HPRD) levels reduce incidence rate of 
pressure sores by 0.32, 0.51, and 1.58 percentage points, respectively, as compared to the 
actual mean (in 2001) of pressure sores of 3.46%.  Equally, increasing total staff hours to 
CMS minimum, preferred, and optimal levels reduce incidence rate of contractures by 2.00, 
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3.17, and 9.67 percentage points, respectively, as compared to the actual mean (in 2001) of 
contractures of 10.53%.  The simulation results support the persistent beneficial effects of 
increasing total staff hours on the onset of catheter use and restraint use as well (Figure 8.1).  
However, more accurate understating of the influence of particular policy would be achieved 
by examining the potential costs of implementing various mandated staffing ratios. 
Figure 8.1  Simulated Incidence Rates, 2001 
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8.5.  Discussion 
This study employs a fixed effects with instrumental variables approach to test for 
and correct for the potential endogeneity of staffing.  The findings in this study suggest that 
increased total staff hours per resident day significantly improved quality of care measured 
by the incidence rates of pressure sores, contractures, and catheter use.  A one unit increase 
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in total staff hours per resident day led to a statistically significant decrease in the incidence 
rates of pressure sores and contractures, by 1.5 percentage points (p<0.01) and 9.1 percentage 
points (p<0.01), respectively.  These results were relative to an overall level of incidence 
rates of pressure sores of 3.45% and contractures of 9.52%, respectively.  An increase in total 
staff time by 1 HPRD resulted in a decrease in the incidence rate of catheter use by 0.73 
percentage points, which was statistically significant at the 10% significance level and was 
relative to an overall mean of incidence rate of catheter use of 1.92%.  Having larger 
estimates than in non-IV models, the findings from IV-FE models provide the support for the 
importance of total staff hours on nursing home quality and provide the evidence that the 
earlier models which did not control for the potential endogeneity of staffing tend to 
underestimate the effect of staffing on quality of care.   
However, it is important to note that a one unit increase in total staff hours per 
resident day represents an unrealistically large increment given that the mean of total staff 
hours per resident day is 2.93 HPRD in the sample used for analysis.  So a one unit (1 
HPRD) increase would imply that almost one-thirds more of current staff hours should be 
provided.  The results from a policy simulation shown in Section 8.4.5 thus provide a more 
realistic interpretation of the contribution of total staff hours to the quality of care.  If the 
facilities with staffing below CMS preferred level would increase their staffing hours to the 
recommendation level of 3 HPRD, the incidence rate of pressure sores is predicted to decline 
by 0.51 percentage points (mean=3.46%) while the incidence rate of contractures is predicted 
to decrease by 3.17 percentage points (mean=10.53%) for the average facility in 2001.  The 
smaller increases in total staff hours by the subset of facilities (i.e., low-staff facilities) also 
support a substantial improvement in overall quality of care.  For example, an increase in 
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total staff hours to CMS preferred level is predicted to decrease the onset of contractures by 
almost 30 percent.  The declines in adverse outcomes become bigger when those low-staff 
facilities raise their staffing hours to more stringent CMS recommendation levels.  Overall 
simulation results support the persistent beneficial effects of increasing total staff hours on 
the onset of adverse outcomes. 
The findings from IV models, however, should be interpreted with caution.  First, the 
interpretation from IV models is different from the usual average treatment effects.  The IV 
models estimate the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE), which provide the estimates of 
the effect of staffing on quality of care among facilities which changed staffing levels over 
time in response to the instruments (i.e. the exogenous state policy shock and the relative 
competitiveness of the market and local resource constraints) used in the model (Harris and 
Remler, 1998; McClellan et al., 1994).  The substantially larger IV results than non-IV 
results for contractures may be explained, as the variation in staffing was solely identified by 
the subset of nursing homes with current staffing below or close to new standards.  Thus, the 
IV results may not be applied to all facilities (i.e., generalizability issue).  Second, the most 
important and contentious assumption in an instrumental variables approach is that the 
selected instruments are validly excluded from the main equation of interest (i.e., validity 
issue).  The exclusion restriction test supports that the instruments together are validly 
excluded from the second stage equation only for the incidence rate of catheter use.  
Therefore, estimated coefficients on staffing for the rest of quality measures may simply pick 
up the true direct effect of the instruments on quality.  If selected instruments were not done 
correctly, a simple model without IVs would be best because IV models cause the variance of 
parameters to increase (i.e., loss in efficiency).  Concerns about endogeneity bias still remain 
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for the rest of outcomes.  Therefore, additional studies using different instruments or 
alternative estimation methods to deal with endogeneity would be beneficial.    
In total, this study has important methodological and policy implications.  From a 
methodological perspective, this study corrects for possible bias from the previous studies by 
using different model specifications.  This better designed study helps to identify the causal 
relationship between staffing and quality of care in nursing homes.  From a policy 
perspective, the results from the study are useful for understanding the contributions of 
staffing level to the quality of nursing home care.  The analysis also has other dimension of 
assessment such that the estimation allows an assessment of the effect of state minimum 
staffing standards.   
 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS 
  
9.1.  Summary of Findings 
This dissertation attempts to provide a comprehensive understanding about the 
impacts of state minimum staffing standards and to determine unbiased estimates of the 
effect of staffing levels on quality of nursing home care.  Specifically, by exploiting 
differences in the timing of staffing standard changes for the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia from 1998 to 2001, this study conducts three empirical analyses to examine (1) the 
total effects of staffing standards on staffing choices and on quality of care, (2) the total 
effect of staffing standards on financial performance, and (3) the underlying (causal) 
relationship between staffing and quality of care.  The major findings of three research 
questions are as follows:  
 
Research Question 1: Do state minimum staffing standards improve the level of staffing and 
quality of care in nursing homes?   
The first analysis utilizes data from the 1998-2001 OSCAR linked to data on specific 
market conditions, state minimum staffing standards, and state Medicaid rates.  The findings 
for the effect of staffing standards on staffing levels suggest that minimum staffing standards 
result in increased staffing primarily at nursing homes with staffing levels previously below 
or close to the new standards [Hypothesis 1a and 1b].  Among those facilities with relatively 
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low staffing levels, only nonprofit facilities appear to respond to regulatory pressures by 
increasing both licensed and unlicensed staffing levels [Hypothesis 1c].  Effects are modest 
in size, with the biggest average effect being an increase in 12.4 minutes of total staff time 
per resident day at nonprofit facilities with relatively low staffing levels.   
With respect to the effect on quality of care, the effects of increased staffing standards 
vary across quality measures.  Resident outcomes (rates of pressure sores, contractures, or 
incontinence) and catheter use are not significantly associated with increases in minimum 
staffing standards, possibly due to difficulty in controlling for case mix measures with using 
facility level data rather than resident outcomes.  The effects of increased staffing standards 
show consistent beneficial effects for the rate of restraint use and the number of total 
deficiencies at all types of facilities [Hypothesis 1a], but reductions are greater at nonprofit 
than at for-profit nursing homes [Hypothesis 1c], and at facilities with relatively high staffing 
than at those with relatively low staffing [reject Hypothesis 1b].   
In sum, reduced-form analyses of the total effect of state minimum staffing standards 
show increases in staffing at certain types of facilities.  Selected facility-level outcomes show 
improvement at all facilities, possibly due to a general response to increased standard or to 
other quality improvements implemented at the same time as minimum staffing standards.   
     
Research Question 2: What are the impacts of state minimum staffing standards on financial 
performance in nursing homes?   
The total effect of staffing standards on financial outcomes is estimated using four 
years (1998-2001) of Medicare cost report data on 7,210 freestanding SNFs.  Consistent with 
staffing findings, the results show that increases in minimum staffing standards have 
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significant negative impacts on total margin only at certain types of facilities [Hypothesis 2a].  
Increases in MSS result in a decrease in total margin by 1.61 percentage points at nonprofit 
facilities with relatively low staffing prior to new MSS (p<0.05) [Hypothesis 2b].  With 
relatively greater increases in costs (possibly due in part to escalating labor costs), those 
nursing homes are likely to have negative margins even though they gain positive net 
revenue per day.  No significant MSS effects on total margin are shown at for-profit facilities 
or facilities with already high staffing prior to new MSS [Hypothesis 2b and 2c].  
The findings from the first and the second analyses together confirm that substantial 
behavioral differences exist between nonprofit and for-profit homes.  Profit-seeking facilities 
may be more cost efficient than nonprofit facilities.  For-profit nursing homes appear to have 
been able to reduce the resources needed to produce nursing services while maintaining 
service quality and financial performance.  For-profit homes might squeeze out more 
productivity from their staff particularly under the nursing shortage and documented staff 
recruitment and retention difficulties.   
 
Research Question 3: What is the causal relationship between nursing home staffing and 
quality of care? 
By using the same facility-year observations used in the first analysis, the third 
analysis finds that increases in total staff hours per resident day are associated with 
significantly improved quality of care measured by the incidence rates of pressure sores, 
contractures, and catheter use [Hypothesis 3a].   
A one unit increase in total staff hours per resident day represents an unrealistically 
large increment given that the mean of total staff hours per resident day is 2.93 HPRD in the 
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sample used for analysis.  The results from a policy simulation shown in Section 8.4.5 
provide a more realistic interpretation of the contribution of total staff hours to the quality of 
care.  If the facilities with staffing below CMS preferred level would increase their staffing 
hours to the recommendation level of 3 HPRD, the incidence rate of pressure sores is 
predicted to decline by 0.51 percentage points (mean=3.46%) while the incidence rate of 
contractures is predicted to decrease by 3.17 percentage points (mean=10.53%) for the 
average facility in 2001.  The smaller increases in total staff hours by the subset of facilities 
(i.e., low-staff facilities) also support a substantial improvement in overall quality of care.  
For example, an increase in total staff hours to CMS preferred level is predicted to decrease 
the onset of contractures by almost 30 percent.  The declines in adverse outcomes become 
bigger when those low-staff facilities raise their staffing hours to more stringent CMS 
recommendation levels.  Overall simulation results support the persistent beneficial effects of 
increasing total staff hours on the onset of adverse outcomes. 
Having larger coefficients than in non-IV models [Hypothesis 3b], the findings from 
IV-FE models provide the support for the importance of total staff hours on nursing home 
quality and provide the evidence that the earlier models which did not control for the 
potential endogeneity of staffing tend to underestimate the effect of staffing on quality of 
care.   
However, it is crucial to note that the findings for quality of care in the first and the 
third analyses vary across quality measures.  There may be several reasons in the lack of 
consistent findings across quality measures.  More importantly, as described in Section 3.4, 
the main mechanisms to affect quality of care are different between the first and the third 
analyses. 
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The first analysis assesses the total effect of new staffing standards on quality of care 
using a reduced-form FE approach.  If facilities view the new staffing regulation as either 
increased scrutiny on their quality of care or as heralding new competition on quality, they 
may look for other ways to improve quality in response to new staffing standards (e.g., 
improvement of physical environment, differing methods of treatment, the facility’s efficient 
use of staff and non-staff inputs, or staff quality and productivity level).  In this case, the 
findings for quality of care in the first analysis may be influenced by not only staffing input 
but also other aspects determined by new staffing standards.  In contrast to the first analysis, 
however, the third analysis directly measures the effect of a one unit increase in total staff 
hours on quality of care after controlling for those unobserved heterogeneity at the facility 
level. 
This distinction may explain why the effect of staffing standards on quality of care in 
the first analysis show significant improvement on facility-level overall quality measure such 
as total deficiency citations rather than resident outcomes (e.g., rates of pressure sores, 
contractures, or incontinence).  But increases in nurse staffing levels in the third analysis are 
significantly associated with high-quality facility care process and the clinical resident 
outcomes.  Total effects of staffing standards assessed in the first analysis also explain why 
facilities with relatively high staffing levels show much greater quality improvements than 
facilities with relatively low staffing levels although those facilities do not show the evidence 
of improving staffing levels in response to new staffing standards.  
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9.2.  Policy Implications  
As quality of care in nursing homes is a leading public policy issue, minimum 
staffing standards in nursing homes have become a major subject for debate at the state and 
national level because of the importance of nurse staffing levels to the processes and 
outcomes of care (Harrington, 2005a, 2005b; PHI and NCDHHS, 2004).  Despite the public 
policy importance, little analysis has been done to link the staffing standards to outcomes, 
either with regard to the level of staffing, quality of care, or financial performance in nursing 
homes.  The analyses performed in this dissertation regarding the impacts of setting 
minimum staffing standards are useful to understand the benefits and pitfalls of 
implementing staffing standards.  Furthermore, the causal effect of staffing on quality of care 
has been poorly understood due in part to the lack of valid control for the potential 
endogeneity of staffing in previous literature.  The third analysis provides new and improved 
estimates on this relationship.  In total, this dissertation is particularly relevant to the era of 
growth in the aged population and provides important both policy and methodological 
implications.   
First, structural differences in the effects of minimum staffing standards on staffing 
by previous staffing status or ownership type constitute major finding of this study.  
Mandated staffing standards seem to primarily affect marginal performers at the low-end of 
staffing spectrum and, therefore, may not improve overall average staffing level in an 
appropriate way.  But overall quality improvement regardless of previous staffing status or 
ownership type that was found suggests that the amount of nursing staff alone is not the only 
factor contributing to quality of care received by residents.  Facilities can vary in their ability 
to efficiently produce quality as a result of differences in their scale of operations, or some 
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facilities may reinvest their profits to enhance quality of care under the current competitive 
market.  For example, for-profit homes might increase productivity from their current staff, 
particularly under the nursing shortage and documented staff recruitment and retention 
difficulties.  For-profit facilities may also have shifted their focus to using quality of care as a 
means of competing for patients to improve their financial performance in the recent more 
competitive market.  The structural differences in nursing home behavior may explain why 
average quality between for-profit and nonprofit sectors in response to MSS does not differ 
significantly while average profit does.   
However, current nursing home staffing policy focuses on the specific staffing 
regulations (i.e., increased staffing level).  The qualiy of care cannot be achieved merely by 
increasing the staffing levels.  The findings in this study suggest that differences in 
organizational efficiency and productivity of nursing home workers may result in observed 
differences in quality of care.  This potential association will give a new insight into policy 
implications relevant to stragetic planning and operative management of scarce labor 
resources to achieve both better quality and greater efficiency.  Future policy should be 
developed by emphasizing on the increased productivity or the effective use of staff and non-
staff resources.     
Second, it is worthwhile to note that the analyses presented in Chapter VII depict 
financial uncertainty threatened by introducing new mandatory staffing regulations, which 
may impede facility administrators’ ability to provide high quality of care.  In order to 
achieve the benefits of mandatory staffing standards, the federal and state governments 
should determine the additional costs and may need to develop a plan to adequately fund the 
required increases in staffing levels. 
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Third, simulation results suggest that even a small change in total staff hours among 
low-staff facilities is leading to a substantial impact on the onset of adverse outcomes.  The 
findings of this study can contribute to the determination of specific staffing standards to 
improve quality of care, which is a priority area of workforce policy.  However, the success 
of this policy will depend on other quality initiatives such as developing training standards, 
staff education, and retention strategies.  Federal and state governments should continue 
efforts to reduce staff turnover and stabilize the workforce. 
Fourth, and more importantly, the state survey process and enforcement activities are 
known to vary widely across states.  As the findings from calculated compliance rates 
confirm, a number of facilities appear to operate at staffing levels below the mandated levels 
(though caution must be used here, as this comparison was based on the standards for the 
facilities with 100 beds) (see Section 5.2).  Quality differences may be caused by variation in 
enforcement rather than directly from the effects of mandated staffing standards.  It is 
important that the federal and state governments should conduct monitoring and enforcement 
of federal and state laws and regulations in order to deter poor quality of care in nursing 
homes. 
Finally, from a methodological perspective, this study corrects for possible bias from 
the previous studies by using different model specifications including a facility-level fixed 
effects and a fixed effects with instrumental variables approach.  This better designed study 
helps to identify the causal relationship between staffing and quality of care, and it is 
therefore useful for understanding the contributions of staffing level to the quality of nursing 
home care.   
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9.3.  Limitations and Future Research 
In each of the three analyses, the results as well as several limitations provide 
motivation for future research.  First, the use of OSCAR data aggregated at the facility-level 
may not reflect the true resident-level case mix and severity, or quality of care.  The use of 
facility-level data may mask some relationships, so research using resident-level data and a 
broad array of outcomes would be beneficial.   
Second, the main policy variables (i.e., transition and steady state effects) appear to 
capture the different legislation changes.  It is important to note that the dummy policy 
variables used in this study are not sufficient to control for the intensity of minimum staffing 
standards or repeated changes.  For example, three states (Arkansas, Delaware, and 
Oklahoma) changed legislation more than once during the study period from 1998 to 2001.  
The measurement of state specificity in the legislation and regulations to reflect intensity or 
level of required staffing may produce more robust results in future studies.   
Third, the main analysis strategy to assess the effects of MSS involves a facility-level 
DD approach, which controls for the unobserved facility-specific time-invariant factors that 
differ across homes over time.  Even though the DD estimation strategy controls for many of 
the unobserved and potential confounding factors, those factors could also have contributed 
to improving nursing home performance (e.g., staffing, quality of care, financial 
performance) over the same time period.  Then the inconsistency in effects (e.g., 
improvements in quality in some facilities without improvements in staffing) might be due to 
omitted time-varying facility, market, and state factors that are highly correlated with policy 
changes.  The DD parameter estimates will be biased if states which change staffing 
standards in a given year are also more likely to change other public health laws.  Indeed, 
many states put in place other quality initiatives at the same time as they changed their 
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staffing standards.  Another concern is that the changes in state minimum staffing standards 
may be endogenous to some unobserved quality-related shocks such as a reaction to publicity 
about quality problems in nursing homes, which could cause bias in the assessment of the 
effect of the policies.  Potential endogeneity bias regarding implementation of MSS should 
be tested for and controlled for in the future research.  
Fourth, since financial data from MCR for nursing homes do not undergo systematic 
audits, financial measures might not be completely accurate and could be manipulated.  
Some multi-facility chains might move profits among facilities or into centralized 
management functions not noted in the facility-level data.  Future research could examine the 
financial pressures with more accurate financial data to improve the validity of the 
assessments if such data are available. 
Fifth, one important mechanism to affect nursing home performance derived within 
the conceptual framework in this study is whether nursing homes charge higher prices 
(especially to their private pay residents) to match the additional costs as quality rises.  
Differences in financial performance at some facilities are possibly due in part to enhancing 
revenues from their private pay residents either by higher prices or more intense utilization of 
services to private pay residents.  However, the data in this analysis do not allow for 
investigating any changes in private payment rates or revenues.  The investigation of changes 
in prices and revenues by payer type or cost center would be useful to understanding nursing 
home behavior.  
Lastly, since quality and profit are fundamental but also potentially conflicting 
objectives, nursing homes indeed respond to minimum staffing standards differently in order 
to achieve the optimal combination of non-pecuniary benefits and monetary wealth for the 
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home.  Staffing is the largest element of costs for most nursing homes and, at the same time, 
staffing is an obvious mechanism by which financial decisions and the nursing home’s 
operational context can impact quality (O’Neill et al., 2003).  The nursing homes’ structural 
decisions on input uses in response to minimum staffing standards will consequently affect 
quality of care and the financial performance in nursing homes.  Differences in financial 
performance may result in differences in quality of care produced and vice versa.  Therefore, 
particular attention should be paid to the potential association between quality and financial 
performance.   
Prior empirical works suggest two conflicting expectations as to the relationship 
between quality and financial performance.  One view shows the conventional trade-off 
between quality and financial outcomes in that cost containment efforts mainly through 
reducing staffing levels may be producing unintended adverse effects on quality of care 
(Cohen and Dubay, 1990; Gertler and Waldman, 1992; Kooreman, 1994; O’Neill et al., 
2003).  Given that the nursing home industry is dominated by for-profit facilities, nursing 
homes have strong incentives to choose the cost-minimizing combination of staffing and 
non-staffing input resources.   
The other set of prior evidence supports that health care quality could be increased 
without increasing costs.  That is, efficiency gains could be possible.  Similarly, as described 
earlier, facilities could differ in terms of their ability to charge higher prices (especially to 
their private pay residents) to match the additional costs as quality rises.  Recent research 
support that nursing homes with higher quality may experience better financial performance 
through their ability to generate higher revenues and reduce costs (Blank and Eggink, 2001; 
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Knox et al., 2003; Laine et al., 2005; Mukamel and Spector, 2000; Weech-Maldonado et al., 
2004).     
Although it is important to identify any causal pathway between quality and financial 
performance, this relationship is not examined in this study due to difficulty in controlling for 
quality being endogenous with financial performance.  An integrative perspective which 
explores the relationship between quality of care and financial performance may be insightful.  
Future work could explore these relationships from a cost-effectiveness perspective (e.g., 
cost per improvement in outcome quality attained). 
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